



HISTORY *of the*
43rd DIVISION
ARTILLERY



192nd Field Artillery Battalion



152nd Field Artillery Battalion



103rd Field Artillery Battalion



169th Field Artillery Battalion

HISTORY *of the* 43RD DIVISION ARTILLERY



WORLD WAR II
1941-1945

by

HAROLD R. BARKER

Brig. Gen. A.U.S. (Ret.)

D
769.3
.43d
B26

Printed in the United States of America by
JOHN F. GREENE CO., INC. PROVIDENCE, R. I.

DEDICATION

To those who fell while fighting for their
Country and to all others who served in the
43rd Division Artillery during World War II.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
LIST OF MAPS, CHARTS & OVERLAYS	x
ILLUSTRATIONS	xi
FOREWORD	xii
PREFACE	xiii
THE AUTHOR	xiv
INTRODUCTION	xvii
CHRONOLOGY	xviii

PAGE

CHAPTER I	3
---------------------	---

ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION ARTILLERY

CHAPTER II	9
----------------------	---

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

Camp Blanding, March-July 1941 — Louisiana Maneuvers, August-September 1941 — Carolina Maneuvers, October-November 1941 — Pearl Harbor, December, 1941 — Reorganization — Camp Shelby, February 1942 — Fort Ord, September 1942 — Voyage to New Zealand, October 1942.

CHAPTER III	22
-----------------------	----

NEW ZEALAND (October 1942)

Military Situation — 172d Regimental Combat Team — Training in New Zealand — Movement Orders.

CHAPTER IV	26
----------------------	----

NEW CALEDONIA (December 1942)

Defense of New Caledonia — Training Program — Jungle Warfare — Movement to Guadalcanal.

CHAPTER V	29
GUADALCANAL (February 1943) — RUSSELL ISLANDS (Feb.-June 1943)	
Guadalcanal — Russell Islands — The Artillery Plan of Operations — Training Program — Warning Orders for the New Georgia Operation — Planning Phase — Advance Reconnaissance Parties — Movement Order — Roster — Organization of the Japanese Force in the Central Solomons.	
CHAPTER VI	48
THE NEW GEORGIA OFFENSIVE — OPERATION TOENAILS	
30 June 1943 — 23 January 1944	
MUNDA CAMPAIGN — BAANGA ISLAND — ARUNDEL —	
KOLOMBANGARA — DEFENSE OF NEW GEORGIA	
CHAPTER VII	116
RETURN TO NEW ZEALAND (February 1944)	
CHAPTER VIII	124
NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN (July-Dec. 1944)	
Aitape Operation — Movement to Aitape — Operations of Persecution Task Force — Driniumor River Line, Tadjik Defense Perimeter — Preparation for invasion of Luzon.	
CHAPTER IX	142
LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN (9 January-6 Sept. 1945)	
Japanese Situation in the Philippines in 1944 — Battle of Luzon: The Preparation Phase, The Amphibious Movement, The Seizure of the Beachhead, The Stotsenburg Action, The Turning of the Shimbu Line, The Ipo Dam Operation. Reports and Conclusions.	
CHAPTER X	231
JAPAN AND CONCLUSION (7 Sept.-23 October 1945)	
APPENDICES	234
APPENDIX A. 43d Inf. Div. Casualties	
APPENDIX B. Roll of Honor	
APPENDIX C. Citations and Decorations	
APPENDIX D. Acknowledgments	
APPENDIX E. Bibliography	
APPENDIX F. Notes	

LIST OF MAPS, CHARTS AND OVERLAYS

	Facing Page
CHRONOLOGY	xviii
PACIFIC AREAS	20
THE SOLOMON ISLANDS	28
RUSSELL ISLANDS	30
NEW GEORGIA OPERATION	
Supporting Artillery Fires, Attack, 9 July 1943	50
Artillery Positions and Zone of Action, Attack, 25 July 1943	58
Daily Progress of Infantry Units, 7 July to 5 Aug. 1943	62
Schedule of Fires for Attack, 13 Sept. 1943	94
Baanga & Arundel Operations. The Final Phase and Shelling of Kolombangara, 5 Aug. to 5 Oct. 1943	96
Location of Artillery Units, New Georgia Operation 30 June to 5 Oct. 1943	100
NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN. Tadjil Defense Artillery, 8 Aug. 1944	132
LUZON CAMPAIGN	
S-2 Jap Information	144
Positions, Zones of Responsibility and Check Points Annex #1 to FO. #1, 24 Nov. 1944	148
Disposition of Div. Art. and Attached Units, Lingayen Gulf Area, 9 Jan. to 13 Feb. 1945	158
Disposition of Div. Art. and Attached Units, the Bamban Operation (Stotsenburg Action) March 1945	166
Turning the Shimbu Line, 12 March 1945	170
Disposition of Div. Art. and Attached Units, Shimbu Line, Sheet #1, 13 March to 1 May 1945	174
Disposition of Div. Art. and Attached Units, Shimbu Line, Sheet #2, 13 March to 1 May 1945	176
S-2 Situation Map, IPO Dam Operation, 29 April 1945	188
Art. Positions of Div. Art. and Attached Units, IPO Dam Operation, 2 May to 12 June 1945	192
Layout C Battery 181 F.A. 19 Jan. 1945	202
INVASION OF JAPAN	
Artillery Plan for Attack, Olympic Operation, 5 Aug. 1945	230

[x]

ILLUSTRATIONS

UNIT INSIGNIAS — 43RD DIVISION ARTILLERY	<i>Frontispiece</i>
	Facing Pages
BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROLD R. BARKER	2
DIVISION ARTILLERY STAFF — BATTALION COMMANDERS	18, 19
THE SINKING OF THE "COOLIDGE"	46
JAPANESE DEFENDERS, NEW GEORGIA	47
NEW GEORGIA OPERATION	56, 57
NEW GEORGIA OPERATION	80, 81
NEW GEORGIA OPERATION	106, 107
NEW GEORGIA OPERATION	114, 115
NEW GEORGIA OPERATION	116, 117
NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN	124, 125
LUZON CAMPAIGN	142, 143
DIVISION ARTILLERY STAFF — BATTALION COMMANDERS	196, 197
LUZON CAMPAIGN	216, 217
LUZON CAMPAIGN	228, 229
DECORATIONS	246, 247


FOREWORD

To the Officers and Men of the
43D DIVISION ARTILLERY:

During its entire period of service in World War II it was my privilege to serve as Commander of the 43d Division Artillery.

It is indeed an honor to be identified with an organization whose members displayed such outstanding courage and ingenuity during some of the toughest amphibious and jungle warfare of World War II.

Your conspicuous record speaks for itself. It will serve as an inspiration for those who follow.


Brig. Gen. A.U.S. (Ret.)

PREFACE

This history of the 43d Division Artillery in World War II has been compiled as a permanent record for friends of the organization. Its original members were National Guardsmen who had enlisted because they liked army work and wanted to be identified with units rich in military tradition. Those who later joined the Division Artillery lived up to the high standards set by the parent unit in previous wars.

In addition, this history may well prove useful in the education of artillerymen in the future. Because the fundamentals of artillery have not changed, their application in amphibious and jungle warfare, as described in this book, should be of value to the artillery student. Quoting from a Department of the Army pamphlet: "Heeding the inscription carved in stone at the entrance to the National Archives — 'What is past is prologue' — the soldier must be rooted in the past to understand the present, that he may project himself into the future."

Finally, this history was made possible by the bravery and endurance of the troops, the knowledge and resourcefulness of their commanders and the cooperation of the respective staffs.

DECEMBER, 1960

H. R. BARKER
Brig. Gen. A.U.S. (Ret.)

CONCERNING THE AUTHOR

Rhode Island, the Mother of Batteries, has a long roll of her sons who have distinguished themselves as artillery commanders on the nation's battlefields in three wars. It is entirely fitting that one such artilleryman — a commander in two wars — should write the history of the 43d Division Artillery's participation in World War II. No one better exemplifies the artillery tradition of the State of Rhode Island than the author of the present volume — Major General Harold R. Barker.

General Barker, whose father, also a Rhode Island artilleryman, commanded Battery A during the Spanish-American War, began his military career on 3 March 1913 when he enlisted in Battery A of the Rhode Island Field Artillery. Commissioned as a Second Lieutenant on 15 October 1915, he was called into Federal Service in June 1916 and served with Battery A on the Mexican Border. On the entrance of the United States into World War I, Battery A became the nucleus of the First Battalion of the 103d Field Artillery Regiment of the 26th (Yankee) Division; General Barker, in various assignments, participated in all of the engagements of the regiment. These include defense missions in the Chemin-des-Dames, Toul and Champagne-Marne Sectors, and the offensive engagements of Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne. For gallantry in action General Barker, then a Captain, was awarded the Silver Star.

Between World Wars General Barker, in the best tradition of the citizen soldier, perfected his knowledge of the tactics and techniques of field artillery in the Organized Reserves and the National Guard. On 14 January 1930, with the grade of Colonel he was appointed to and assumed command of the 103d Field Artillery Regiment, a part of the 43d Division.

CONCERNING THE AUTHOR

The 43d was composed of national guard troops from the states of Maine, Vermont, Connecticut and Rhode Island. On 19 February 1937 General Barker was appointed a Brigadier General and took command of the 68th Field Artillery Brigade of the 43rd Division.

On 24 February 1941 the 43d Division was inducted into Federal Service, and moved to Camp Blanding, Florida. There the artillery of the Division began the arduous and protracted training under General Barker which was to pay such rich dividends in bitter combat in the Pacific Theater campaigns in the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, and the Philippines. During the months of training, in camp, on the range or in maneuvers, General Barker showed himself as a meticulous organizer of training, adamant in his insistence on high performance of duty. In combat he displayed excellent tactical and strategic skill, shrewdness and imagination in solving the unforeseen problems of artillery in island and jungle warfare. His insistence on seeing for himself very often found him at or forward of the infantry elements of the division. The telling efficiency of the artillery fire of the division won ungrudging praise from senior officers of the Regular Army and the Marine Corps, and led to the appointment of General Barker as acting commander of the XIV Corps Artillery comprising the battalions of the 25th, 37th, 43d divisions and Marine Corps Artillery employed during the New Georgia operations. At the conclusion of the operation General Barker received the personal and professional thanks of Major General Oscar W. Griswold, Commanding General of the XIV Corps. General Barker was a welcome and frequent sight to the enlisted men of the division who were fighting up forward where the going was rough.

A grateful government has recognized General Barker's bravery, professional expertness, and leadership by many decorations. He wears the Silver Star with oak-leaf cluster,

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

the Legion of Merit with oak-leaf cluster, the Bronze Star and the Air Medal. Upon his return to Rhode Island he was awarded the Rhode Island Cross for Valor and Meritorious Service, on 3 October 1945.

The present history of the 43rd Division Artillery is a somewhat profane labor of love by General Barker who displayed the same persistence in accumulating materials and organizing them that in days gone by brought such credit to his country, his state and himself.

ROBERT W. KENNY
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.R. (Ret)

INTRODUCTION

The facts and data for this history came from the Division Artillery files and the Operations Reports of the respective Units. The Division Artillery Operations Reports prepared by Col. E. W. Berry, S-3, Div. Arty., were used extensively in the preparation of this History. All existing Histories pertaining to operations participated in by the Division Artillery were carefully checked and valuable information from these was used as noted in the text and Bibliography.

It is regretted that a complete Roster of all members of the Division Artillery could not be included in this History. Due to the large number of men who served in this organization over a period of more than five years and the inaccuracies and omissions which were bound to occur, it was felt that this important feature should be omitted. *Nevertheless let it be stated here that, without the men whose names do not appear in this publication, there would have been no history or record of accomplishment.*

Military Titles used in the manuscript are those that applied during World War II.

As all original members were National Guardsmen and replacements were from the Reserve, it is of interest to note that only one Regular Army Officer was assigned to the Division Artillery during the entire War and that he was reassigned to the European Theater of Operations before the Division entered combat. This Regular Army Officer, Major James A. Costain, was an excellent Field Artilleryman. After reporting for duty in the European Theater he was killed during the Normandy Landing.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

THE ROLL OF THE ARTILLERY IN BATTLE

At no time during World War II did the Artillery of the 43d Infantry Division lose sight of its Mission, i.e., *the support of its Infantry in Combat*.

The *Infantry*, the 'Queen of Battles', has the most difficult the most dangerous and the most important mission of all the ground force troops in combat.

Instead of paying verbal tribute to its Infantry the Division Artillery seized every opportunity to give its entire physical support to the Infantry to which it was assigned. By the use of liaison detachments, forward observers, communication and survey details, continual contact was made at all times with front line Infantry units.

The development of the *Infantry — Artillery Team* was paramount and the records attest to the success of this organization.

Morale played an important part in the success of the Artillery support. The genuine achievement and heroic traditions established by New England Artillery in our previous Wars resulted in setting a standard that was second to none.

The importance of the Artillery in Battle might be covered by a cynical maxim of Napoleon's: "God fights on the side with the best Artillery".

GEORGIA ZEALAND GUINEA
GEORGIA DEFENSE cer Candidate School RN TO NEW ZEALAND Replacements and pment
ning
d Maneuvers at Rotorua Infantry and Artillery ge
c Orders Recieved for Guinea Campaign
GUINEA CAMPAIGN ce Operation lumor River Line
l Defense Perimeter
ning
Air Observation meter Defense Exercises ntry-Artillery Maneuvers orps Inspection rps Inspection aration for Invasion of a, Philippine Islands

1945	LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS JAPAN UNITED STATES
JAN	[LUZON CAMPAIGN Amphibious Movement
FEB	[Beach Head
MAR	[Stotsenberg Action Turning the Shimbu Line
APR	[
MAY	[IPO Dam Operation
JUN	[Mt Oro - Mt Ayaas
JUL	[CABANATUAN Plans for Operation Against Japanese Home Empire
AUG	[JAPAN SURRENDERS
SEP	[MOVEMENT TO YOKOHAMA, JAPAN KUMAGAYA
OCT	MOVEMENT TO SAN FRANCISCO, USA Camp Stoneman, California

THE HISTORY



BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROLD R. BARKER

HISTORY OF THE 43d DIVISION ARTILLERY

CHAPTER I

ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION ARTILLERY

IN 1930 Rhode Island received the allotment of the 68th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters and on 7 March of that year Federal recognition was extended to the Headquarters 68th Field Artillery Brigade which was organized under the command of Brig. Gen. Herbert R. Dean.

The Artillery of the 43d Infantry Division then consisted of the following units:

Headquarters 68th Field Artillery Brigade of Rhode Island
Headquarters Battery of Maine

103d F. A. Regiment of Rhode Island	(75mm Guns)
152d F. A. Regiment of Maine	(75mm Guns)
192d F. A. Regiment of Connecticut	(155mm Howitzer)

Many of the batteries in the three regiments had distinguished artillery records and unit traditions, won on many battlefields in World War I and the Civil War. As a result of these records and traditions a morale was developed over the years which helped carry these organizations through combat and finally to victory in World War II. The following was the organization and partial assignment of officers in 1930:

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Hqs. 68th F. A. Brigade	
Brig. Gen. Herbert R. Dean	C. G.
Maj. C. Gordon MacLeod	Brigade Ex.
Capt. Frank Mauran Jr.	S-1
Capt. E. C. Pearson	S-3
1st Lt. John S. Blair	Aide
2d Lt. Leon P. Sutton	S-4
2d Lt. Arthur S. Hassell	S-2
Capt. E. V. Cleaves	C. O. Hq. Bty.
103d F. A. Regiment	
Col. Harold R. Barker	C. O.
Lt. Col. Francis W. Rollins	Regt. Ex.
Maj. Hugh S. McLeod	C. O. 1st Bn.
Maj. Earle W. Chandler	C. O. 2d Bn.
152d F. A. Regiment	
Col. Herbert L. Bowen	C. O.
Lt. Col. John F. Choate	Regt. Ex.
Maj. Thomas P. Packard	C. O. 1st Bn.
Maj. Frank Silliman 3rd	C. O. 2d Bn.
192d F. A. Regiment	
Col. Otto H. Schroeter	C. O.
Lt. Col. George J. Schoen	Regt. Ex.
Maj. Laurence B. McEwen	C. O. 1st Bn.
Maj. Arthur D. Wood	C. O. 2d Bn.
Maj. Kieran Harford	C. O. 3d Bn.

FIELD TRAINING

The Headquarters 68th F. A. Brigade took its annual tour of field training over the years as follows:

- 1931 Tobyhanna, Pa. Organization of Staff.
- 1932 Camp Keyes, Maine, with 43d Division Hq.
- 1933 Fort Devens, Mass., with 103d F. A.
- 1934 Quonset Point, R. I., with 43d Division Hq.
- 1935 As part of the 43d Division, the 68th F. A. Brigade participated in the First Army Maneuvers in the vicinity of Pine Camp, New York. This was the first large-scale peacetime maneuver since World War I. Over 40,000 National Guard and Regular troops were employed.
- 1936 The Federal report of this tour of duty praised the Brigade Commander for the superior quality of his leadership and the fitness of the Headquarters for field service.
- 1937 In January Brig. Gen. Herbert R. Dean, at his request, was relieved of command of the 68th F. A. Brigade and was succeeded by Col. Harold R. Barker of the 103d Field Artillery. In February 1937 Col. Barker received his promotion to Brigadier General.

ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION

- 1938 Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, with 43d Division and 68th F. A. Brigade, less 103d F. A.
- 1939 The Brigade Headquarters, with the 43d Division, again participated in the First Army maneuvers held at Plattsburg, N. Y. and vicinity. Seven additional days of field training also were taken on weekends in Rhode Island.
- 1940 The Brigade participated in maneuvers in the Watertown-Madison Barracks-Pine Camp-Plattsburg Concentration Area, N. Y. as part of the 43d Division. During the week prior to the maneuvers service practice was held at Camp Edwards, Falmouth, Mass.
- 1941 On 21 February the Brigade, as part of the 43d Division, was inducted into Federal Service for the purpose of training for one year.

ORGANIZATION & OFFICER ASSIGNMENT, 21 FEBRUARY, 1941

The following was the organization and partial assignment of officers on 21 February, 1941.

DIVISION COMMANDER, Maj. Gen. Morris B. Payne
85TH INF. BRIG., Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Troland
86TH INF. BRIG., Gen. Leonard F. Wing
68TH F. A. BRIG., Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker

HEADQUARTERS F. A. BRIG. STAFF

Lt. Col. Zenas R. Bliss, Executive	
Lt. Col. Edward W. Berry	S-3
Capt. Bernard F. Redihan	S-2
Capt. Leon P. Sutton	S-4
Capt. E. V. Cleaves	Comm. O.
1st Lt. Richard N. Rainey	Asst. S-3
1st Lt. Andrew Staley	Adjutant, S-1
1st Lt. Philip Miller	Asst. S-2
1st Lt. James R. Ruhlin	Aide (Sr.)
2d Lt. D. N. Kirkland	Aide (Jr.)
2d Lt. W. D. Stewart	Asst. Comm. O.

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

Capt. E. V. Cleaves	C. O.
2d Lt. C. E. Remick	
2d Lt. W. D. Stewart	

103D FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT

Col. Francis W. Rollins	C. O.
Lt. Col. Hugh S. McLeod	Exec.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

Capt. Phillip Rose C. O.

1ST BATTALION

Lt. Col. William B. McCormick C. O.

Maj. Stephen L. Nichols Exec.

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY 1st Lt. Raymond N. Lee C. O.

BATTERY A Capt. Waldo H. Fish C. O.

BATTERY B Capt. Robert E. Lee C. O.

BATTERY C Capt. Howard F. Williams C. O.

SERVICE BATTERY Capt. Ernest J. Woods C. O.

2D BATTALION

Lt. Col. Chester A. Files C. O.

Maj. Mark P. Rancourt Exec.

BATTERY D 1st Lt. George F. Bashaw C. O.

BATTERY E Capt. William N. Bailey C. O.

BATTERY F Capt. Mario DeMaio C. O.

SERVICE BATTERY 1st Lt. Bradford A. Clark

152D FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT

Col. John F. Choate C. O.

Lt. Col. Frank Silliman 3rd Exec.

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

Capt. Leslie C. Hartz C. O.

1ST BATTALION

Lt. Col. George W. Putnam C. O.

Maj. Byron H. Smith Exec.

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY Capt. Edmund D. White C. O.

BATTERY A Capt. Raymond M. Keirstead C. O.

BATTERY B Capt. Herbert L. Ketch C. O.

BATTERY C Capt. Clifford L. Dean C. O.

SERVICE BATTERY 1st Lt. Ray M. Astle C. O.

2D BATTALION

Lt. Col. Norman E. Whitney C. O.

Maj. Earl W. Bowen Exec.

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY Capt. Mills D. Barber, Jr. C. O.

BATTERY D Capt. Paul L. Pooler C. O.

BATTERY E Capt. Walter F. Ulmer C. O.

BATTERY F 1st Lt. Lynwood W. Fisher C. O.

SERVICE BATTERY Capt. O'Dillion C. Turner C. O.

192D FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT

Col. George J. Schoen C. O.

Lt. Col. Kieran Harford Exec.

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

Capt. Ralph D. Briggs C. O.

1ST BATTALION

Lt. Col. Laurence B. McEwen C. O.

ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY	Capt. Carl W. Young	C. O.
BATTERY A	Capt. Norman B. Peck	C. O.
BATTERY B	Capt. Charles E. Anderson, Jr.	C. O.
BATTERY C	Capt. James R. Case	C. O.
ANTI-TANK BATTERY	Capt. Louis M. Freedom	C. O.

SERVICE BATTERY	Capt. Frank R. Peck	C. O.
2D BATTALION		
Lt. Col. Arthur D. Wood	C. O.	
Maj. Reuben H. King	Exec.	

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY	Capt. Raymond G. Kells	C. O.
BATTERY D	Capt. Willis E. Woodin	C. O.
BATTERY E	Capt. Walter M. Mitchell	C. O.
BATTERY F	Capt. Adolph H. Nelson	C. O.
ANTI-TANK BATTERY	1st Lt. Thomas J. Conlin	C. O.
SERVICE BATTERY	Capt. John J. Cahill	C. O.

CURRENT EVENTS

The intensification of field training in 1939 and 1940 is better understood in the light of the following events of World War II.

EUROPE

On 1 September 1939 forty-four regular German divisions, including mechanized and motorized formations, crossed the German-Polish frontier with the intention of destroying the armed forces of the Polish State. Within three weeks Poland was conquered.

On 3 September 1939 Britain and France declared war on Germany.

On 10 May 1940 the German Western Armies, which had meanwhile been training up to a very high standard, attacked along their entire front. As early as 14 May the Dutch Army was forced to lay down its arms. Just two weeks later the Belgian armed forces surrendered. This forced the British Expeditionary Force back to the coast, and by 4 June the greater part of the British divisions had been

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

transported back to England, together with rather smaller French and Belgian forces.

On 10 June 1940 Italy came into the war on the side of Germany.

On 14 June 1940 Paris was declared an open city and occupied by the German Army.

On 17 June 1940 the French premier, Marshal Petain, was compelled to seek armistice terms which were signed on 25 June.

In a campaign that lasted only forty-four days the German Armies had defeated the Armies of France, Belgium and Holland and had occupied most of metropolitan France. Only one of their enemies had not been knocked out of the War: England.¹

THE PACIFIC

In the Pacific the menacing preparations of Japan were regarded as a possible preface to attacks upon British and Dutch possessions in the Far East and upon the Philippines, Hawaii and the Panama Canal. Aggression in Indo-China gave unmistakable evidence of Japan's plan to enlarge her empire at the expense of weaker countries.²

In 1937 Japan began its war against the Chinese by the occupation of Peiping, China. Our sympathies in favor of the Chinese were more and more openly expressed until 26 November 1941 when relations between the United States and Japan became seriously strained. From then on the situation deteriorated rapidly until, on 7 December Japan, without warning and with complete disregard for the rules of international warfare, attacked the American Naval Base at Pearl Harbor on Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands. The defenses of Pearl Harbor were caught completely by surprise resulting in the almost fatal damage to the United States Navy.

¹For all Notes throughout the manuscript see Appendix F, Notes, Page 251.

CHAPTER II

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

Camp Blanding, March-July 1941
Louisiana Maneuvers, August-September 1941
Carolina Maneuvers, October-November 1941
Pearl Harbor, December 1941
Reorganization of Division
Camp Shelby, February 1942
Ford Ord, September 1942
Voyage to New Zealand, October 1942

CAMP BLANDING (March 1941)

CAMP BLANDING, the site selected for the 43d Division, located six miles from Starke, Florida and situated on Kingsley Lake, was to be the base camp and training area for the 43d Division from New England and the 31st Division from Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. By the end of March 1941 the division had completed its combined rail and motor movement to Blanding and a thirteen weeks basic training program was started. On 14 May and again on 16 June the IV Corps, of which the 43d Division was a part, conducted inspections of the basic training of the 68th F. A. Brigade. Deficiencies shown were corrected. Although the artillery range at Camp Blanding was limited in range and observation, service practice was conducted at every opportunity.

LOUISIANA MANEUVERS (August-September 1941)

The 43d Division, as part of the IV Corps, participated in the Third Army Maneuvers in Louisiana. The 68th F. A. Brigade carried out its normal tactical missions as part of an infantry division. The following subjects were emphasized: *Mobility*, to include day and night marches, both tactical and non-tactical; *Reconnaissance & Occupation of Positions*; *Artillery Support of Infantry*; *Communications* and *Planning of Artillery Fires*. The maneuvers included

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

both offensive and defensive operations. Upon the completion of the maneuvers the 43d Division returned to Camp Blanding, Florida.

CAROLINA MANEUVERS (October-November 1941)

The 43d Division, again as part of the IV Corps, operated with the First Army in the Carolinas. All of the methods emphasized in previous maneuvers were again stressed and special attention was given to forward observation, liaison, and the building up of the Infantry-Artillery team. At the conclusion of the maneuvers the Artillery Brigade Commander at the end of his critique made this comment: "The 68th F. A. Brigade has just completed two field maneuvers and has performed in a manner which is a credit to itself and to its division. It has demonstrated its ability and officers and men alike should be proud of their identification." By the first of December the 43d Division had returned to Camp Blanding.

PEARL HARBOR (7 December 1941)

On 7 December 1941 the Japanese attacked the United States Naval installations at Pearl Harbor and war was declared. Three days later the German Government declared war on the United States of America. At this point the one year's induction into Federal Service for training of the 43d Division terminated and its members were in for the duration of the war.

REORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION

In January 1942 the Secretary of War directed that the 43d Infantry Division be reorganized from a *square* to a *triangular* division at once. This called for the following changes within the artillery of the division.

The 68th F. A. Brigade was disbanded, with the Head-

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

quarters and Headquarters Battery being redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 43d Division Artillery.

The 103d F. A. Regiment was disbanded. The 1st Battalion was redesignated as 103d F. A. Battalion and 2d Battalion redesignated as the 169th F. A. Battalion. The 103d F. A. Hq. Btry. redesignated as 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop.

The 152d F. A. Regiment was disbanded and the 2d Battalion redesignated as the 152d F. A. Battalion.

The 192d F. A. Regiment was disbanded and the 2d Battalion redesignated as the 192d F. A. Battalion. The 192d F. A. Hq. Btry. consolidated with present Pioneer Co. 643d Tank Destroyer Bn. and designated as Pioneer Co. 643d Tank Destroyer Bn.

Units not retained in the 43d Division were redesignated and assigned to other organizations outside the division.

This reorganization changed the artillery within the division from an artillery brigade with three regiments to the 43d Division Artillery with four battalions; three light, direct support battalions and a medium, general support battalion. The infantry was similarly reduced in size from two infantry brigades totaling four regiments to three infantry regiments.

This drastic reorganization resulted in the loss of many of our best and most experienced officers and non-commissioned officers. These officers and men over the years were proportionately responsible for the organization and high standard of training developed in the artillery units up to this date. The training and tradition of these officers and the enlisted men who went with them to other units during the war equalled the high standards and traditions of their parent organizations. The artillery officers retained in the 43d Division were selected on the basis of seniority.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

The following is a partial assignment of officers of the division and division artillery after its reorganization.

Division Commander

Maj. Gen. John H. Hester

Assistant Division Commander

Brig. Gen. Leonard F. Wing

Division Artillery Commander

Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker

ROSTER OF OFFICERS 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

HQ. 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Harold R. Barker	Brig. Gen.	Commanding General
Francis W. Rollins	Col.	Exec.
George W. Hanley	Capt.	S-1
Henry L. Miller	Capt.	S-2 & R. O.
Philip L. Miller	1st Lt.	Asst. S-2 & Sur. Off.
Edward W. Berry	Lt. Col.	S-3
James R. Ruhlin	1st Lt.	Asst. S-3
Leon P. Sutton	Maj.	S-4
Walter I. Leland	Capt.	Div. Arty. Comm. O.
Charles E. Remick	2d Lt.	Asst. Div. Arty. C. O.
Herbert E. MacCombie	Lt. Col.	Chaplain
John F. Culliton	1st Lt.	Chaplain
Joseph C. Kent	Maj.	Div. Arty. Surgeon
Thos. A. Martin	Capt.	Asst. Div. Arty. Surgeon
George O. Vezina	Capt.	Div. Arty. Dental O.
Lawrence S. Palmer	1st Lt.	Asst. Div. Arty. Dent. O.
Edward W. Wild	2d Lt.	Senior Aide
David M. Twachtman	2d Lt.	Junior Aide
Harry E. Clark	W. O. (Jr. Gr.)	Bandmaster

HQ. BTRY. 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Walter I. Leland	Capt.	C. O. & Div. Arty. C. O.
Charles E. Remick	2d Lt.	Asst. Div. Arty. C. O.

HQ. 103D F. A. BN.

William B. McCormick	Lt. Col.	C. O.
Stephen L. Nichols	Maj.	Exec.
George B. Lomas	Capt.	S-1
John S. Blair, 3rd	Capt.	S-2 & R. O.
James W. Higson	1st Lt.	Asst. S-2
Robert W. Kenny	Maj.	S-3
Nathan M. Southwick	Capt.	Asst. S-3
Tilden B. Mason	2d Lt.	Personnel O.
Thomas A. Martin	Capt.	Bn. Surgeon

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

HQ. BTRY. 103^D F. A. BN.

William B. Foster	Capt.	C. O.
Warren K. Covill	1st Lt.	Ln. O. #1
	2d Lt.	Ln. O. #2

BTRY. A

George O. Hirsch	Capt.	C. O.
Johns H. Congdon	2d Lt.	Exec.
Kenneth O. Kullberg	1st Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

BTRY. B

Robert E. Lee	Capt.	C. O.
Robert W. Hyde	1st Lt.	Exec.
Thomas B. Peckham	1st Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

BTRY. C

Elwood J. Euart	Capt.	C. O.
	1st Lt.	Exec.
Lawrence M. Higgins	2d Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

SER. & AMM. BTRY.

Albin C. Stevens	Capt.	C. O. (S-4)
Charles L. Pollitt	2d Lt.	Mun. O.
Norman H. Bennett	2d Lt.	Motor O.

HQ. 169TH F. A. BN.

Chester A. Files	Lt. Col.	C. O.
Wilbur E. Bradt	Maj.	Exec.
John M. Watters	Capt.	S-1
Dixwell (NMI) Goff	Capt.	S-2 & R. O.
John T. Haney, Jr.	2d Lt.	Asst. S-2
Rene L. DeBlois	Maj.	S-3
Richard N. Rainey	Capt.	Asst. S-3
Edwin S. Knowles	2d Lt.	Personnel O.
Otto F. Rogers	Capt.	Bn. Surgeon

HQ. BTRY. 169TH F. A. BN.

Howard F. Brown	1st Lt.	C. O.
	1st Lt.	Ln. O. #1
	2d Lt.	Ln. O. #2

BTRY. A

George F. Bashaw	Capt.	C. O.
Edward J. Keegan	1st Lt.	Exec.
Michael J. Butler	2d Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

BTRY. B

William N. Bailey	Capt.	C. O.
Earl R. Davis, Jr.	1st Lt.	Exec.
William A. Farrell	2d Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

BTRY. C

Mario (NMI) DeMaio	Capt.	C. O.
Howard F. Bottomley	1st Lt.	Exec.
Francis A. McAuliffe	1st Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

SER. & AMM. BTRY.

Bradford A. Clark	Capt.	C. O. (S-4)
Robert E. Jones	2d Lt.	Motor Off.
James G. Conway	2d Lt.	Mun. Off.

HQ. 152D F. A. BN.

Norman E. Whitney	Lt. Col.	C. O.
Sherwin M. Ricker	Maj.	Exec.
Herman A. Peterson	Capt.	S-1
Arthur H. Norwood	Capt.	S-2 & R. O.
Thomas A. DeWolfe	2d Lt.	Asst. S-2
Waldo H. Fish	Maj.	S-3
	Capt.	Asst. S-3
Wallace B. Hobbs	2d Lt.	Personnel O.
	Capt.	Bn. Surgeon

HQ. BTRY. 152D F. A. BN.

Mills D. Barber, Jr.	Capt.	C. O.
John E. Ray	2d Lt.	Ln. O. #1
Kenneth W. Hurley	2d Lt.	Ln. O. #2

BTRY. A

Paul L. Pooler	Capt.	C. O.
Roger L. Averill	2d Lt.	Exec.
Harold A. Slager	1st Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

BTRY. B

Walter F. Ulmer	Capt.	C. O.
Frank W. Burns	1st Lt.	Exec.
Robert W. Hussey	2d Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

BTRY. C

William D. Tardiff	Capt.	C. O.
Winston R. Hurd	2d Lt.	Exec.
Norman H. Oliver	2d Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

SER. & AMM. BTRY.

Lynwood W. Fisher	Capt.	C. O.
Clairoy A. Tripp	2d Lt.	Motor O.
Donald G. McLaughlin	1st Lt.	Mun. O.

HQ. 192D F. A. BN.

George M. Hill	Lt. Col.	C. O.
Reuben H. King	Maj.	Exec.
Richard W. Fitch, Jr.	1st Lt.	S-1
George J. Renoff	Capt.	S-2 & R. O.
George T. Fielding III	2d Lt.	Asst. S-2
Willard A. McDonald	Maj.	S-3
	Capt.	Asst. S-3

HQ. BTRY. 192D F. A. BN.

Samuel F. Pierson	1st Lt.	C. O.
Donald N. Kirkland	2d Lt.	Ln. O. #1
	2d Lt.	Ln. O. #2

BTRY. A

Thomas I. Wilson	Capt.	C. O.
Spencer M. King	2d Lt.	Exec.
John G. Bernard	2d Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

BTRY. B

John J. Cahill	Capt.	C. O.
Hugh E. Ryan	1st Lt.	Exec.
Robert N. White	1st Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

BTRY. C

Raymond G. Kells	Capt.	C. O.
Milton P. Lewis	1st Lt.	Exec.
Anthony T. Papa	2d Lt.	R. O.
	2d Lt.	Asst. Exec.

SER. & AMM. BTRY.

Everett W. Robinson	Capt.	C. O.
Everett A. Mead	1st Lt.	Mun. O.
Henry G. Drinkwater	2d Lt.	Motor O.

CAMP SHELBY (February 1942)

On 8 February 1942, following the reorganization, the Division was ordered to move from Camp Blanding, Florida, to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and by 19 Feb. all units had completed this movement. Camp Shelby, located twelve miles

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

from Hattiesburg, Mississippi, was the former camp of the Mississippi National Guard.

TRAINING AT CAMP SHELBY

With the United States at war with Japan and Germany, training became more intensive and with definite objectives. The training program was carried out in the following sequence.

Reorganization Phase, 16 Feb. to 22 Feb.

Battery Training Phase, 23 Feb. to 1 Mar.

Preparation for G. H. Q. F. A. Battalion Firing Tests, 2 Mar. to 14 Mar.

G. H. Q. F. A. BATTALION FIRING TESTS, 15 Mar. to 1 April

These firing tests were the most exacting and important undergone by the Artillery of the Division and were repeated at every opportunity during the entire war, both in the United States and overseas. This Field Artillery Firing Program consisted of three phases as follows:

Test I stressed the speed with which positions could be occupied and targets of doubtful location attacked with bracket fire, and the massing of fires within the battalion.

Test II stressed the value of surprise effect on observed targets, and the ease and speed with which positions could be occupied and fire transferred on a photo map.

Test III stressed the survey necessary before metro data can be fired to maximum advantage, the value of old VE's and registration, and demonstrated the massing of fire of many battalions.

All Tests stressed the superiority of ricochet and time fire compared to percussion fire.

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

ARTILLERY DEMONSTRATION (28 March, 1942)

An artillery demonstration was given to the infantry of the division to show the infantry, whom we support, the effect of artillery fires. At this demonstration the coordination of the infantry and artillery weapons in the division was stressed.

INFANTRY BATTALION FIELD EXERCISE TACTICAL TESTS (2 May to 19 May)

Following the artillery demonstration, each of the nine infantry battalions in the division participated in a tactical field exercise during which it was supported by the artillery battalion which normally would support it in combat. These tests called for artillery firing over the heads of infantry personnel.

REPEAT OF G. H. Q. FIRING TEST III (1-2-3 July)

As G. H. Q. Test III was the one in which the Division Artillery obtained the lowest rating, it was repeated and an excellent rating was obtained.

INSPECTIONS

IV ARMY CORPS INSPECTION (18-19 June)

The purpose of this inspection was to check conduct of small unit training. Deficiencies noted were corrected.

THIRD ARMY INSPECTION (22-23 July)

The purpose of this inspection, similar to the IV Corps inspection, was to check conduct of unit training.

MATERIEL REPLACEMENT

While at Camp Shelby the old French 75mm guns of our direct support battalions were replaced with the new U. S. 105mm howitzers. The old 155mm Schneider howitzers, of World War I vintage, of the 192d F. A. Battalion were retained until after the New Georgia Operation.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE, DIVISION ARTILLERY (20 Aug.)

A revised Standing Operating Procedure, which reflected the results of all training, field maneuvers and the new division artillery organization was completed and issued on 20 Aug. 1942. By a thorough understanding of these procedures:

(a) Confusion and errors, especially under stress, are minimized.

(b) Operations as a whole are simplified, expedited and facilitated.

(c) Brevity in the issuing of orders is obtained, thus saving valuable time in combat.

(d) Teamwork is promoted between commanders, staffs, and troops. Special emphasis was given to the Infantry-Artillery teams.

The following subjects were covered in this S.O.P.

Infantry-Artillery Teams

Liaison

Combat Orders

Communications

Intelligence

Movement

Development for Combat

Combat

Standing Field Orders

Coordination of Supporting Fires

Administration

Motor Maintenance

Division Artillery Headquarters

LOSS OF TRAINED PERSONNEL

During our six months stay at Camp Shelby two hundred seventy-five (275) of our best non-commissioned officers were selected for Officer Candidate School and a large

Division Artillery Staff



Colonel Chester A. Files — Executive Officer.



Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Berry — S-3.

Division Artillery Staff



Major Leon P. Sutton — S-4.



Captain Walter I. Leland — Hdqrs. Battery Commander

Battalion Commanders



Colonel William B. McCormick — Division Artillery Staff, Executive
Commander, 103rd Field Artillery Battalion.




Lieutenant Colonel Norman E. Whitney — 152 F. A. Bn.

Battalion Commanders



Lieutenant Colonel Wilber E. Bradt,
169th Field Artillery Battalion — 152nd Field Artillery Battalion.



Lieutenant Colonel George M. Hill — 192nd Field Artillery Battalion.

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

number of both officers and men were transferred from the Division Artillery to form cadres in new divisions of the United States Army.

LEAVES

A policy on leaves permitted many men to visit their homes during the month of August.

MOVEMENT ORDERS FROM CAMP SHELBY, MISS. TO FORT ORD, CAL. (August 1942)

During the latter part of August orders were received to move the division from Camp Shelby, Mississippi, to Fort Ord, California.

Fort Ord, located near Monterey, California, was to be the final training and staging area before movement to the Port of Embarkation. By this time it was quite evident that, instead of going to the European Theater of Operations, as many had expected, the 43d Division was headed for the Pacific and the war with Japan.

FORT ORD, CALIFORNIA (September 1942)

TRAINING

The change in Theater of Operations from Europe to the Pacific called for no change in our basic training, but the application of these principles to Amphibious and Jungle Warfare had to be studied and applied before the division was ready for combat.

Artillery Firing was carried out during our entire stay at Fort Ord and consisted of conducting a series of modified Army Ground Force Tests. Small arms practice was also conducted by all members of division artillery.

PERSONNEL

Replacements of both officers and enlisted men were received to bring all units up to war strength.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

During this period Col. F. W. Rollins was promoted to Brigadier General and transferred to the 79th Division as artillery commander. Lt. Col. C. A. Files of the 169th F. A. Bn. was promoted to Colonel and assigned as Executive Officer of the division artillery in place of Colonel Rollins. Maj. Reuben H. King of the 192d F. A. Bn., the senior artillery major, was promoted to Lt. Colonel and assigned as commander of the 169th F. A. Bn.

EQUIPMENT

New articles of equipment were issued, shortages made up, and all supplies made ready for overseas shipment.

MOVEMENT TO PORT OF EMBARKATION

The troops of the 43d Division, less the 172d Combat Team, (which included the 103d F. A. Bn.), moved by train from Fort Ord to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation and were checked aboard ships on 29 September 1942.

THE VOYAGE TO NEW ZEALAND (October, 1942)

On 1 October a convoy of transports with the 43d Division (less the 172d Combat Team) aboard left San Francisco for New Zealand. The ships in the convoy were the *President Grant*, *Day Star* and the *Maui*, all United States ships; the *Tabinta*, the *Bloem Fontein*, and the *Boschfontein*, all of Dutch registry.

The Artillery of the division was loaded by Regimental Combat Team formation as follows:

169th Field Artillery Battalion with 169th Infantry
Regiment

152d Field Artillery Battalion with 103d Infantry
Regiment

192d Field Artillery Battalion with Division Artillery Hqs.

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

Although a complete training schedule had been drawn up, outside of study periods and calisthenics, little could be accomplished in training aboard ship because of lack of space on the crowded transports. After three weeks at sea, which included the crossing of the Equator, the convoy arrived in Auckland, New Zealand on 22 October 1942.

CHAPTER III

NEW ZEALAND (October 1942)

MILITARY SITUATION — 172D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM — TRAINING IN NEW ZEALAND — MOVEMENT ORDERS

UPON ARRIVAL in New Zealand on 22 October, the artillery of the division was stationed as follows:

(a) The Division Artillery Hqs. and 192d Field Artillery Battalion at Hildene 10 miles south of Auckland.

(b) The 169th F. A. Bn. with the 169th Infantry Regiment at Warkworth, 50 miles north of Auckland.

(c) The 152d F. A. Bn. with the 103d Infantry Regiment at Mangere Crossing, just south of Auckland.

MILITARY SITUATION

The military situation in the Pacific by 22 October was as follows:

The Japanese had completed their conquest of the Philippines with the surrender of Corregidor on 6 May 1942.

In view of the enemy's capabilities throughout the Pacific and the loss of the Philippines, the major effort of the United States was directed toward a rapid concentration of defense forces along our route to Australia.

The Japanese moved into the Solomon Islands in March 1942 and by 3 May occupied Tulagi.

Concurrently with the campaign to reduce the Philippines, the enemy had exploited his successes on the Malay Peninsula

NEW ZEALAND

to bring the entire Netherlands East Indies under his domination. Concentration of Japanese forces there and in the Bismarck Archipelago and Solomon Islands constituted a direct threat to our lines of communication in the Pacific and to the north coast of Australia.

On 2 July 1942 the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Allied forces in the Pacific to mount a limited offensive to halt the Japanese advance towards the line of communications from the United States to Australia and New Zealand.

On 7 August 1942 the U. S. Navy and Marine forces seized beachheads on Guadalcanal and Florida Islands and occupied Tulagi. By 22 October the highly prized airfield on Guadalcanal was held by the Marines after a long series of heavy air, sea and ground assaults by the enemy. If successful at Guadalcanal the next objectives of the Japanese were to have been the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji Islands and New Zealand.

THE 172D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM

On 6 October the 172d Regt. Combat Team left San Francisco aboard the U. S. Presidents Line's *President Coolidge*. Its destination was Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides Islands, one of the objectives of the Japanese in their expansion in the Pacific. As the *President Coolidge* was entering Pallikula Bay, Espiritu Santo Island at about 0945 on 26 October the great ship struck an allied mine in the field laid across the mouth of Segond Channel. The bridge called for full speed astern, but the way was too great and before it could be overcome a second mine exploded amidship.

The ship was beached on Espiritu Santo and the order to abandon ship was given. Prior to this all troops had been ordered back to their quarters.

In no instance was there any panic although isolated cases of fear were noted when men reached the bottom of the nets

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

and hesitated to drop into the oil covered water. These cases occurred principally among the troops who had received no amphibious training. Unit commanders promptly assumed the responsibility of caring for their commands, and all officers and men carried out their assigned duties with credit. This was particularly true of many junior officers and non-commissioned officers.

All batteries of the 103d F. A. Bn. were in fairly favorable locations for abandoning ship with the exception of Service Battery which was quartered on C Deck, forward. With the explosion of the second mine the public address system had gone out and this battery failed to get any orders. With the ship listing badly and the water rising on their deck, these men refused to move without orders.

When they were finally ordered out, the ship was listing so badly that only a few could escape up the main companion-way. The remainder went out through the starboard hatch onto the side of the hull. A rope was thrown down, and with the assistance of Warrant Officer Moshimer on the outside, and Captain Elwood J. Euart, Captain Warren K. Covill, and Lt. Ward D. MacDonald on the inside, all men were removed to safety.

After all men were out, Lt. MacDonald and then Capt. Covill went up the rope. Capt. Euart had previously tied the rope around his body to steady it for those going up. The ship by this time had keeled over on the port side until the decks were vertical.

Capt. Covill and W. O. Moshimer tried to raise Capt. Euart on the rope, but all three were physically exhausted. At about 1100 the ship slid off the reef on which it had been beached and sank in 400 feet of water, taking Capt. Euart with her. Capt. Covill and W. O. Moshimer were drawn down with the ship but came to the surface again and were picked up.

NEW ZEALAND

Capt. Euart was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Capt. Covill, Lt. MacDonald, and Warrant Officer Moshimer were awarded the Soldier's Medal. Technical Sergeant John S. Flanagan, Jr. was recommended for citation for courageous action above and beyond the call of duty.

All materiel including vitally needed equipment and stores went to the bottom with the ship.

The 103d F. A. Bn. at the time was commanded by Lt. Colonel William B. McCormick, who met the changing situations in a most efficient manner. For this conduct he received a letter of commendation from Commanding General, USAFISPA.

TRAINING IN NEW ZEALAND

The objective of the training period in New Zealand was preparation for combat under tropical conditions.

The following were emphasized:

- (a) Care of the individual in the jungle.
- (b) Intelligence bulletins containing the experiences of Marine officers who were present during part of action at Guadalcanal. Both artillery and infantry subjects were covered.

MOVEMENT ORDERS

On 4 November a Movement Order was issued and plans made to leave New Zealand for New Caledonia. Although the New Zealanders were most friendly and hospitable, the members of the division were anxious to get on with the war, and welcomed the order to move.

CHAPTER IV

NEW CALEDONIA (December 1942)

DEFENSE OF NEW CALEDONIA — TRAINING PROGRAM — JUNGLE WARFARE — MOVEMENT TO GUADALCANAL

NEW CALEDONIA, a French island possession, is located 900 statute miles northeast of Brisbane, Australia, and 1149 statute miles northwest of Auckland, New Zealand. It is 250 miles in length and 35 miles in breadth. The island is so located that it controls the important sea and air lines of communication between Australia and the western coast of North America. Before the war New Caledonia supplied Japan with practically all its nickel and, acre for acre, has the richest mineral resources in the world. It was quite obvious why this island was one of Japan's military objectives.

The 43d Division began to leave New Zealand by the middle of November, but due to the shipping shortage it was 30 December before the movement to New Caledonia was completed.

DEFENSE OF NEW CALEDONIA

The island was divided into three sectors for defense. The Third New Zealand Division occupied the Northern Sector. The 112th Cavalry Regiment defended the Southern Sector, including Noumea, the capital, and also a rapidly expanding U. S. naval and military base.

The 43d Division was assigned the Center Sector for defense. Division and Division Artillery Headquarters were located at Bouloupari, about 50 miles north of Noumea.

NEW CALEDONIA

The 169th F. A. Bn. was located along the Ouenghi River flanking U. S. Highway #1. Its sector for defense included the air base at Tontouta.

The 152d F. A. Bn. was located along U. S. Highway #1 at Ouemani, near La Foa. Its sector for defense included the Oau Tom Air Base.

The 192d F. A. Bn. was located in the vicinity of Bouloupari.

The 223d F. A. Bn., one of the 155mm how. bns. of the 26th Division (Mass.) made surplus by the reorganization from a square to a triangular division, had been assigned to New Caledonia for defense purposes. It voluntarily attached itself to the 43d Division Artillery for training and functioned in an excellent manner during the entire stay of the 43d Div. Artillery in New Caledonia.

TRAINING PROGRAM

The backbone of the training program in New Caledonia centered around the G. H. Q. Firing Tests and Field Exercises which included service firing. In addition, artillery firing demonstrations were given for the benefit of infantry commanders and officers of the Third New Zealand Division. This New Zealand division was commanded by Maj. General H. E. Barrowclough; the Artillery Commander was Brigadier Duff. All battalions took G. H. Q. Test #1 and were graded by officers of another battalion in the Division Artillery. Thus training experience was gained by personnel of two battalions at once.

The employment of the Division Artillery as a whole and the massing of artillery fires were emphasized by having the division artillery take G. H. Q. Test #3 in conjunction with several field exercises. Continued improvement in survey methods and in all Fire Direction Centers was noted.

The artillery firing demonstration included the rapid occupation of positions, firing on moving targets, battalion con-

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

centrations (time fire), smoke demonstration, registration for Division Artillery concentration and finally a Division Artillery concentration. Both observers and units participating benefited by these demonstrations.

JUNGLE WARFARE

In an effort to obtain all possible information on artillery methods, techniques and tactics in jungle warfare, a reconnaissance party of artillery officers consisting of Lt. Col. E. W. Berry, Div. Art. S3, Capt. R. F. Hussey and Capt. Ruhlin visited Guadalcanal 11 to 16 January 1943, where fighting was still in progress. Their report, a copy of which was issued to all units, again emphasized the difficulties encountered by artillery in jungle warfare and greatly added to the study of this subject.

MOVEMENT TO GUADALCANAL

Warning orders for movement were received the first part of February, 1943, and on 13 February the 152d F. A. Bn., as part of the 103d R. C. T., left New Caledonia in a convoy and four days later arrived at Koli Point, Guadalcanal.

The 169th F. A. Bn. left New Caledonia on 16 February and during its trip to Guadalcanal its convoy was attacked by Japanese torpedo dive bombers. Six Japanese bombers were shot down by the ships' anti-aircraft fire and the other Jap planes were driven off, with no casualties suffered by our own convoy. The balance of the Division Artillery arrived in Guadalcanal on 28 February 1943.

CHAPTER V

GUADALCANAL, (February 1943) —

RUSSELL ISLANDS (Feb. - June 1943)

Guadalcanal — Russell Islands — The Artillery Plan of Operations — Training Program — Warning Orders for the New Georgia Operation — Planning Phase — Advance Reconnaissance Parties — Movement Order — Roster — Organization of the Japanese Force in the Central Solomons.

GUADALCANAL

BY THE TIME the 43d Division arrived on Guadalcanal most of the fighting had ended, as the Japanese, except for a few stragglers, had been evacuated from Cape Esperance. Nevertheless, air bombings by the Japanese were a regular occurrence both night and day.

During the brief stay of the division on Guadalcanal a concentrated training program in jungle warfare was carried out. Scenes of the recent fighting were visited and a careful study made of these operations, with particular attention being given to the employment of the artillery.

The following artillery units of the 43d Division received official recognition for participating in the Guadalcanal Campaign:

Division Artillery Hq. & Hq. Btry.

152d F. A. Bn.

169th F. A. Bn.

192d F. A. Bn. This Battalion was given credit for the Guadalcanal Campaign in G. O. 12, 1 Feb. 1946. However, the unit did not leave New Caledonia until 24 Feb. 1943, three days after the campaign was over.

(From *U. S. Army in World War II, Guadalcanal, The First Offensive.*)

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

RUSSELL ISLANDS (Feb. - June 1943)

Prior to the final advances on Guadalcanal the Allied Command in the South Pacific had been considering additional measures to counter the Japanese infiltration down the Solomons. The Americans wished to attack New Georgia, but in January lacked the forces for so large an undertaking. The occupation of the Russell Islands, a small group lying about 35 miles northwest of Cape Esperance and about 125 miles southeast of the New Georgia group, seemed feasible. Possession of the Russells would deny them to the Japanese, who had been using the islands as a staging area for shipping troops to Guadalcanal. In addition, airfields could be built in the Russells which would shorten the airline distance from Henderson Field to Munda by about 65 miles, and motor torpedo boat and landing craft bases could also be established. The Russells would not only strengthen the defenses of Guadalcanal but would serve as a useful advanced base and staging area to support the invasion of New Georgia.¹

On 7 February Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander of the South Pacific, gave orders for the occupation of the Russell Islands. This was known as operation "CLEANSLATE".

The "CLEANSLATE" amphibious force was under the command of Rear Admiral R. K. Turner and the Russells Occupation Force was commanded by Maj. Gen. John H. Hester, C. G. 43d Division, and consisted of the 43d Division (less the 172d R. C. T. which was then at Espiritu Santo) and attached units. Guadalcanal was the staging area for the "CLEANSLATE" operation.

While the 43d Division was assembling at Guadalcanal, officers of the Division reconnoitered the Russells to determine whether the Japanese were still there and to select landing beaches and sites for airfields and torpedo boat bases. In this reconnaissance party from the division, the artillery was represented by Lt. Col. E. W. Berry, S3. The party

GUADALCANAL — RUSSELL ISLANDS

went ashore in a landing boat at Renard Sound at Banika, the easternmost main island, after dark on 17 Feb. Natives assured them that the Japanese had evacuated. The next day the patrol examined the area around Paddy Bay at Pavuvu, the largest island, and then all of the party returned to Guadalcanal on the night of 18-19 February.

The first echelon for the occupation, consisting of the Division Headquarters, Division Artillery Headquarters, elements of the 103d Regimental Combat Team and attached units loaded aboard ships 20 February 1943.

At 0600 on 21 February the assault waves went ashore unopposed and by the afternoon of 22 February the 43d Division and attached units had taken over the Russell Islands. The first evidence that the Japanese were aware of the occupation was an air raid on 6 March. As the Russells had been under radio silence, radars had not alerted the islands, but the damage was comparatively slight. Thereafter the Japanese continued to bomb the Russells day and night, but the radars alerted the troops in time and fighters from Guadalcanal usually drove the enemy off until the airfields in the Russells were completed.

Construction of roads, airfields and boat bases had begun in late February and by the 15 April the first of two airfields on Banika was ready for operation. The torpedo boat base at Wernham Cove had gone into operation on 25 February and by this time three landing craft bases were also operating.

The Artillery Plan of Operations for the Russell Islands was as follows:

I. MISSION

Defense of the islands, paying particular attention to fighter strips, P. T. base, Renard Sound, Paddy Bay.

II. DISPOSITION FOR GROUND DEFENSE

Two battalions (105mm How. & 155mm How.) plus a 155mm gun battery on Banika.

One battalion (105mm How.) plus a 155mm gun battery on Pavuvu.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

III. ORGANIZATION OF POSITION

Battery positions were organized to permit perimeter defense, and all guns were able to fire in Normal Zone, Contingent Zone and to permit Massing of Fires. Batteries were so emplaced as to be able to fire six batteries in all directions. By the use of alternate positions all nine batteries could mass fires.

IV. CONCENTRATIONS

Division Artillery concentrations were prepared to prevent landing of hostile forces.

Battalion concentrations were prepared for close support of infantry.

V. SURVEY AND REGISTRATION

A complete survey was instituted which, together with registration by all batteries, permitted timely and accurate unobserved fires both day and night.

VI. OBSERVATION POSTS

A system of O. Ps., continually manned, permitted observed fires at all times. Six O. Ps. were located on Banika and three O. Ps. were located on Pavuvu.

VII. ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE

The Tenth Defense Battalion (USMC), Colonel Blake commanding, had the primary mission of anti-aircraft defense for fighter strips.

Missions assigned to 43d Division Artillery :

Man one battery 90mm AAA guns.

Man twenty-five 20mm anti-aircraft guns placed as follows :

Group one	Wernham Cove	9 guns
-----------	--------------	--------

Group two	Renard Sound	6 guns
-----------	--------------	--------

Group three	Paddy Bay	10 guns
-------------	-----------	---------

Man sixty-four 50 cal. M. Gs. distributed among the battalions.

The anti-aircraft missions assigned to 43d Div. Arty. were under the supervision of Maj. William N. Bailey.

TRAINING PROGRAM

The following training program was carried out.

Objectives. The objectives for this training period were :

a. Continued maintenance of individual basic training to the standards of T. M. 6-605.

b. Completion of detailed plans for the defense of the island.

GUADALCANAL — RUSSELL ISLANDS

c. The perfection of tactics and technique of both the individual and the units of the Division Artillery for further operations in island and jungle warfare.

ARTILLERY FIRING

GENERAL PLAN

a. *Practice Alerts.* Each battalion had one practice alert per week, firing all guns each time as follows:

105mm battalion — 12 rounds Class B ammunition each alert.

155mm battalion — 12 rounds Class A ammunition each alert.

b. *Service Practice.* Each battalion conducted service practice twice each week. 152d F. A. Bn. designated one battery each service practice day for officers of the 192d Bn. A different battery was selected for each practice so that officers could have a varied experience on terrain.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT, ANTI-TANK PLATOONS

Objectives. The objectives for this training period were:

a. The efficient defense against low flying bombardment and strafing from hostile aircraft of installations and troops in Wernham Cove, Renard Sound and Paddy Bay.

b. To effectively supplement the infantry 37mm beach defenses in the vicinity of the anti-aircraft positions.

GENERAL PLAN

a. Platoon commanders were responsible for the organization and conduct of training within their sectors which were as follows:

152d AA-AT platoons. Wernham Cove Sector

169th AA-AT platoons, Paddy Bay Sector

192d AA-AT platoons, Renard Sound Sector

b. At least one air alert per day was held in each platoon.

c. Two hours per week were scheduled for marksmanship and test firing.

WARNING ORDERS FOR THE NEW GEORGIA OPERATION

By the middle of May the Allied Command felt it had sufficient forces to carry out the New Georgia Operation and orders were issued to put their plans into effect.

PLANNING PHASE

The preliminary plans for this operation were made at a series of conferences held on Admiral Turner's flagship, the

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

U. S. S. McCawley, at Noumea during the last two weeks of May. These conferences were attended by the Naval, Marine, Army Air Force and Army Ground Troop commanders and their staffs which were to participate or co-operate in the operation. The Artillery Section was headed by Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker, U. S. A., who was accompanied by Lt. Col. Edward W. Berry, S-3 Div. Arty. These conferences developed vital information and detailed plans for the operation. The following paragraphs contain a partial summary of this information and the plans which were of specific interest to the artillery.

OBJECTIVES

The directive studied by the conferences prescribed the following objectives:

1. The capture and development of Rendova Island, Viru Harbor Area, Segi Point Area and Wickham Anchorage as positions for further offensive operations.
2. Capture or destruction of enemy garrisons.
3. The preparation, by D plus 4 days, to capture in succession Munda, Kolombangara and other enemy positions in the New Georgia Group.
4. The construction of a fighter field on Segi Plantation.
5. The establishment of naval bases in the New Georgia Group.
6. The development of Wickham Anchorage and Viru Harbor as protected stages and refuges for small craft.
7. The establishment of operating facilities for motor torpedo boats in Rendova and Viru Harbor.

TASK FORCE

To accomplish the above missions Task Force #31 was constituted.

GUADALCANAL — RUSSELL ISLANDS

ARTILLERY UNITS

The initial artillery components of the Task Force were:

FIELD ARTILLERY

43d Division Artillery Headquarters	Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker
103d F. A. Battalion, 105mm Howitzers	Lt. Col. W. B. McCormick
152d F. A. Battalion, 105mm Howitzers	Lt. Col. N. E. Whitney
169th F. A. Battalion, 105mm Howitzers	Maj. W. E. Bradt
136th F. A. Battalion, 155mm Howitzers	Lt. Col. H. L. Shafer
192d F. A. Battalion, 155mm Howitzers	Lt. Col. G. M. Hill

COAST ARTILLERY

Provisional Battalion, 70 C. A. (AA)	Lt. Col. John W. Romlein
--------------------------------------	--------------------------

MARINE

9th Defense Battalion	Lt. Col. W. T. Scheyer
These units were later reinforced by 37th Division Artillery Headquarters	Brig. Gen. L. M. Kreber Col. K. Cooper, Ex. Off. Lt. Col. H. F. Haines, S-3
135th F. A. Battalion, 105mm Howitzers	Lt. Col. R. Chamberlain
140th F. A. Battalion, 105mm Howitzers	Lt. Col. C. W. Wolfe
89th F. A. Battalion, 105mm Howitzers	
25th Division Artillery	

ARTILLERY PERSONNEL AND WEAPONS

PERSONNEL

Officers	332
Enlisted Men	5993

WEAPONS

M1 Carbine	30 cal.	5,454
Machine gun	30 cal.	20
Sub. Mach. gun	45 cal.	117
Machine gun	50 cal.	196
A. A. gun	20 mm	64
A. A. gun	37 mm	8
A. T. gun	37 mm	48
A. A. gun	40 mm	16
A. A. gun	90 mm	20
Howitzer	105mm	72
Howitzer	155mm	24
M. I.	155mm guns	8

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

ARTILLERY COMMAND

Command of all Field Artillery Battalions and/or groupments throughout the campaign was under Brigadier General Harold R. Barker. The authority for this was:

From 30 June to 21 July by F. O. #1 NGOF 16 June.

From 22 July to 5 August by F. O. #1 NGOF (XIV Army Corps).

From 22 July 1943, par. 3d *"All Artillery will operate as Corps Artillery under Brigadier General Barker who is designated as Corps Artillery Commander."*

COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY

The coordination of employment for all Field, Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery and Naval Bombardment was centralized and controlled by General Barker. Authority for this was

From 30 June 21 July by F. O. #1 NGOF, 16 June 1943 paragraph 3x sub Paragraph 2. "Division Artillery commander will be responsible for the coordination of all Field, Coast and Anti-Aircraft Fires."

Responsibility for coordination of Naval Bombardment was by verbal order of Rear Admiral Turner during the Noumea conferences and later confirmed at the Lunga Point conferences.

PLANS FOR COORDINATION OF FIELD ARTILLERY, COAST ARTILLERY AND AA FIRES

A Directive for the Coordination of all Field, Coast and Anti-Aircraft fires was issued by Gen. Barker 25 June 1943.

PLAN FOR PRELIMINARY TRAINING

A thirty-day period of intensive training in final preparation for the operation was prescribed. This training directive placed special emphasis on the following:

1. Amphibious training of the 103d F. A. Battalion for fifteen days. This program was conducted at Efate on the transports to be used for the movement. These transports

GUADALCANAL — RUSSELL ISLANDS

were combat loaded, having one Battalion Combat Team per transport. Practice loadings were held throughout the period. Shore Fire Control Parties for the employment of Naval Support Fire were trained. The proper distribution of artillery officers and equipment to be used in each wave was developed so as to expedite the delivery of fire.

(The 103d F. A. Battalion had been at Espiritu Santo since the sinking of the *President Coolidge* on 26 October 1942. It reverted to the 43d Division Artillery for the New Georgia operation and moved to Guadalcanal.)

2. Intensive Service Practice.

The 103d F. A. Bn. and the 136th F. A. Bn. used the range at Guadalcanal and the 152d F. A., 169th F. A. and 192d F. A. Battalions fired at the Russell Islands. Massing of fires based on the adjustment of a single battery, the accuracy and speed of Fire Direction Centers and Forward Observer Methods for adjustment were stressed.

3. Calibration of all artillery weapons.

4. Refresher courses and combat range firing of small arms and automatic weapons.

5. Instructions and service practice on 20mm AA guns.

6. Practice field exercises in camouflage and field fortifications.

7. Demonstration and practice exercises in the use of pyrotechnics.

ADVANCE RECONNAISSANCE PARTIES

On 13 June the 43d Division sent an officer reconnaissance party from the Russell Island Group with the mission of reconnoitering the Japanese-held island of Rendova.

The following Division Artillery officers participated.

Capt. A. H. Norwood, Capt. P. W. Miller, Capt. H. A. Slager and Lt. F. C. Burnaby. By the use of native guides, native canoes and traveling at night they avoided the Japanese defenders and in five days established an O. P. in the

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Rendova Mountains and obtained much valuable information on Japanese dispositions. Lt. Burnaby remained on Rendova to contact the artillery commander upon his arrival on D Day. The other artillery officers returned to the Russells to report their findings of the reconnaissance. The importance and the risks involved in these reconnaissances are described in detail in the following awards of the Legion of Merit.

CITATION

AWARD (POSTHUMOUS) OF THE LEGION OF MERIT

HAROLD A. SLAGER, (0-360364), Captain, Field Artillery, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services from 13 to 24 June, 1943, while a member of a party of officers which reconnoitered Japanese-held Rendova, Solomon Islands, in advance of landing operations. After a hazardous journey past Japanese outposts and over mountainous jungle country, he made careful reconnaissance of important sectors of the island. In the midst of enemy troops he sought out possible landing beaches and observed hostile defense positions. Captain Slager returned by canoe through storm-swept seas with valuable military information which was used in the later occupation of Rendova.

(AUTH: CO 525, HQ USAFISPA dated 23 Dec 43)

CITATION

AWARD OF THE LEGION OF MERIT

ARTHUR H. NORWOOD, (0-299763), Captain, Field Artillery, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services from 13 to 24 June 1943, as officer in charge of large-scale reconnaissance parties which paved the way for New Georgia occupation forces. Assigning some of the officers to Japanese-held Rendova Island and Viru Harbor, Captain Norwood led a party to Vangunu, also in the hands of the enemy, and directed the sounding of beaches, measuring of water depths and location of artillery positions. He familiarized himself with terrain features and enemy positions. With native guides, Captain Norwood reconnoitered potential observation posts and explored a trail leading deep into the jungle. As a result of his careful planning and supervision, the co-ordinated reconnaissance reports supplied valuable military information essential to the success of the invasion.

(AUTH: CO 451, Hq USAFISPA dated 29 Nov 43)

HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA

GENERAL ORDERS)

APC #502

:

24 December 1943

NO.....528)

GUADALCANAL — RUSSELL ISLANDS

EXTRACT

AWARDS OF THE LEGION OF MERIT

FREDERICK C. BURNABY, (0-169884), First Lieutenant, Field Artillery, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services from 13 to 30 June 1943, while a member of a party which reconnoitered Japanese-held Rendova, Solomon Islands, and set the stage for successful landing operations. After a hazardous journey past Japanese outposts and over mountainous jungle country, he made accurate reconnaissance and helped construct observation posts which overlooked Munda, New Georgia Island. Aided by natives, he familiarized himself with shore-line characteristics and island trails. On the day of the invasion, he posted himself on a small island facing the harbor entrance as well as enemy installations and guided the ships by flashing signals. The wealth of military information that Lieutenant Burnaby collected was a valuable contribution to the success of landing parties and the thoroughness of his preliminary surveys made possible a prompt and accurate delivery of artillery fire on hostile positions. Home address: Minneapolis, Minnesota.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARMON:

A. J. BARNETT

Brigadier General, GSC

Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/M. B. Kendrick

M. B. KENDRICK

Major, A.G.D.

Asst Adj Gen.

A True Copy: Edwin S. Knowles

1st Lt., FA Asst. Adjutant

43d Div. Arty.

RELIEF ORDER

On 14 June an Order relieving the 43d Division Artillery of its Island Defense responsibilities at Russells by the 140 F. A. Battalion was issued, the 140 F. A. Battalion to occupy the positions of the 152d F. A. Battalion in this relief. Also relief orders for the 136th F. A. Battalion at Guadalcanal were issued.

On 15 June an order was issued calling for advance reconnaissance parties for the Rendova Area, from each field artillery battalion. They were to accompany the first echelon

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

of the Division Artillery Hqs. on 29 June from Guadalcanal. This plan resulted in a reconnaissance of battalion areas before their arrival in the Rendova Area.

MOVEMENT ORDER

On 18 June the following Movement Order was issued:

S E C R E T

ANNEX #5, TO FO #1, HQRS., 43D INF. DIV., C. S., ARTILLERY	HEADQUARTERS 43D DIV. ARTY.
S E C R E T	A. P. O. #43, c/o Postmaster
Auth: CG, 43d Div.	San Francisco, California
Init: EWD	18 June 1943
Date: 6-18-43	

FIELD ORDER

Number 2

MOVEMENT ORDER

1. a. See Intelligence Annex #3, FO #1, 43d Inf. Div., c.s.
 - b. The 43d Inf. Div. with 136th FA Battalion and 4th Marine Raider Bn. attached will seize and occupy RENDOVA HARBOR, WICKHAM ANCHORAGE, SEGI AREA and VIRU HARBOR preparatory to a full scale offensive against MUNDA and VILA-STANMORE AREAS.
2. 43d Division Artillery with 136th FA Battalion attached will move to areas from which it can support the occupation and provide close defense of RENDOVA and mass its fires on the installations at MUNDA.
3. a. Division Artillery Headquarters and Hqs. Battery will move to RENDOVA in four echelons.
 - (1) 1st Echelon — 9 Officers, 41 Enlisted Men, 6 vehicles. Leave Russells for KOLI POINT D minus 2 day. Load ADAMS at KOLI POINT D minus 1 day. Land East side RENDOVA COVE D day, 0640.
 - (2) 2nd Echelon — 1 Officer, 37 Enlisted Men, 3 vehicles. Load RUSSELLS LST (192nd) south side RENARD SOUND, D day. Land RENDOVA COVE, East side, D plus 1 day, 0640.
 - (3) 3rd Echelon — 3 Officers, 50 Enlisted Men, 3 vehicles. Load RUSSELLS (place, transport and date later) Land at RENDOVA COVE (date later, approximately D plus 6).
 - (4) 4th Echelon — 1 Officer, 6 Enlisted Men, 1 vehicle. Remain at RUSSELLS as rear detachment.
- b. 103d FA BATTALION (Attached to 172nd CT for movement and landing)

GUADALCANAL — RUSSELL ISLANDS

- (1) Btry. "A" load *McCawley* June 12, LUNGA. Land RENDOVA HARBOR, East side, 0640, D-day.
- (2) Bn. Hq., Hq. Btry. and Service Btry. load JACKSON 12 June LUNGA.
Land RENDOVA HARBOR, East side, 0640, D-day.
- (3) Battery "B" load HAYES 12 June LUNGA. Land RENDOVA HARBOR WEST SIDE 0640 D-day.
- (4) Battery "C" load ADAMS 12 June LUNGA. Land RENDOVA HARBOR EAST SIDE 0640 D-day.

c. 136th FA Bn. Load (GUADALCANAL)
approximately D plus 3.

Land POKO PLANTATION D plus 4.

d. 152d FA Bn. Attached to 103d CT.

(1) Battery B load WERNHAM COVE two LCT D minus 1 day. Land Southwest Shore OLEANA BAY 0400 D-day.

(2) Battery "A" load WERNHAM COVE two LCT D-day. Land SEGI POINT D plus 1 day.

(3) 152d Bn. (less A & B) remain at RUSSELLS. Move on call approximately D plus 6.

e. 169th FA Battalion remains at RUSSELLS for further orders.

f. 192d FA Battalion, load two LST South Side RENARD SOUND D-day.

Land (B plus C) Kokorana 0640 D plus 1 day.

Land (Hq. plus A) East Side RENDOVA HARBOR 0640 D plus 1 day.

x. For detailed landing plans see Annex #2 to FO #1, Hq. 43d Inf.

Div., c.s.

4. For administrative details see Annex #4, Administrative, to FO #1, 43d Inf. Div., c.s.

5. For plan of signal communications:

(1) Prior to embarkation see paragraph 5 a, FO #1, Hq. 43d Div. Arty., c.s.

(2) Initial plan of landing, see Annex #6, to FO #1, Hq. 43d Inf. Div., c.s.

BARKER

BERRY
S-3

Final loading was carried out according to the accompanying Movement Order and on the morning of 29 June the 1st Echelon of the Division Artillery Hqs. loaded aboard the Transport *Adams*. It sailed from Kola Point at 1600 that afternoon.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION — NEW GEORGIA (TOENAILS) OPERATION: 30 JUNE 1943

HQS. DIVISION ARTILLERY

C. G. Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker
Exec. O. Col. Chester A. Files
S 1. Lt. Loyd W. Lovestedt
S 2. Capt. Philip L. Miller
Asst. S2. (Survey) 1st Lt. Frederick C. Burnaby
S 3. Lt. Col. Edward W. Berry
S 4. Lt. Robert E. Jones
Counter Battery Officer. Capt. Wm. N. Bailey
Liaison Officer. Capt. James R. Ruhlin, at Task Force or Div. Hqs.
Surgeon. Capt. Otto F. Rogers
Dentist. Capt. Lawrence Palmer
Chaplain. Capt. Trebaol
Senior Aide. Lt. Earl M. Peterson, Liaison Off. from 136 F. A. Bn.
Junior Aide. Lt. Albert W. Merck

HQS. BATTERY, 43d Division Artillery

C. O. Capt. Chas. E. Remick
Asst. C. O. Lt. Jackson W. Richards

COUNTER BATTERY GROUP

	Col. C. A. Files	F. D. C. #2 RENDOVA
192d F. A. Bn.,	Lt. Col. G. A. Hill	
Mission:	Counterbattery	
Positions:	Kokorana Island	
9th Defense Bn.,	Lt. Col. Wm. J. Scheyer	
Mission:	Counterbattery, long range support fire for 192d F.A. and counter surface vessel attack.	
Positions:	RENDOVA PLANTATION	
Bat. C. 152d F. A. Bn.,	Capt. F. W. Burns	
Mission:	Defense southwest flank of Rendova Installation.	
Position:	RENDOVA ISLAND	

DIVISION ARTILLERY PROVISIONAL

	Lt. Col. E. W. Berry, F. D. C. #1 BARAULU
103 F. A. Bn.	Lt. Col. W. B. McCormick
Mission:	Direct Support 172 Inf. Regt.
Positions:	Northwestern area SASAVELE ISLAND — BARAULU ISLAND
169 F. A. Bn.	Lt. Col. W. E. Bradt
Mission:	Direct support 169 Inf. Regt.
Positions:	SASAVELE ISLAND
136 F. A. Bn.	Lt. Col. Henry L. Shafer
Mission:	General support of attack, mass fires zone of advance.
Positions:	Western tip BARAULU ISLAND

GUADALCANAL — RUSSELL ISLANDS

BATTALION STAFFS AND BATTERY COMMANDERS

103D F. A. BATTALION

Bn. Co.	Lt. Col. William B. McCormick
Ex. O.	Maj. Stephen L. Nichols
S-2	Capt. Warren K. Covill
S-3	Maj. Nathan M. Southwick, Jr.
S-4	Capt. Charles L. Pollitt
Hq. Btry.	Capt. David M. Twachtman
Btry. A	Capt. William B. Foster
Btry. B	Capt. Robert W. Hyde
Btry. C	Capt. Albin C. Stevens
Service Btry.	Same as S-4

152D F. A. BATTALION

Bn. Co.	Lt. Col. Norman E. Whitney
Ex. O.	Maj. Robert W. Kenny
S-2	Capt. Arthur H. Norwood
S-3	Maj. Waldo H. Fish, Jr.
S-4	Capt. Clairoy A. Tripp
Hq. Btry.	Capt. Mills D. Barber, Jr.
Btry. A	Capt. Roger L. Averill
Btry. B	Capt. Robert W. Hussey
Btry. C	Capt. Frank W. Burns
Service Btry.	Same as S-4

169TH F. A. BATTALION

Bn. Co.	Lt. Col. Wilber E. Bradt
Ex. O.	vacancy
S-2	Capt. Dixwell Goff
S-3	Maj. Rene L. DeBlois
S-4	Capt. Andrew F. Maffei
Hq. Btry.	Capt. Edward J. Keegan
Btry. A	Capt. Richard N. Rainey
Btry. B	Capt. Edgar S. Downing
Btry. C	Capt. William A. Farrell
Service Btry.	Same as S-4

192D F. A. BATTALION

Bn. Co.	Lt. Col. George M. Hill
Ex. O.	Maj. Willard A. McDonald
S-2	Capt. George T. Fielding III
S-3	Maj. John S. Blair 3rd
S-4	Capt. Everett W. Robinson
Hq. Btry.	Capt. Samuel F. Pearson
Btry. A	Capt. Lawrence M. Higgins
Btry. B	Capt. John J. Cahill
Btry. C	Capt. Raymond G. Kells
Service Btry.	Same as S-4

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

136TH F. A. BATTALION

Bn. Co.	Lt. Col. Henry Lee Shafer
Ex. O.	Maj. George P. Guthrie
S-3	Maj. James H. Nellis
Asst. S-3	Capt. Edmund E. Lange
S-1	Warrant Officer Louis Gagy
S-2	Capt. Albert M. Untch
S-4	Capt. John C. Groves
Hq. Btry.	Capt. John B. Leonard
Btry. A	Capt. Paul R. Conrad
Btry. B	Capt. Awtry P. Wehrle
Btry. C	Capt. Howard W. Zurcher
Service Btry.	Capt. Karl A. Minke

ORGANIZATION FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE

Organization for the employment of anti-aircraft units may be listed under three headings.

First: employment of the 9th Defense Battalion,

Second: the Second Provisional Bn. of the 70th A. C.,

Third: use of Field Artillery and Anti-aircraft and tank platoons reinforced.

9TH DEF. BATTALION: Lt. Col. Wm. J. Scheyer

The battalion was originally placed on Rendova and adjacent islands for the protection of that base. Because of the nature of the terrain the 90mms were more centralized than would be desirable under ideal conditions. They were better placed for protective barrage than for defense at the bomb release line. Also, the field of fire for the special weapons was generally limited to the north and northwest; here again the nature of the terrain, jungle and cocoanut growth gave virtually no other choice. The following is a list of the anti-aircraft weapons available to the Rendova Area.

90mm guns — 12
40 mm guns — 16
20mm guns — 54
50 cal. guns — 119

2ND BATTALION (PROV), 70TH CA: Lt. Col. John W. Romlein

GUADALCANAL — RUSSELL ISLANDS

The distribution of these units was as follows:

WICKHAM	Btry. "B" — 90mm	WICKHAM
	"E" AW	
	Hq. 2d Bn. Prov.	SEGI
	Btry. "A" — 90mm	
	Btry. "F" — AW	
	1 Platoon "E" AW	VIRU

Field Artillery AA — AT Platoons: It was necessary to improvise pedestal mounts for all 50 caliber AA guns, as no suitable mounts were issued with the new Weapons Carriers. Weapons Carriers had been cut to about $\frac{1}{3}$ of the table of Basic Allowances and would have been too valuable to tie up in this duty. Also it was desirable that these weapons be used in a dual purpose to include Beach and Anti-Barge attack. Battalions were reinforced by ten 20mm guns with Navy pedestal mounts. This gave each battalion a total of twenty 50-caliber and ten 20mm AA beach defense guns.

AA Warning System: Direct contact with the radar and air control installations permitted the artillery warning center to keep battalions and AA platoons advised of the location of both friendly and Japanese aircraft. The results of this were twofold: first, they alerted and gave location to the AA platoons of aerial targets, and secondly, this permitted artillerymen to service their pieces during Condition Red, day or night, until actual bombing was imminent. The agency for distributing this information is shown in the Div. Arty. organization chart for operations. The following radars were available to obtain this warning.

70th CA-2 — 268B; 1 — 270,

9th Def. Battalion, 4-268's, 1 — 270

Argus 1 NZ Circ s Navy 2 — 602.

PLANS FOR COORDINATION OF NAVAL GUN SUPPORT

The plans were developed in conference with Admiral Turner's gunnery staff. These fires came under two classifications: 1. Fires in support of landing parties; 2. General preparation fires prior to coordinated attacks.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

PLAN FOR LANDING:

Four Shore Fire Control Parties were organized and trained for approximately 15 days at EFATE. This training was conducted in conjunction with the amphibious training of the 172d Combat Team. Each Fire Control Party consisted of:

- 1 Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer
- 1 Field Artillery Forward Observer
- 1 Communications detail consisting of
 - 1 Chief of Section
 - 2 Radio Sergeants
 - 2 Telephone Operators
 - 2 Radio Corporals
 - 2 Basics

Equipment:


- | | |
|-------------------|-----|
| 2 Portable radios | 284 |
| 3 Portable radios | 194 |
| 1 Mile W-130 wire | |
| 2 Telephones | |

The general function of this party is similar to that of the Artillery Forward Observer detail. For more complete information on this see the mimeographed instructions entitled "Naval Gunfire in Support of Naval Operations" published by the Amphibious Force USAF.

One Shore Fire Control party was assigned to each of the three battalions of the 172d Infantry. The fourth party was assigned to the VIRU Landing Force. In practice none of these parties was actually used. At RENDOVA the only enemy fire suitable for destroyer action came from the North in the vicinity of MUNDA-BAANGA AREA.

GENERAL PREPARATION FIRES PRIOR TO COORDINATED ATTACKS

Plans were made to support all coordinated attacks with naval bombardment but it was necessary to abandon these plans because of the direction of fire, which was generally Northwest to due East, falling into friendly troops. Inspec-



THE SINKING OF THE "COOLIDGE"




Battle area Guadalcanal. View from Hill 27 showing bare hills and wooded ravines.



Natives with American pipes. (Guadalcanal).



Major General Noboru Sasaki,
Commander of Japanese Southeast Detached Force.



Jap defenders of the Solomons.

GUADALCANAL — RUSSELL ISLANDS

tion of defenses of the west shore made after the capture of Munda Field clearly showed the wisdom of abandoning these plans.

ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FORCE IN THE CENTRAL SOLOMONS

Major General Noboru Sasaki of the Japanese Army was Commander of the Southeast (NANTO) Detached Force in the Central Solomons. The organization of this force was as follows:

Southeast Detached Force
(Central Solomons)
Maj. Gen. Noboru Sasaki
Lt. Col. Yashiharu Kamiya, Cofs

229th Infantry	230th Infantry	13th Infantry
Col. Genjiro Hirata	Col. Wakichi Hisashige	Col. Satoshi Tomonari
1st Battalion	10th Ind. Mt. Arty.	1st Battalion
Maj. Masao Hara	Lt. Col. M. Kitayama	Maj. Shishu Kinoshita
2nd Battalion	15th Field AAA	2nd Battalion
Maj. Giichi Sato	Col. Sanichi Shioto	Maj. Takeo Ohashi
3rd Battalion		3d Battalion
Capt. Bunzo Kojima		Maj. Uichi Takabayshi

CHAPTER VI
THE NEW GEORGIA OFFENSIVE —
OPERATION TOENAILS
30 June 1943 — 23 January 1944

MUNDA CAMPAIGN — BAANGA ISLAND — ARUNDEL —
KOLOMBANGARA — DEFENSE OF NEW GEORGIA

THE LARGEST and most important action of the war in the Pacific during the summer of 1943 was the offensive in the Central Solomons directed against the Munda Airfield on the island of New Georgia and the occupation of the Vila Airfield at Kolombangara. A necessary preliminary to this action was the seizing of beachheads at Rendova, Wickham Anchorage, and the Segi and Viru Harbor areas on New Georgia.

MUNDA CAMPAIGN

Early in the morning of 30 June 1943 (D Day), under an overcast sky and heavy rain, Admiral Turner's Task Force Group 31, protected by high flying Black Cats (PBYs), sailed into Blanche Channel. As the Task Force neared Rendova a heavy fog settled upon the coast line obliterating all landmarks. The Barracudas, advance reconnaissance units of the 43d Division, which were supposed to precede the initial elements of the Task Force and mark the shallow beachheads, became lost in the fog; the current and wind carried them several miles past their objectives which they did not reach until about one hour after the first wave from the Task Force, which included Hqs. Div. Arty., had reached shore. As the plan envisaged the Barracudas establishing the beachhead, the first wave of the 172d R. C. T. did not land in assault formations, but carried with them barracks bags

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

and other impedimenta. The beach, however, was held by Japanese and the artillerymen quickly dropped personal equipment, typewriters and mimeograph machines, and with their carbines joined the infantry in driving the Japanese from the beachhead. General Barker, Col. Files, Lt. Col. Berry and Capt. Miller were among the first ashore on Rendova. The General and his party immediately began reconnaissance of the area for artillery positions, but were soon forced to postpone this plan until enemy resistance was reduced. By mid-morning the beachhead was secure and unloading from the transports proceeded.

By the evening of D Day, Division Artillery Hqs., the 103d F. A. Bn. and the 9th Defense Bn., U.S.M.C., were in position. The 103d F. A. Bn. by late afternoon had registered and was lobbing shells across Blanche Channel at Japanese outposts on New Georgia. On D plus 1 the 192d F. A. Bn. landed on Kokorana, a small island off the Rendova shore, and by afternoon was shelling Lambetti Plantation on the New Georgia mainland.

On D plus 2 (2 July) while the 103d, 192d and 9th Defense Battalions were registering and firing on enemy targets, without warning 24 enemy two-engine bombers (Bettys), covered by 44 fighters (Zekes) came in low over the Rendova Mountains from the south. Ground troops mistook the Bettys for friendly B-25s until the bombs began to fall. Enemy bombs started fires and exploded ammunition in the crowded beachhead, causing over 200 casualties. This experience resulted in better air coverage and anti-aircraft defense.

On 2 July (D plus 2) Btry. C, 152d F. A. landed at Rendova. Its initial mission was defense of the southwest flank of the Rendova installations. The 152d F. A. Bn. (Lt. Col. N. E. Whitney), as the artillery of the 103d Combat Team, had been employed earlier in the Wickham Anchorage and Segi operations: Bn. Hqs. and Btry. A at Segi; Btry. B at Wickham Anchorage. By the middle of July the battalion

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

having reverted to Division Artillery control and from positions on Dokedoke, a small island in the Roviana Lagoon, rendered effective support throughout the balance of the operation for the capture of the Munda air strip.

PREPARATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR THE FIRST COORDINATED ATTACK OF 9 JULY. INFANTRY

On 3 July a beachhead was established at Zanana Beach on the mainland of New Georgia by elements of the 172d and 169th R. C. Ts. The build-up of the beachhead was painfully slow. The troops were moved 4 - 7 July in small boats across Blanche Channel into the Roviana Lagoon to the narrow beachhead out of which poor trails led to the Barike River, the Line of Departure for the advance southward along the Munda Trail to the airfield. Rain, sticky mud and bogged-down vehicles all combined to slow the deployment of the troops after their landing at Zanana. The first coordinated attack was scheduled for 7 July but was delayed until 9 July to permit the infantry to reach their Line of Departure.

ARTILLERY

At 0300, 9 July, all artillery joined in laying pre-arranged fires on targets on the front of the 43d Division in one of the heaviest artillery preparations thus far in the Pacific War. The forward progress of the Infantry was slow, over some of the most difficult terrain yet encountered in the South Pacific. On 12 July a second beachhead was established at Laianna near Ilangana Point which measurably shortened the supply line from Rendova. During this period air, artillery and limited ground offensives tried to pin down the forces of Maj. Gen. Norboru Sasaki. An artillery offensive on the south flank provided a useful softening. A Japanese corporal, after mercilessly forcing his men to hold their dugout positions, during a bombardment, confessed to his diary. "It is really more than I can bear."¹

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN


Historical accuracy demands that it be noted that some of these excellent artillery preparations were not altogether effective because of two Japanese countermoves. At the start of American artillery preparations the enemy moved close to our lines and thus escaped with minimum casualties. General Sasaki also adopted the practice of firing his 90mm mortars into the 43d Division front lines while our artillery was firing upon his troops. Initially this led the infantry to believe our rounds were falling short. As the operation continued and infantry confidence in artillery accuracy grew this second device was much less effective.

DIVISION ARTILLERY MISSIONS (9-24 July)

During this period a total of 461 artillery missions was assigned by the Division Fire Direction Center. Among these were included 6 general preparations, 3 local preparations, and 1 smoke screen. The following table shows the breakdown of these missions.

Date	Div. Con.	Preparations 2 or more Battalions	Div. Night Fires	Total
July.				
9	8	80	—	88
10	14	56	—	70
11	9	28	7	44
12	9	24	7	40
13	13	48	7	68
14	15	13	7	35
15	6	4	6	16
16	6	16	10	32
17	—	9	8	17
18	—	6	1	7
19	—	1	5	6
20	4	3	2	9
21	4	—	6	10
22	4	3	3	10
23	—	2	1	3
24	4	2	1	6
Totals	96	295	70	461
	Counterbattery Missions		155mm How.	45
	Counterbattery Missions		155 MI Guns	52
			Total Missions	558

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY



By mid-July it was apparent that the original estimate of the number of Japanese forces on New Georgia and the adjacent islands had been far too low; it was also clear that the Japanese on Munda had been reenforced. Elements of the 13th, 229th and 230th Japanese regiments were identified. The presence of other Japanese Army and Navy elements was learned from captured prisoners and documents.

(The Navy elements were NSLF units, Navy Special Landing Forces.)

"Properly speaking, the Japanese possessed no "Marines" in the true American sense. The *RIKUSENTAI* (Naval Landing Force) consisted entirely of sailors under Navy officers trained at the Army's Infantry School. Light fire-power equipment was furnished from Army stocks; heavier material was manufactured by the Navy. *RIKUSENTAI* units were never grouped in larger than battalion strength. Numbered elements were named after the Naval Districts: YOKOSUKA, SASEBO, MAIZURU and KURE; e.g., 4th SASEBO Naval Landing Force, etc."

(From *KOGUN* (The Japanese Army in the Pacific War.) published by the Marine Corps Association, Quantico, Va.)

This reinforcement began on 9 July when the first 1200 of about 5000 troops landed at Kolombangara; the following night they were moved by small boat to Bairoko, thence overland to Munda. General Sasaki, by 14 July, felt that he had sufficient additional strength to counter-attack. Rugged terrain and poor communications had bedeviled the attacks of the 43d Division; the same elements were to force a post-

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

ponement by Sasaki of his attack until 17 July. The counter-attacks failed to secure their objective, but not before a display of fire power and fire control by the artillery which cannot go unmentioned in any history of the 43d Division Artillery.

The following excerpt is reprinted here through the courtesy of the Historical Branch of the U. S. Marine Corps (Marines in the Central Solomons).

By 17 July, Sasaki was in a position to launch his assault, but lack of communications prevented adequate coordination. Because of heavy American attacks on his forward positions at 11 :30 that morning, Captain Kojima could not regain his balance for a jump off; the incessant American artillery shelling and air strikes had completely disorganized Commander Takeda's boat pool, thus making impossible an organized amphibious assault behind the American lines. (Captain Kojima and Major Hara, both battalion commanders of the 229th Japanese Infantry, were killed later on Munda by American artillery fire.) Colonel Tomonari's 13th Infantry, however, managed to encircle the right flank of the 43d Division and by 1600 organized in a mangrove swamp on the banks of the Barike River for a thrust against the Zanana Beach supply dumps and the 43d Division command post. About sundown Tomonari attacked. Within a few minutes he had surrounded the 43d Division command post then located on the shore about 400 yards west of Zanana Beach, and severed the supply lines leading to the front and rear. Fortunately the foe overlooked and failed to cut one telephone wire over which the Americans gave the alarm and called in artillery support from Roviana and Sasavele Islands.

Gen. Barker's 43d Division guns responded magnificently. With the general himself acting as one of the forward observers, the artillerymen planted heavy shells 100 to 500 yards from the edge of the camp. Barker called in box barrages at irregular intervals for the remainder of the night to prevent the enemy from organizing a *banzai*. Of the great number of rounds fired that night only one fell short, and that a single shot fired during registration.

A note subjoined to the foregoing text reads:

"The senior Marine observers present in the command post that night are unstinting in their praise of Barker and the work of his men. It became quite evident that Fort Sill doctrines, accurately applied by well-trained battery and gun commanders, were valid. Had any doubt previously existed, artillerymen this night effectively dissipated it."

Several details of the repulse of the Japanese attack on the Division Command Post are of interest. The telephone line, so fortunately undiscovered by the Japs, was a direct

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

wire from General Barker at the Division CP on New Georgia to Lt. Col. Edward Berry at Division Artillery Fire Direction Center on Baraulu Island. The line was laid over a different route and did not pass through the Division switchboard.

When the Jap advance was first reported Captain H. A. Slager of the 152d F. A. went in a jeep down the Munda Trail until he had established contact with the enemy; he radioed reports of their progress as they advanced upon the Division Command Post. Captain Slager, a courageous officer, was later killed by Japanese Machine Gun fire. He was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for bravery under fire. Following is a copy of his Citation.

CITATION

AWARD (POSTHUMOUS) OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

HAROLD A. SLAGER, (0-360364), Captain, Field Artillery, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in the South Pacific Area on July 25, 1943. Captain Slager was ordered to coordinate the employment of tanks with an infantry battalion attacking a strong enemy position. Having initiated the movement he might have sought cover. Instead, he crept forward to an advantageous point where he might better supervise the operation, fully aware that he was in extreme danger. While he was observing the progress of the attack to insure its success he was killed by machine gun fire. He made this sacrifice endeavoring to insure the most effective employment of tanks with the minimum loss.

(AUTH: CO 218 Hq USAFISPA dated 21 Aug 43)

Lt. Col. E. W. Berry at the Division Artillery FDC, acting upon a call from Division CP, organized a force of about 100 men composed of artillery personnel armed with rifles, and a detachment of Fijian Scouts from the First Company, First Fijian Infantry, excellent jungle fighters. Under the command of Lt. O. H. Schupert of the 103d F. A. Bn. this force arrived to reinforce the Division CP prior to the attack.

A force of approximately 300 Japs surrounded the command post about dusk and encircled personnel prepared for a last-ditch stand. General Barker was with this group and

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

requested artillery fire. The isolated position was outside the zone of normal fires. By cutting trees for a field of fire, the 136th F. A. Bn. succeeded in delivering fire.* For the next nine hours of darkness, Col. Berry, M/Sgt. Quimby and Cpl. Hagerthy stayed by the phones and plotting boards interpolating commands from the General. As a result of this accurate placing of fire, only about 75 Japs survived at daybreak and were easily disbanded by our reinforcements which arrived at dawn.

General Barker, Captain James R. Ruhlin and Pvt. F. Chamberlain manned the fire control phone from a foxhole on the perimeter and sensed all rounds fired in defense of the command post. At daybreak a Japanese NCO and a grenadier were found within ten yards from this foxhole, killed by a burst of machine gun fire from the center of the perimeter. Capt. James R. Ruhlin was awarded the Legion of Merit for exceptionally meritorious conduct during this attack.

EFFECT OF THE ARTILLERY FIRE

After the adjustment, by sound, had been completed, a firing schedule was given to the F. D. C., calling for fires at irregular intervals during the night. The Japs rushed the C. P. from time to time during the night, and in each instance artillery fire was called for. This artillery fire saved the personnel of the division C. P. from possible annihilation. About 75 dead Japs were found in the morning, killed by artillery fire, and many more were unquestionably killed who were not found, as the Japs took away their dead and wounded when driven off.

Over this same artillery telephone line orders were issued for a battalion of infantry to land at daybreak and attack the Japanese. This was done and relief accomplished.

*The 136th FA Bn. (155mm how.), Lt. Col. H. L. Shafer, of the 37th Division Artillery was attached to the 43d Division Artillery at the beginning of the operation. It was one of the best artillery battalions encountered during the Pacific War. Members of the 43d Division Command Post will never forget its support fires of July 17 during the night attack by the Japanese.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED ENEMY LAND STRENGTH

Estimated			Actual		
			Jap Army	Jap Navy	Jap Total
RABAUL	30,000 to 40,000		55,000	35,000	90,000
REKATA BAY	1,000		800	3,400	4,200
KOLOMBANGARA	5,000 to 7,000		3,000	1,000	4,000
VELLA LAVELLA	250		1,000	100	1,100
WICKHAM VIRU	290 to 460		260	50	310
RENDOVA	100		150	140	290
MUNDA	2,000 to 3,000		2,000	2,500	4,500
BAIROKO	500		300	800	1,100

XIV CORPS ASSUMES CONTROL

The forward progress of the attack, hindered by stubborn Japanese defense and well nigh impassable jungle terrain, had slowed to a halt. Accordingly, Lt. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold*, Commanding General, XIV Corps, assumed command of the operation on 16 July and ordered into action substantial elements of the 37th and 25th Divisions. Infantry reinforcements from the 37th Division were the 145th and 148th Infantry Regiments, each less one battalion; and the 161st and 27th Infantry regiments of the 25th Division. The 27th Infantry, however, was not committed.

Artillery reinforcements, all 105mm battalions, consisted of the 85th, 135th, 140th and 152d Field Artillery Bns. The artillery was divided into three groups: 37th Division Artillery, 43d Division Artillery and the Rendova Base Group for counterbattery missions. XIV Corps order #1 centralized control of these elements. "All artillery will operate as Corps Artillery under Brig. Gen. Barker who is designated as Corps Artillery Commander."

*General Oscar W. Griswold, Commander of the XIV Corps, was a professional soldier of the highest type. He understood the capabilities and limitations of Artillery and never hesitated to delegate responsibility to a subordinate.




Group of General staff top men in 43rd Div. hold informal conference on beach.
Gen. Hester, CG of 43rd Div. holds map in center. South Pacific Area. 7/14/43




Lt. J. M. Ackerson, Pvt. E. Montemarano, Pvt. T. Reed, Pvt. H. Vinlette, Sgt. J. Murray, Chief of Section, Pvt. A. Mekos, all of 152nd F. A. — 43rd Division. They are shown just before artillery barrage on Vanguna Island, New Georgia Group. 30 June 1943.



1st Lt. Donald L. Mushik, 169th F. A. Bn. *Forward Observer* on Munda Trail.
July 1943.



Close support fires during attack of 25 July 1943 on New Georgia.



View of virgin jungle terrain on Munda, illustrating the difficulties involved in trying to bring up heavy artillery and the enormous job it is to push a road through such jungle. 30 July 1943.



Soldier examines a palm tree truncated by shell during U. S. assault on Munda. 3 August 1943.

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

SECOND COORDINATED ATTACK 25 JULY to 5 AUGUST FIELD ARTILLERY ANNEX TO FIELD ORDER #1, XIV CORPS

S E C R E T

FIELD ARTILLERY ANNEX

HQ NGOF
1700 22 July, 1943

Annex #2 to Field Order #1

MAPS: CICSOPAC PHOTOMAP C-2P1 UNIT FMAC

1. a. See G-2 Annex to F.O. #1 (Annex No. 1) ABVD-1 photos, current sorties 24" — 20,000.
b. 37th and 43d Inf. Division will make a coordinated attack on Munda. For date and time see F.O.I. For line of departure and zone of advance see Opn. Overlay to FO #1.
2. General mission the Artillery with the Corps is the direct and general support of the attack, with the mass of fires in the zone of advance; counterbattery fire against dual purpose party installation in the vicinity of MUNDA; Artillery defense of RENDOVA Base both perimeter land and coast approaches for the West.
3. a. *Div. Arty. Units*
 - (1) (a) 37th Inf Div
135th FA Bn. Direct support 145th Inf.
140th FA Bn. Direct support 148th Inf.
192d FA Bn. General support 37th Div.
Note: 169th FA Bn. remains in direct support of 145th and 148th Inf. until relieved by 135th and 140th FA Bns.
 - (b) 43d Inf. Div.
103d FA Bn. Direct support 172d Inf.
152d FA Bn. Direct support 103d Inf.
136th FA Bn. General support 43d Div.
169th FA Bn. General support. Contingent mission:
Direct support 161st Inf.
(152d FA Bn) Prov. minus one organic Btry. plus one Btry 89th FA Bn.
- (2) (a) 135th, 140th, 152d and 192d FA Bns. will register one gun between 1500 and dark D minus 1 day. These Bns. will do no other firing prior to the preparation D day.
(b) 136th and 192d FA Bns. will execute counterbattery at direction of this headquarters.
(c) Arty of both divisions will be prepared to mass its fires on call from this headquarters within the area 85-33 east to 89.33 northeast to 90-40 and west to 85-40.
(d) For positions and zones of responsibility see Annex #1 overlay.
(e) For general preparation see Annex #2 to follow.


HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

- (f) All night harassing and box security fires to be coordinated through these headquarters.
 - (g) Firing Chart CICSOPAC PHOTOMAP C-2PI FMAC 1:20,000. For grid breakdown see attached overlay #1.
 - (h) Medium battalions will be prepared to use air observation.
 - b. *Corps Arty Unit*
 - (1) Two Btrys 155 MI Gun (Lt. Col. Wm. J. Scheyer)
 - (a) One battery prepared for coast defense of RENDOVA. See approach from the west. Position: TAMBUSOLO.
 - (b) One battery prepared for counterbattery BAANGA-KINDU KINDU area and long range interdiction and routes and DIAMOND NARROWS north of MUNDA. 1000 rounds will be reserved for this mission.
 - c. *Arty with the Corps*
 - (1) 89th FA Bn (less one Btry with 152d FA Bn.). Local security RENDOVA BASE. Position: KOKORANA.
 - (2) Anti-Aircraft protection as now organized by the 9th Def. Bn.
 - 4. a. Units expending in excess of one (1) unit of fire in a single day will notify this headquarters without delay.
 - b. Other details — No Change.
 - 5. No change.
- RIDINGS G-3

GRISWOLD

BATTALION GROUPINGS

The following diagram shows the battalion groupings during the second coordinated attack of the Munda Campaign. It illustrates the flexibility and co-operation of the artillery units during the New Georgia Operation.



THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

RESPONSIBILITIES AND METHODS OF COORDINATION

The responsibilities and methods of coordination were the same as for the first attack with the omission of the naval bombardment.

The 43d Fire Direction Center acted in the dual capacity of Corps Artillery and 43d Division Artillery Fire Direction. The artillery of the Corps was massed during this operation in three preparation schedules, one general preparation for main attack and 17 Corps concentrations on enemy strong points.

The vital part played by Lt. Col. Edward W. Berry as S-3 of the Division Artillery is covered in detail in the citation of The Legion of Merit awarded to him for outstanding services in the New Georgia Campaign, which follows:

HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA

APO #502

GENERAL ORDERS)

30 December 1943

:

No.....543)

E X T R A C T

Award of the Legion of Merit

II

II. AWARDS OF THE LEGION OF MERIT

EDWARD W. BERRY (0-244768), Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services from 24 February 1941 to 7 August 1943, on the way to and in the South Pacific Area. Colonel Berry, who served as S-3 for the artillery of a division as well as of an entire corps at New Georgia, Solomon Islands, collaborated in the formulation of a plan which was so thorough that it was used unchanged as a basis for artillery employment during the campaign. He organized a fire control center for the corps artillery consisting of some ten battalions and during

[59]

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

the period of combat on New Georgia established an outstanding record for artillery support in jungle fighting.

Home Address: Glenbrook, Connecticut.

By Command of Lieutenant General Harmon:

A. J. Barnett
Brigadier General, USA,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

S/ M. B. Kendrick
Major, A.G.D.
Asst Adj Gen

A TRUE COPY:
Edwin S. Knowles
1st Lt. FA
Asst. Adj. 43d Div. Arty

CORPS-DIVISION ARTILLERY MISSION

During this attack a total of 446 artillery missions was assigned by the Corps-43d Division Artillery Fire Direction Center.

The following table shows the breakdown of these missions.

Date	Corps Conc.	Div. Conc.	Preparation of 2 or more Pre-Prep.*	Div. Night	Total
Battalions	Fires				
22 July			81		81
23 July			81		81
24 July			81		81
Attack.					
25 July	—	4	128	1	133
26 July	4	8	12	5	29
27 July	4	—	41	8	53
28 July	1	2	0	8	11
29 July	2	3	10	7	22
30 July	2	—	—	4	6
31 July	1	4	—	7	12
1 Aug.	1	4	4	7	16
2 Aug.	—	4	—	4	8
3 Aug.	2	2	8	4	16
4 Aug.	—	1	—	4	5
5 Aug.	—	1	—	—	1
Totals	17	33	446	59	555

*The 192d F.A. fired 15 support missions for the 148th Infantry.

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY UNITS

As this was a Corps operation, artillery was held under the control of the Division Artillery Commander with all coordinated attacks handled through the Corps Artillery Officer. *Except during coordinated artillery preparations under Corps or Division orders, all light battalions were in direct support and always available for call missions. The medium battalions were in general support and were used extensively to reinforce the lights* for harassing fires and fires both from chart coordinates and air observation on trails and known or suspected Jap gun positions, bivouac areas, and areas of activity.

PROGRESS OF ATTACK OF JULY 25TH

The first day (25 July) of the offensive resulted in only a small gain. The artillery saturated the jungle with 105mm and 155mm fire; yet, as soon as the barrage ended and infantry on the seaward side started west, the enemy, who had crept to comparative safety close to the American lines during the bombardment, remanned his pill-boxes. And, as the Marine tanks could not climb such steep hills as were there, the sun set on a stalemate.

On 26 July the progress was better. The infantry drew back so that the artillery could work over the no man's land where the Japanese waited. Then the barrage moved on westward and the infantry, supported by tanks, flame-throwers, heavy weapons, and artillery, reduced enemy resistance at Ilangana and continued its advance, cracking through a line of some 74 bunkers, to the coastal village of Kia. From 28 July through 31 July the infantry fought its way slowly forward taking the high ground, including Shimiza Hill and finally Horseshoe Hill.

CAPTURE OF MUNDA AIRFIELD

On 1 Aug. evidence of a Japanese withdrawal was detected

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

and a general advance was made by all infantry units. During the next four days the advance continued along the entire Corps front. In three days of heavy fighting Bibilo Hill was taken. Kokengolo Hill, in the center of the airfield, where the Methodist Mission had once stood, held up the advance temporarily, but by 1410, on 5 August, Munda Airfield, the major objective, was in Allied hands.

See insert of Daily Progress of Infantry Units, New Georgia Occupation Forces, 7th July to 5th August 1943.

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE, MUNDA CAMPAIGN (June 30 thru Aug. 6)

103 F.A.		152 F.A.		169 F.A.		136 F.A.		192 F.A.	
HE	WP	HE	WP	HE	WP	HE	WP	HE	WP
18822	550	21927	960	28190	362	14667	678	12231	359
89 F.A.		135 F.A.		140 F.A.		9 D.B.			
HE	WP	HE	WP	HE	WP	HE	WP		
2464	33	9513	382	4449	108	3154	0		
Total rounds 105 HE-84910				Total rounds WP 105 — 2530					
Total rounds 155 HE-30052				Total rounds WP 155 — 1037					
Total rounds HE-114962				Total rounds WP — 3567					

GRAND TOTAL — 118529 rounds

COUNTERBATTERY REPORT (30 June 1943 to 5 August 1943)

Counterbattery operations by the Artillery of the XIV Corps were started on 30 June. Units participating were the 9th Defense Battalion, consisting of two batteries of 155mm rifles on Rendova Island, and the 192d F. A. Bn., consisting of three batteries of 155mm howitzers on Kokorana Island. On 22 July the 192d F. A. Bn. moved to Roviana Island, and its operations were there controlled by the Corps Artillery forward echelon.

Results of counterbattery operations as reported by aerial observers and as determined by many excellent aerial photographs indicated that the operations were most successful. It is also believed that the comparatively small amount of enemy artillery fire received by our troops during the attack can in large measure be attributed to the destruction and

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

neutralization of enemy batteries by our counterbattery fire. Had additional ammunition been available for the 9th Defense Battalion, the excellent results obtained by this unit would have been greatly increased and the increased assistance to the entire operation would have been most valuable.

Observation of fires was carried out by aerial observers operating from Henderson Field, Guadalcanal and from four OPs located on Rendova Island. One OP was operated by personnel from the 9th Defense Battalion and three by personnel of the 43d Division Artillery Hq. Battery. Aerial observation was the most satisfactory means of directing counterbattery fire. The air observers and planes should be credited with much of the success obtained.

COUNTERBATTERY GROUP MISSIONS

A total of 52 targets was listed by the Counterbattery Group. The total number of rounds fired by the 9th Defense Battalion on counterbattery missions was 2790, and by the 192d F. A. Battalion, 5047. Total number of rounds fired on Counterbattery Missions, 7837.

The following citation covers in detail the outstanding services performed by Col. Chester A. Files as Commander of the Counter-Battery Group as well as Executive of the Corps Artillery during the Munda Campaign.

HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA

APO #502

30 December 1943

GENERAL ORDERS)

:

EXTRACT

No.....544)

Awards of the Legion of Merit.

II. AWARDS OF THE LEGION OF MERIT:

By direction of the President, under the provisions of the act of Congress approved 20 July 1942 (sec. III, Bull. 40, WD, 1942), Executive Order No. 9260, 29 October 1942 (sec. I, Bull. 54, WD, 1942) and authority contained in War Department radiogram dated 8 February

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

1943, a Legion of Merit is awarded by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, to the following-named officers and enlisted men:

CHESTER A. FILES, (0-297695), Colonel, Field Artillery, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services from 24 February 1941 to 7 August 1943, on the way and in the South Pacific Area. From 2 July to 7 August 1943, Col. Files was in command of an artillery groupment on Rendova and Kokorana, Solomon Islands, which shelled, with excellent results, fifty-two enemy battery targets in addition to Japanese bivouac and supply areas on New Georgia. While serving as corps artillery executive, in coordination of ten artillery battalions, during the campaign, he ably performed not only his function of command but also assumed the responsibility of delivering enormous quantities of ammunition, the supply officer having been wounded and evacuated. His services were marked by extraordinary faithfulness to duty and a high standard of efficiency.

Home address: Providence, Rhode Island.

By Command of Lieutenant General Harmon:

A. J. Barnett
Brigadier General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/ M. M. Kendrick
Major, A.G.D.
Asst Adj Gen

A TRUE COPY:
Edwin S. Knowles
1st Lt. FA
Asst Adjutant, 43d Div. Arty.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ARTILLERY FIRE

The progress of the campaign and observation of the battle areas following it give a good picture of the effectiveness of artillery fire. Neutralization and destruction were on the same level that was noted at Guadalcanal and was in keeping with what was to be expected from such a large ammunition expenditure. Heavily shelled strong points on jungle hills were completely cleared of vegetation. Artillery fire also produced three effects peculiar to this operation. These were:

1. *Elimination of tree snipers.* The most practical cure found for this menace was the command "Fire Mission All

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

Battalions . . . Fuse Quick Three Volleys". After the first week of this type of treatment the Japs moved from the trees into the ground.

2. *Elimination of night attack.* The best cure for the whistle blowing, howling night attack upon our troops was a closely adjusted system of night fires placed around our troops. The all-night firing at irregular intervals by single batteries, and sometimes a single gun, discouraged these attacks. What few were launched after this system was inaugurated were effectively stopped by short bursts of fire at maximum rate in the vicinity of the unit being attacked and along the front of adjacent units.

3. *War of Nerves.* The incessant firing of our artillery during the six-week period produced two contrasting effects on the nerves of both sides. Our own infantry often stated that these rounds continually landing in front of their lines and on the Jap positions was one of their best morale builders, especially at night. The effect on the Jap was to produce severe cases of war neurosis. He couldn't sleep at night because he never knew when and where the next round was going to land. He couldn't sleep during the daytime because when he was not being attacked by the infantry he was being shelled by the artillery.

In addition the artillery preparations destroyed or damaged enemy positions and killed, wounded or demoralized the enemy.

PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATIONS

The Japanese reaction to artillery fire is well shown by the following quotations from the Prisoner of War Interrogations.

a. *"Several inquired whether our artillery was rapid fire or automatic because the rounds came so fast."*

b. *"Between Bibilo Hill and Munda Airport there were many guns of all sizes before this campaign. But many of them had been knocked out by artillery. It has completely demoralized many units, reduced many*

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

units, and reduced many to a neurosis state. We were awakened at night by the slightest noise, because of the bad state of nerves. At night three men slept in one foxhole, two awake while the other was sleeping. During the day, we tried somehow to get some sleep, alternately, but the artillery fire kept us on edge and we could not sleep soundly."

c. "Another prisoner stated that "even in their two-story dugouts some Japs had been killed by concussion and that direct hits would kill all of the men inside."

d. "Major Hara, Capt. Kojima, both Bn. Commanders, and many staff officers of the 229th Regt. have been killed by Artillery fire."

e. "The 23d Regt. which was to proceed to Munda was unable to do so because of enemy artillery."

f. From another prisoner: "The artillery is the one thing that is universally feared by the ground forces. The artillery continues over such periods of time that the men cannot rest."

g. Another prisoner stated that "they feared only our artillery and except for it they might have continued their defense."

LANGUAGE SECTION 43D DIVISION

The Language Section of the 43d Division, commanded by Capt. Eugene A. Wright, Language Officer, was one of the most important and efficient sections in the division. It was part of the G-3 Section of Division Headquarters.

Information of great value was obtained from captured prisoners of war, enemy documents, enemy clothing and materiel. Some types of information obtained were:

Location of artillery targets

Movement of enemy troops

Identification of Japanese units and commanders

Morale and health of enemy troops and

Location of enemy artillery positions

On many occasions, the effectiveness of our artillery fire was the direct result of reports from this Language Section.

The Nisei enlisted men came from Washington, Oregon and California. Prior to joining the Division, they were trained at the Army Language School. They proved to be loyal, intelligent, and hard workers, and took great pride in their service with the 43d Division. Great care had to be used when they were working in forward areas so they would not

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

be mistaken for the enemy. Although assigned to Division Headquarters, many of these linguists preferred to work with forward units, and were temporarily detailed to them.

The Language Section was always keenly interested in the plans and operations of the Division Artillery. On 4 August 1943 they honored Brigadier General H. R. Barker on his birthday, and presented him with the insignia of rank taken from Rear Admiral Takaji Joshima of the Japanese Eleventh Air Fleet.

The following officers and men served on the language team.

Captain Eugene A. Wright, Infantry
Lieutenant Michael Mitchell, MI
Technical Sergeant Shigeo Yasutake
Technician Third Grade Richard K. Matsumoto
Technician Third Grade Haruo Tanaka
Technician Third Grade Charles N. Nakagawa
Technician Third Grade S. Lloyd Sato
Technician Third Grade Kiyoto T. Nishimoto
Technician Third Grade Charles Hamasaki
Technician Third Grade Ted T. Kihara
Technician Third Grade Mamoru Noji
Technician Fourth Grade Mike Ohara

Sergeants Yasutake and Kihara were later commissioned as Lieutenants of Infantry from Fort Benning, Georgia, and Sergeant Tanaka was commissioned in the field as a Lieutenant.

Captain Yasutake finished the War in the China Theater as an assistant G-2.

DIRECT SUPPORT OF INFANTRY

Some idea of the effectiveness of the direct support given to our own infantry can be obtained from the following unofficial report of a Marine Observer, Lt. Col. J. M. Smith, USMC, who served continuously in the front lines until wounded by Jap mortar fire and evacuated on 25 July.

"The hasty terrain map and the photo map lacked much of the accuracy normally thought necessary to firing night concentrations. Yet these

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

difficulties were overcome. Some of the Artillery Liaison officers had an uncanny ability for sensing by ear and maneuvering the fire into the areas desired. To illustrate: one night I was with two battalions of the 172d Infantry that were cut off on three sides by the Japs, with a swamp on the fourth side. The battalions were shot up, congested and unnerved. Part of both were clinging to the inner side of what appeared to be a half crater, while some men were in the bowl. The Japs laid down a mortar concentration, and casualties began to mount. No one could tell accurately where we were, but the Artillery Liaison Officer, Capt. Robert S. Pine, 103d F. A., called down a concentration on a point some hundred yards away, and by waltzing and side slipping fire, brought it in so close on two sides that dirt was thrown on us in our foxholes. The mortars were silenced for most of the night.

"Little delay was ever experienced in getting concentrations when and where needed."

Capt. Pine's final adjustment was called "Concentration 110" and for some time afterwards "Concentration 110" became a byword with all infantrymen and whenever they got into a tight situation they would say "Give us Concentration 110".

Some idea as to the courage and efficiency of Capt. Robert S. Pine can be obtained from the following citations covering the award of The Legion of Merit and The Silver Star. In addition Capt. Pine was awarded the Purple Heart with (1) Oak-Leaf Cluster for wounds received in action on 10 and 20 January 1945 in the Luzon Campaign.

CITATION

AWARD OF THE LEGION OF MERIT

ROBERT S. PINE, (0-453602), First Lieutenant, Field Artillery, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services on New Georgia, Solomon Islands, during the periods of 5-17 and 20-28 July; and 4-8 August 1943. Lieutenant Pine was combat Liaison Officer and forward observer for the light artillery supporting infantry assault echelons. In the advance through dense jungle and swamp from Barike River to the junction of the Munda and Lambetti Trails, Lieutenant Pine, despite heavy rains, poor visibility and lack of terrain desirable for observation, displayed outstanding ingenuity and skill in bringing artillery fire to bear upon enemy troops, bivouac areas and strong points. In spite of hostile sniper, mortar and machine-gun fire, he kept the infantry commander advised of artillery capabilities, adjustment of attack concentrations and night defensive fire, in most instances by sound. Later, in the attacks westward from the

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

Lambetti Trail, through a series of rugged, wooded ridges studded with enemy pillboxes and organized defense positions, Lieutenant Pine vigorously pushed forward, often to within 100 yards of Japanese troops. His action proved of unusual value and timeliness in laying down artillery fire upon the enemy. His excellent judgment in adjusting fire at times when the location of friendly troops was obscure was especially commendable and the effect of the fire delivered was a prominent factor in the success of the advance.

(AUTH: CO 352 Hq. USAFISPA date 1 Nov. 43)

CITATION

AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR

ROBERT S. PINE, (0-453602), First Lieutenant, Field Artillery, United States Army, for gallantry in action at New Georgia, Solomon Islands, when on 11 July 1943, he placed himself in the dangerous position of receiving both enemy and friendly fire by aggressively going forward to a point, from which he skillfully laid down a curtain of artillery fire between his battalion and the enemy to successfully neutralize the latter's mortar fire.

(AUTH: CO 521 Hq. USAFISPA dated 22 Dec. 43)

LIAISON AND FORWARD OBSERVATION

All battery officers, except the executive, were used as forward observers, generally with the front line infantry companies. These officers and their parties were usually rotated every three or four days. Wire communication proved far more reliable than radio in the jungle. Radio equipment deteriorated rapidly in the moist atmosphere, and the height of the trees in the rain forest cut down radio range markedly. Field wire, however, even when laid in the salt water of the lagoon remained serviceable for long periods. Eventually, the wire was frayed by the sharp coral bottom and short circuits developed. Line repair was impracticable and generally whole new lines were laid, usually by small boats.

Lateral communication between forward observers was found to be most essential in order to be certain at all times of the forward location of the adjoining infantry units. In

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

all cases when close-in missions were fired, the forward observer was in communication with the liaison officer at Infantry Battalion Headquarters. Forward observers were handicapped in firing missions by the lack or scarcity of firing charts and photo maps of the areas over which they were advancing.

Command Liaison was maintained by rotating, every 3 or 4 days, the Artillery Battalion Commanders, Executives and Liaison Officers; five-man detachments were used; 1 NCO, 1 telephone operator, and 3 linesmen. An extra wire crew was kept at the Infantry Regimental C. P. An extra 4-drop switchboard at the liaison headquarters greatly facilitated communications with the Forward Observers.

The work of the liaison details, forward observers, survey parties and communication details was largely responsible for the effective artillery support provided for the infantry during the operation. Sixty percent of all artillery officers were with the infantry on the mainland at all times. The rotation of artillery personnel with the front line detachments was vital to maintain high efficiency and uninterrupted fire support.

Some examples of the efficient and courageous work done by this personnel are illustrated by the following Citations and Decorations that were received by artillerymen for action in the New Georgia Campaign.

CITATION

AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

DONALD L. MUSHIK, (0-1140106), First Lieutenant, Field Artillery, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism on 23 July 1943, while he was forward observer for an artillery battalion supporting an infantry salient which had penetrated Japanese positions and was exposed to fire from three directions on Horseshoe Mountain, New Georgia, Solomon Islands. Lieutenant Mushik boldly went forward for better observation and at an unprotected point became the target for heavy enemy fire. His telephone wires were twice shot out. Four mortar shells dropped

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

within fifteen feet of him and one other burst in a tree directly over his head. Although wounded by shell fragments, he repaired the telephone lines and defiantly stood on a log seventy-five yards from hostile lines to direct artillery fire. The Japanese then shelled his position with a dual-purpose gun and also subjected him to machine-gun fire. His lines again were severed and his radio was struck, but he completed his mission by using infantry communications. His persistent efforts neutralized two all-out enemy attacks. Lieutenant Mushik, after accurately adjusting fourteen artillery concentrations, was ordered to the rear for medical attention.

(AUTH: CO 453 Hq USAFISPA dated 30 Nov. 43)

CITATION

AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

EDWARD WOODROW WILD, (0-420448), First Lieutenant, Field Artillery, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism as a forward artillery observer in New Georgia, Solomon Islands, from 20 July to 5 August 1943. To assure destruction of heavily-fortified enemy positions, Lieutenant Wild frequently moved beyond the infantry in the front lines to observe and direct fire accurately. Fully realizing that any miscalculation in range or defect in ammunition would cause his death, he directed artillery fire to within forty yards of his own position. When he was wounded he refused evacuation for proper medical attention and courageously continued to perform his duties.

(AUTH: CO 392 Hq USAFISPA dated 13 Nov 43)

CITATION

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

MAJOR ROBERT W. KENNY, 0-205944 (then 152d FA Bn), for especially meritorious service beyond the usual in the MUNDA operation.

In that during the period of the MUNDA Operation from 4 July to 5 August 1943, he did perform especially meritorious service, and during the greater part of this period Major Kenny maintained command liaison for his battalion with the supported infantry in the front lines. In that capacity he directed artillery fire with such skill, although under extremely hazardous conditions, that our troops were able to advance from LAIANA and assist in the capture of the air field. Much of the success of this operation is due to Major Kenny's performance at this time. His excellent manner of performance aided greatly in the successful completion of this campaign.

By Command of Major General WING

[71]

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Following are the names of some personnel *who also* distinguished themselves and received awards for this type of service during the NEW GEORGIA operation.

Capt. Wilton H. Bremer
Capt. Johns H. Congdon II
Capt. Warren K. Covill
Capt. William B. Craig
Capt. Thos. A. DeWolfe
Capt. Edgar S. Downing
Capt. William A. Farrell
Capt. Robert S. Hussey
Capt. Francis A. McAuliffe
Capt. Robert W. Patenge
1st Lt. Riner E. Deglow
1st Lt. Earl M. Payne KIA
1st Lt. Ernest M. Meier
2nd Lt. Arthur F. Malone KIA
(KIA — Killed in action)

It is regretted that the names of the enlisted men who so capably assisted these officers and made this outstanding record possible, are not available in any of the reports on file. Little could have been accomplished without their support.

SECURITY OF THE MAINLAND

Because of the undoubted superiority of the Japanese infantryman as a night fighter, the advance of our forces was usually halted about 1500 and the infantryman dug in for the night, stretched trip wires armed with grenades and hung tin cans together to warn of the approach of the infiltrating Jap. Forward observers adjusted the night fires for close-in protection, the guns were laid on these concentrations and fired during the night on call. During the hours of darkness all personnel were in fox holes and no movement was permitted. Anyone moving above ground after dark was fired upon by both friendly and enemy troops.

BATTERY POSITIONS

One of the most difficult problems for the artillery to solve in jungle warfare was the selection of battery positions which

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

would permit the fulfillment of fire missions. Battery positions in the New Georgia Operation were of two types: (1) positions on adjacent islands and (2) positions on mainland.

Island positions had the disadvantage of lines of communication under water. They require boat transportation for movement of personnel, supplies and ammunition. Small boats were very difficult to obtain.

The advantages of island positions were:

(1) the elimination of construction of roads, clearing fields of fire, and the difficult maintenance of wire lines in the jungle;

(2) the elimination of transportation over muddy jungle trails;

(3) the freedom of operation of FDCs, switchboards, and gun crews day and night, without interference by snipers and raiding parties. Island positions required only small beach parties for close-in defense.

(4) the possibility of enfilade fire in many instances.

The advantages of island positions greatly outweigh the disadvantages. This was particularly so in this operation *as there were no positions on the mainland where effective fields of fire could be obtained*. The peculiar communications and supply problems were satisfactorily overcome.

Most of our positions during the New Georgia operation were on adjacent islands, and the use of our antitank platoons permitted an effective beach and close-in defense. Positions on the mainland were not occupied until after the Munda Airfield was taken. If positions on the mainland had been occupied during the initial landings and attacks, it is extremely doubtful if proper security could have been maintained, as the infantry had its own problems and simply could not be depended upon for the close-in defense of the artillery. *At no time from their positions on adjacent islands was the artillery unable to carry out its Fire Missions.*

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

The following is quoted from *The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War* by Isely and Crowl. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J.)

"On New Georgia a set of *ground tactics* was outlined which later would be polished and become routine in the Central Pacific. This was the *integration of artillery, tanks and infantry*, equipped with flamethrowers to overcome strong enemy positions. . . . Also on New Georgia Americans for the *first time* in the Pacific War set up shore-based artillery on an unoccupied beach in order to neutralize or destroy possible enemy opposition on an adjacent island. Great as is the naval gunfire, shore based artillery should be used whenever possible, particularly if an amphibian assault is expected to develop."

AIR OBSERVATION

Three artillery officers, one each from the 152nd F. A. Bn., 169th F. A. Bn., and 192d F. F. Bn., were sent from the Russells to the strike command at Henderson Field, Guadalcanal. They were permanently stationed at Henderson Field and were on call on two hours' notice through the Air Support Party on Rendova. It was only possible to maintain one observer in the air at a time. No time was available for specific training of these officers between the receipt of the decision to use artillery officers as observers and the time of their reporting. At their time of leaving the correct CICSOPAC photomaps were not available.

These observers successfully accomplished 330 missions during the campaign. This does not include the repeated neutralization of Japanese artillery which ceased to fire when the observer was in their vicinity. There were only two days when because of poor flying weather the observers were not available. The major difficulty encountered was communications, due to the fact that the plane radios were teamed to operate on two frequencies only, and these frequencies were being used by the Army, Navy and Air Corps in other nets. Japanese anti-aircraft fire was frequently directed against our air observers as they adjusted fire on their targets. One

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

of the observers, Lt. W. B. Craig, 192d F.A., was shot down twice during such adjustments.

Following is the Citation covering the award of The Distinguished Service Cross to Lieut. Wm. B. Craig. In addition the Purple Heart for wounds received in action on 27 July 1943 was awarded to Lieut. Craig.

CITATION

AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

WILLIAM B. CRAIG, (0-361608), First Lieutenant, Field Artillery, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy during the New Georgia (Solomon Islands) Campaign. While assigned as an artillery air observer, Lieutenant Craig was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire in the vicinity of Munda on 24 July 1943. He was picked up by a friendly boat, and the following day returned to his base. On 26 July he again returned to the area as an observer. While adjusting fire for his battalion, he again was shot down by enemy fire in approximately the same location. In spite of minor burns he returned to his air base and requested that he be allowed to return to the air. On 2 August, Lieutenant Craig was placed on a duty status and he returned to the Munda area and continued to adjust fire from the air. His action and courage were an inspiration to the ground troops of the command of which he was a member, and his service as an artillery observer was praised by all commanders of units for whom he had adjusted fire. (AUTH: CO 317 Hq USAFISPA dated 21 Oct 43)

SUPPORTING AIR BOMBARDMENT

Requests for aerial bombardment to supplement field artillery fires were made by the artillery operations section to the Air Support Party at Rendova.

COMMUNICATIONS

WIRE

The location of our guns off of the mainland of New Georgia on adjacent islands posed a communications problem which was successfully solved. The inter-island network included both 5-pair and standard W-110 field wire and was laid under water by small boats. New W-110 wire without numerous repair splices gave excellent results. All lines had to be kept clear of channels and landing beaches. On the mainland circuits were laid in duplicate, using different routes. Test

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

stations were established every two or three miles to expedite location of breaks. Maximum use was made of infantry regimental switchboards in the forward areas, thus reducing the necessity for extra switchboards.

Lateral Communication for Forward Observers was established. This was a must, particularly in jungle warfare. W-130 wire gave good service for Forward Observers.

The sound power phone was the best type of phone for the Forward Observer. It is light in weight, and has no ringing mechanism to give away the position at night. It was used also between executives and chiefs of section when the guns were emplaced in deep jungle or at any time when gun sections could not easily be controlled by voice, between OPs, and in the Warning Net and AA installations. The sound power phone is of all equipment the least affected by dampness.

RADIO

Both the SCR-193 and the SCR-284 gave excellent results for Air-Ground communications. The 600-series gave very erratic performance in the jungle. All sets gave their best performance when located in clearings.

The climatic effect on radios in this theater of operations was considerable. Most of the new radio batteries received were unserviceable because of corrosion and shelf life.

The difficulties of communication and the courage and ingenuity displayed in overcoming these difficulties are illustrated by a few, of the many, citations awarded for this work, which follow:

HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA

APO #502

9 November 1943

GENERAL ORDERS)

No. 380)

EXTRACT

Awards of the Legion of Merit Section
II

[76]

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

II. AWARDS OF THE LEGION OF MERIT

By direction of the President, under the provisions of the act of Congress approved 20 July 1942 (Sec. III, Bull. 40, WD, 1942), Executive Order No. 9260, 29 October 1942) (sec. I, Bull. 54, WD, 1942) and authority contained in War Department radiogram dated 8 February 1943, a Legion of Merit is awarded by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, to the following-named enlisted man:

EVERETT J. BARTLETT, (20146238), Master Sergeant, Field Artillery, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service during the offensive at New Georgia, Solomon Islands, from 30 June to 7 August 1943. Often working at night at the risk of being fired on by friendly as well as enemy troops, Sergeant Bartlett displayed initiative and ability in installing and maintaining fifty miles of telephone wire in water and dense jungle with the assistance of a minimum of personnel. When no other craft was available, he repaired a small enemy landing barge and rowed from island to island to lay wire. Uninterrupted telephone communications from the division artillery headquarters to the battalions and to the front lines were due almost entirely to his efforts.

Home address: Mt. Desert, Maine.

By Command of Lieutenant General Harmon:

A. J. BARNETT
Brigadier General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/M. B. Kendrick
t/M. B. Kendrick
Major, A.G.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

A TRUE COPY:

Edwin S. Knowles
1st Lt., FA, Asst. Adjutant

With reference to this award, Sergeant Bartlett insisted that his act was part of a *team effort* and specifically named the following men as part of the team.

S/Sgt. Claude Murphy (Wire Section)
S/Sgt. Reginald Linscott (Radio Section)
Sgt. Jesse Fogg
Cpl. Curtis West
Cpl. Edwin Sprague
Cpl. B. Richardson
Pvt. A. A. Bonnevie

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

CITATION

AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

FRED L. JUNKIN, (36331859), Private First Class, Field Artillery, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism at New Georgia, Solomon Islands, on 14 July 1943. Private Junkin and one other enlisted man voluntarily went into enemy-occupied territory in order to re-establish telephone communication with an infantry battalion which was in a critical battle situation and was without artillery support. For almost six hours, he moved through dense jungles repairing and installing wire while under the intermittent fire of snipers and patrols. At one point in the line where the Japanese returned three times and cut the wire as soon as he had repaired it, Private Junkin stood guard under sniper fire and held off the enemy while urgent artillery instructions were being transmitted. His courage and cool perseverance while under the prolonged strain of outwitting the enemy also made possible the transmission of vital infantry tactical messages.

(AUTH: CO 67 Hq USAFISPA dated 12 Jan 44)

CITATION

AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

STANLEY L. GINISH, (20153463), Private, Field Artillery, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism at New Georgia, Solomon Islands, on 14 July 1943. Private Ginish and one other enlisted man voluntarily went into enemy occupied territory in order to re-establish telephone communication with an infantry battalion which was in a critical battle situation and was without artillery support. For almost six hours, he moved through dense jungles repairing and installing wire while under intermittent fire of snipers and patrols. At one point in the line where the Japanese returned three times and cut the wire as soon as he had repaired it, Private Ginish stood guard under sniper fire and held off the enemy while urgent artillery instructions were being transmitted. His courage and cool perseverance while under the prolonged strain of outwitting the enemy also made possible the transmission of vital infantry tactical messages.

(AUTH: CO 71 Hq USAFISPA dated 12 Jan 44)

METRO

Variations from day to day and during the day were negligible. K changed from midday to midnight by approximately 9 yards per thousand.

37TH DIVISION ARTILLERY REPORT

The 37th Division Artillery commanded by Brig. Gen. Leo M. Kreber gave a notable performance during the New

THE MUNDA CAMPAIGN

Georgia Operation. Its efficiency and co-operation left nothing to be desired.

The following pertinent items were taken from its report:

ARTILLERY GROUPING

The grouping of the artillery battalions from the two divisions clearly shows that *Ft. Sill training methods* are most satisfactory, and further that any battalion having successfully *passed the GMQ tests is able to perform any mission presented it.*

As the 140th F.A. Bn. did not arrive until five days after the initial attack of the Division, the 192d F.A. (155mm How.) was used in direct support of the 148th Infantry during a large part of the battle. Liaison sections and forward observers were drawn from the 89th and 169th F.A. Bns. until the arrival, before the rest of the battalion, of the liaison officers and forward observers of the 140th. Calls for fire were handled through the Division Artillery F.D.C. and timely and accurate fire delivered. In most cases communication was by telephone direct from the forward observer, relayed and controlled by an officer at the Division Artillery F.D.C. When possible, fire missions were parted through the F.D.C.

FIRE DIRECTION

Fire Direction by both battalion and Division Artillery followed standard Ft. Sill procedure. Battalion targets were designated by coordinates or by reference to previous concentrations. Observed fire, except for Base Point registration, was conducted by forward observation methods, usually starting with a round of smoke. Division Artillery targets were habitually designated by chart or adjusted coordinates and fired on time schedule, at command, or when ready, as the situation and the element of surprise dictated. Frequent use was made of conference calls on direct lines from Division Artillery to the Bn. F.D.C.'s.

Standard rates of fire were one battalion concentration every three minutes of three volleys for the lights and two for the mediums. This meant delivery at the rate of twelve tons of high explosives from the 105's and twenty-four tons from the 155's.

SURVEY

Survey is valuable in establishing vertical control, and locating artillery observers, OPs and front line infantry elements.

Because of the lack of accurate maps, and the dense rain forest, survey operations were a problem, but position and target areas were surveyed and connected rapidly. However, the data resulting was soon found to be valueless because of the inaccuracy of the map. When using a photo map, survey control must be started from inspection, as near the target as possible. Battalions normally located themselves from the base point by

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

inspection and back plotting. An initial point was then established on Laiana Beach by the Division Artillery team and carried forward to a center point in the Division area. Three traverses were run from here. One, by the 192d F.A. team under Lt. Fielding, leading to the 148th Infantry area, ran into a party of Japs and had to be discontinued but disclosed the fact that the 148th Regiment had been entirely cut off. Had it been possible to complete the traverse much of the trouble experienced in definitely locating elements of this regiment would have been eliminated.

The 135th F.A. survey team under Lt. Scheffer carried control successfully to the 161st Infantry front lines, where it was used to good advantage. The 37th Division Artillery team under Lt. Shannon carried control to the 145th Infantry and forward OP of the 169th F.A. Bn. It was most useful and was completed without casualties, although Lt. Shannon, while acting in the dangerous capacity of front site man, was fired upon and pinned to the ground by a Jap machine gun.

Fairly accurate control had now been established on New Georgia Island. Credit for the initial survey work should be given to the 43d Division Artillery team and to Lt. Fielding* and the 192d F.A. Bn. team.

OBSERVATION

Artillery fire was habitually observed. Forward observers, with infantry front line battalions, were used to the maximum.

Location of front line units in the jungle was extremely difficult. *Infantry units were located many times by artillery fire.* A round of smoke would be called for in front of the estimated position; all observers, artillery and infantry, were alerted to watch for it. Following each sensing of smoke, the next round was fired closer to our lines, and the fire continued until a round was sensed 200 to 300 yards directly to the front.


Location of the front was determined by the plot of the final round.

Initial sensings were frequently by sound, sometimes requiring a battery volley of HE after it was determined that the trial round of smoke was in a safe location. This was particularly difficult as the sound reverberated in the jungle and seemed to come from false directions and distances, and differed between day and night, rain and clear weather. Shells bursting in the tops of tall trees sound quite different from those reaching the ground and may, in fact, vary in range over 100 yards due to the slope of fall. These factors made the work of the forward observers most difficult, and led infantry commanders to feel at times that fire was falling closer to them than was actually the case.

Forward observers and liaison officers stayed with, fought with, and became a part of the infantry battalion, going through the campaign with them without relief and then frequently being sent into combat with another battalion when their own was temporarily inactive.

Capt. Barnhouse was cut off with the 148th Infantry, ambushed and lost his vehicle, radio, and equipment. Capt. Black and Lt. McKinnan, and a forward observer, while adjusting fire from the beach (on a party of

*Lt. George T. Fielding III, a fearless, energetic young officer, was killed later during the Luzon Campaign.



Front view of 105 howitzer showing position and camouflage on Sasavele Island. This gun was one of the many used on Munda by American forces, 3 Aug. 1943.



Effect of Artillery fire on trees in New Georgia.



Japanese interpreters of the U.S. Army decipher papers found on a wounded Jap Officer on the Island of Rendova. Standing: right, Capt. Eugene A. Wright, center, Sgt. Ted T. Kihara, left, Sgt. Haruo Tanaka. Kneeling: Sgt. Charles Hamasaki, Sgt. Kiyoshi Nishimoto, Corp. Charles Nakagawa. July 2, 1943.



Lt. Michael Mitchell (left) and T/3 Haruo Tanaka, a member of the language section of the 43rd Division, examine a Japanese shelter-dugout in the jungle of South Pacific Island. 27 Aug. 1943.



Infantry Patrol on Munda Trail, New Georgia, July, 1943



Entrance to Jap pillbox, possessing unusual feature of six MG ports, giving Jap gunners 180 degree field of fire. Commanding position of this fortification makes it one of the strongest of such type positions found on New Georgia.



First troops, 103rd Infantry, 43rd Division, advancing on Jap pillbox beside grounded Jap bomber at edge of Munda air field. Men are from Co. F. 4 August 1943.



Bursting Artillery shells landing on the Munda Air-strip, New Georgia during final assault, 5 August 1943.

THE BAANGA CAMPAIGN

Japs who had escaped to a small island offshore) were cut off by seven Japs. They shot their way out, killing all of the Japs.

Lt. Muldoon, with a hand grenade, killed a Jap who had been firing at him.

Lt. Stewart was walking down a trail beside a sergeant. The sergeant fell with a bullet through the head; Stewart whipped around and (with his "tommy gun") killed the three Japs who had fired on them. Lt. Curtin was seriously wounded after weeks of excellent work.

Air observation was excellent. Artillery officers, detached from their battalion for this purpose, flew low over the target area, drawing fire and then adjusting on it. One air observer, Lt. Craig, of the 192d F.A. Bn., was shot down on two occasions, once not being rescued until the following day, and each time immediately resumed his duties with deadly effect.

JAPANESE COUNTER-MEASURES

Japanese artillery fire, while at times annoying, was generally ineffective. Although they had 75mm high velocity guns in several locations near the airport and observation from Kokengolo Hill and at times from the air, no more than one gun was ever fired at a time and no serious attempt at counterbattery seems to have been made. Their most effective counter-measures seem to have been the firing of mortars and artillery by single piece inside our lines when our artillery was firing, to give the impression that our own fire was falling short. This was definitely proved in many instances, and unfortunately at times accomplished its purpose when our artillery was ordered to suspend fire. It must be guarded against in the future.

The Jap is clever. He even fired three rounds when he thought we were going to continue our practice of firing concentrations of three volleys and on one occasion changed to smoke when we did and we sensed two rounds when all that had been fired was one round.

There were not many cases of low flying planes which presented suitable targets but those that did strafe or dive bomb the positions suffered heavily for their pains. The 192d F.A. Bn. shot down two and the combined fire of the Division Artillery, Hq. Battery, 192d F.A., and 135th F.A.Bns. brought down another. The percentage brought down was extremely high.

THE BAANGA CAMPAIGN (August 1943)

By 5 August, on New Georgia at least, the bloodiest of the slugging was over. The Munda Airfield had to be put into shape at once, and the remaining Japanese had to be cleaned out of New Georgia and several of the off-shore islands.

Following the capture of Munda defensive operations were promptly initiated by the 43d Division against possible

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

counter-attacks or raids. The 172d Inf. and 169th Inf. were disposed along the Main Line of Resistance (approx. 3,000 yards north of Munda Airport). Strong patrol action was initiated from the Munda area in all directions. The enemy continued to place sporadic fire on the Munda Point and adjacent bivouac areas from the general direction of Swinger Channel. The fire was not effective, but indicated enemy strength still active in the Diamond Narrows area, particularly Baanga Island.

CONDITION OF COMBAT TROOPS

By 5 August the condition of the combat troops was poor. Casualties and disease had weakened the infantry regiments. The 43d Division, with an authorized strength of 8,000 men, had in its three rifle regiments only 4536 men and these were in urgent need of rest and rehabilitation.

THE JAPANESE SITUATION — 5 AUGUST

On 5 August General Sasaki had decided to abandon New Georgia as he could no longer defend it. He therefore sent the *13th Infantry* and most of the Bairoko-based Special Naval Landing Force units to Kolombangara, and the *229th Infantry*, the *3d Battalion*, *230th Infantry*, and the *3d Battalion*, *23d Infantry*, to Baanga, a long narrow island which lay across Lulu Channel from Zieta. These units, plus two 120mm naval guns, were ordered to defend Baanga, and the naval guns were to shell Munda Airfield.

Having abandoned Munda, Sasaki's Headquarters were established on Baanga until 7 August, and the next day he transferred to Kolombangara.

CHANGES IN COMMAND OF THE 43D INFANTRY DIVISION

On 29 July, Maj. Gen. John H. Hester,* because of physical disability, was relieved, and Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge

*Maj. Gen. John H. Hester, a professional soldier and a fine gentleman, who always had the best interests of his men at heart, was notable for his training of troops. He assumed command of the 43d Infantry Division at Camp Blanding, Florida in September 1941.

THE BAANGA CAMPAIGN

assumed command of the 43d Division. On 10 August Gen. Hodge,* whose appointment had been temporary, returned to his Americal Division, and Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker succeeded him in command of the 43d.

THE MISSION OF THE 43D INFANTRY DIVISION

On 10 August Gen. Griswold ordered the 43d Division, which after the fall of Munda had been building defensive installations, to patrol the New Georgia shoreline north for 4000 yards and to reconnoiter Nusembembeya, Baanga and Ondonga Peninsula as far north as the entrance to Diamond Narrows. Patrolling was to be "co-ordinated, continuous and aggressive."

On 10 August the 169th Infantry was given the mission of reconnoitering the islands adjacent to its sector, including Vela Cela, Baanga and the small islands commanding the southern approach to Diamond Narrows. It was apparent that the complete defense of Munda required control of the Diamond Narrows, this channel giving access to the Munda area for the enemy's Vila troops.

Early 11 August, a reconnaissance patrol landed on Southern Baanga with the mission of determining enemy strength and disposition. Enemy strength was discovered in the southern portion of the island. On 12 August a rifle company was landed on Baanga with the mission of continuing the reconnaissance in force. The company was completely surprised by strong shore defenses and suffered heavy casualties. Approximately half of the company was forced to withdraw, leaving the balance, many of whom were dead or wounded, on shore. The extent of the enemy's strength and defensive installations had been seriously underestimated. Immediate action was taken to attack the island in force. Efforts were made under cover of darkness to extricate the isolated forces on the

*Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge, a professional soldier who had a distinguished record as a combat general, not only in the 43d Infantry Division but later on as commander of the XXIV Corps.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

island, but they failed. Enemy automatic weapons commanded all approaches to the shore.

On 13 August, one battalion of the 169th Infantry landed on Vela Cela, searched the island with negative results, and prepared to advance to Baanga at daybreak the following morning.

On 14 August Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker, now commanding the 43d Infantry Division, together with Lt. Col. Bradt, 169th F. A. Bn., and his artillery forward observers were present on Vela Cela and accompanied the advance of the 3d Bn. 169th Infantry to Baanga. After the beachhead was established on Baanga, Field Order 16, directing a co-ordinated division attack on Baanga, was issued.

Secret

HEADQUARTERS 43d INFANTRY DIV.

Auth: Comgen, 43 Div. A.P.O. #43, c/o Postmaster

Init: San Francisco, California

Date: 8/15/43

FIELD ORDER)
No 16)

1. a. Enemy strength Baanga unknown. Dispositions, see opn. overlay. Enemy is well supplied with automatic weapons and presents a fluid defense, adjusted to pill boxes and heavy weapons.
b. Air missions on call.
2. 43d Division will seize Baanga Island ; it will destroy all enemy resistance and establish base on Island for further advance to islands North and West.
3. a. 169th Inf. (-1 Bn.) will advance with its left flank on the shore (see opn. ovly.), and move West and South. It will reduce all enemy strength in its sector. Upon reaching Southeast tip Baanga (78.3-36.7), it will establish and secure beachhead, and continue advance to West.
b. 172d Inf. (-1 Bn.) : 1 platoon, 118th Engrs attached will advance in column, following 169th Inf. It will protect North flank, 169th Inf. West of 78.2. It will be prepared to envelop enemy strength from Right (North) flank. It will furnish one Bn. for Div. Reserve, Vela Cela.

THE BAANGA CAMPAIGN

- c. 43d Div. Arty. (136th F.A. Bn. and 140th F.A. Bn. attached) will furnish preparation fires and direct support.
 - d. One platoon, 118th Engrs. attached to 172d Inf. will improve landing beach (79.9-39.0) and improve route of advance of 172d Inf.
 - x. (1) Five (5) LCV's attached each regiment.
(2) Disposition per F. O. #13 will be adjusted to accomplish local mission, defense Munda. 37mm guns and heavy MGs required in beach defense will not be moved initially to Baanga.
4. Administrative:
- a. Class I and V: Vela Cela pier.
 - b. Evacuation: Lambeti Beach.
5. a. Signal: No change.
b. 43d Div. Forward OP — (79.9-39.0)
Regimental OP — to be announced.

BARKER

Marland
G-3

Lt. Col. Bradt, 169th F. A. Bn., had direct supervision of Artillery Fires in support of the Infantry operations on Baanga. The following citation covering the award of The Legion of Merit to Col. Bradt gives details on the superior services performed by this officer during the New Georgia Campaign. In addition, Col. Bradt was awarded the Purple Heart with Oak Leaf Cluster, having been wounded on 4 and 12 July.

CITATION

AWARD OF THE LEGION OF MERIT

WILBER E. BRADT, (0-182711), Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services on the way to and in the South Pacific Area from 24 February 1941 to 21 September 1943. In New Georgia, Solomon Islands, he supervised the direction of fire on 14 July 1943, which helped the infantry to seize strategic Horseshoe Hill. On the following day his battalion's fire forced the retreat of Japanese troops who threatened annihilation of an infantry command post. From 20 to 30 July, his battalion ably supported two infantry regiments and on one occasion during this period Colonel Bradt directed all artillery battalions of a division in massed fire which virtually wiped out an enemy command post. His supervision of fire in support of infantry operations on both Baanga and Arundel Islands was outstanding. The continuous superior achievement of Colonel Bradt contributed much to the success of the New Georgia Campaign.

(AUTH: GO 545 Hq USAFISPA dated 30 Dec. 43)

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

The advance of the force from the beachhead on 15 August was halted by enemy fortifications in the heavy jungle area 600 yards west of the beachhead. Reinforcements failed to overcome the Jap strength, and on 16 August the 172d Infantry was committed to the operation. This left one battalion of the 169th Infantry and one battalion of the 172d Infantry in defense of Munda proper.

On 18 August enemy fortifications in the eastern sector were successfully flanked and our forces advanced South, encountering little opposition. A block was established across the neck of the southern peninsula to pocket the remaining enemy strength in the area. On 20 August the Anti-tank Platoon, 169th F. A. Bn. (Lt. Edwin S. Knowles) occupied Nusembembeya Island, to furnish close direct support to infantry elements on Baanga. During the nights 18-19 and 20-21 August, the enemy evacuated southern Baanga, by boat and land, suffering heavy losses from our troops blocking the trails. Intelligence later disclosed that remnants of two battalions, reinforced by naval gun elements, were opposing our troops on Baanga. After 21 August the enemy's harassing fire ceased.

The remainder of Baanga, as well as the islands leading north to Diamond Narrows, were searched without re-establishment of contact with the enemy. Elements of the 25th Infantry Division successfully occupied Ondongo Island, comprising the eastern shore of Diamond Narrows.

ARTILLERY OPERATIONS

RECORD OF EVENTS

Liaison with the 169th Infantry Regiment was continuously maintained by the 169th F. A. Bn. from the end of the operation against the Munda Airport. When patrols met resistance on Baanga Island on 11 and 12 August, "C" Battery, 169th Bn., was assigned to support the operation. On 13 August an observation post was established on Kindu Point.

THE BAANGA CAMPAIGN

The island of Nusembembeya and the south end of Baanga Island were neutralized by the battery. The 3d Bn. 169th Infantry, accompanied by the normal forward observer and liaison parties from the 169th F. A. Bn., occupied Vela Cela Island on the night of 13 August; after a one-hour artillery preparation against what was later found to be a strongly organized Japanese position, the 3d Bn., 169th Infantry crossed Lulu Channel to Baanga Island without opposition about noon, 14 August. Contact was made with a strong Japanese force about 800 yards east of the beachhead that night, but the forward observer was unable to get artillery support because communications had been cut. The Baanga Island mission was turned over to the 169th Infantry Regiment on 15 August with the 169th F. A. Bn. in direct support. Since the 169th F. A. Bn. on Sasavele Island was out of artillery range, the fires were furnished by the 140th F. A. Bn. and the 136th F. A. Bn. (less "B" Btry). All batteries were registered and fired close-in fires all night. On 16 August a forward command post of the 169th F. A. Bn., with forward switchboard, was organized on Vela Cela to control the work of the liaison and forward observer parties and coordinate the firing of the battalions. At this time, two battalions of the 172d Infantry were committed. Liaison and forward observer parties were furnished from the 140th F. A. Bn. with one additional officer from the 103d F. A. Bn. The 136th F. A. Bn., placed one officer at Kindu Point observation post.

The 169th F. A. Battalion was alerted 17 August to occupy new positions on New Georgia Island in support of this operation. Two howitzers of "A" Btry and two of "B" Btry on one LCT, and "C" Btry on another, moved from Sasavele Island about dark and occupied positions north of Bibilo Hill. During the following morning the four remaining howitzers and a total of one unit of fire for the battalion were moved over and the battalion was registered just before noon, 18

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

August. These positions were occupied for the rest of the operation.

From 0700 to 0800, 19 August, a general preparation was fired by all artillery on the entire peninsula of Baanga Island and both air observed missions and long range interdiction missions were fired through the 20th. On 21 August an OP was established and manned on the west shore of Baanga Island, giving surveillance of the islands to the west. The 169th F. A. Bn. was relieved of liaison observer duties by the 103d F. A. Bn., but continued in fire support of the 172d Infantry.

No fires were called for during the period 20 August to 23 August while the infantry secured and organized Baanga Island.

ARTILLERY CONTROL

Perhaps the most significant feature of this operation was the type of control necessitated by the number of units, both infantry and artillery, participating during different phases of the operation. Since the mission was first assigned to the 169th Infantry, liaison parties from the 169th F. A. Bn. operated at the front, but fire support was supplied by the 136th F. A. Bn. By 16 August the 172d Infantry and the 140th F. A. Bn. were committed and a forward artillery CP was established at the infantry CP on Vela Cela Island. Each infantry battalion was accompanied by one liaison and one forward CP party. One artillery officer accompanied each regimental commander at all times and communicated with the artillery control either by artillery or infantry wire nets, the two being connected by a lateral line between forward switchboards. Throughout the operation this system was found to be very satisfactory and proved flexible enough to accommodate all units as they were assigned or relieved.

FIRING

During the early stages of the operation fire was supplied

THE BAANGA CAMPAIGN

by C Battery 136th F. A. Bn. This battery fired a number of neutralization fires on the south peninsula of Baanga and Nusembembeya, and also fired the artillery preparation on the east shore of Baanga before the landing was made. Approximately 360 rounds were expended in these fires. Concentration numbers were assigned on all definite terrain features fired on and these proved very useful later in the operation. In one case when two 4.7 naval guns located on the south tip of Baanga opened fire on the airfield, at 0615, 17 August, it was possible to bring accurate fire on them within four minutes. On the night of 16-17 August, one gun was adjusted on an enemy field piece located within 75 yards of friendly units. Both fires were very effective and the enemy guns mentioned were later found to be completely neutralized.

After the 169th F. A. Bn. was committed, it fired 14 separate missions with a total expenditure of 2951 rounds. These are broken down as follows:

1 observed direct support mission	74 rounds
2 night barrages	136 rounds
8 general areas interdicted	785 rounds
3 artillery preparations	1663 rounds

Fire direction was centralized and occupied one hole about 16' x 16' covered with a log roof and pyramid tent. The CICSOPAC photo map and JAN coordinates were used for firing chart, situation map, and also by the observers. However, an observed fire chart was used initially but as soon as the surveyed location of the batteries was restituted to the CICSOPAC map, this was used and separate corrections determined for each battery. This system was used as the operation progressed and registrations were made along the route of advance. Very satisfactory results were obtained on transfers, and it is believed that the separate "K" for each battery was necessitated by a twist in the photo map.

New positions of the 169th F. A. Bn. on the New Georgia mainland were occupied in rolling terrain almost denuded of

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

foliage. For protection, the howitzers were dug in and camouflage nets erected. Although the organization was not as complete as might be desired, it was entirely satisfactory in this case, since the Japanese had little or no observation of the area. Enemy shells fell in the area during the reconnaissance and occupation, but no casualties resulted.

When the 169th F. A. Bn. moved from Sasavele Island, it brought one unit of fire with the howitzers, and trucks were continuously shuttled back and forth carrying a total of 6½ units of fire in six days.

LIAISON AND FORWARD OBSERVATION

Standard Operating Procedure was followed in the assignment of liaison parties which communicated with the forward command post rather than with individual infantry battalions. One forward observer normally accompanied each battalion and was used at the discretion of the liaison officer. (In all cases contact was made with each liaison officer when close-in missions were fired.) This was absolutely necessary since there was no observation at all in the thick jungle terrain found on Baanga Island, and sound sensing had to be used for each adjustment. This close contact kept one observer from bringing fire into another unit. The primary job of the liaison officers was to keep an accurate picture at all times of the *location of all elements of the infantry to include patrols*. Actually, forward observers did very little in this operation except assist the liaison officers and supply liaison with companies which were sent on separate missions. This practice, however, was found to be unsatisfactory in that one observer was lost in action and his party of three men severely wounded while accompanying *a company of only 42 men*. It was not felt advisable to send artillery observers into unreconnoitered areas with less than a *full company*, unless, of course, the need was very urgent and *communication to the rear could be maintained*.

THE BAANGA CAMPAIGN

Following are the names of the liaison party who were casualties during this operation.

1st Lt. Norbert J. Heidelberg	Btry. C, 169th F. A., MIA
Cpl. Samuel B. Morgan	Btry. C, 169th F. A., MIA
Cpl. Norbert F. McElroy	Btry. C, 169th F. A., MIA
Pfc. Jack T. Dickerson	Btry. C, 169th F. A., MIA

(MIA — Missing In Action)

This liaison party was one of the most aggressive in the Division Artillery and had always done an excellent job.

OBSERVATION

Because of the nature of the terrain, two OPs were established and maintained throughout the first phase of the operation, one at Kindu Point and another on the dock at Vela Cela. Both were found extremely useful for keeping the shore of Baanga under surveillance. All registrations, and many missions, were adjusted from these points. Later, on 21 August, an OP was established on the west shore of Baanga to give surveillance on the islands to the west. This OP was moved several times up and down the coast and was used for adjustment of fire in collaboration with Air Observation.

With the thick jungle encountered on Baanga Island, forward observation was extremely limited and was therefore secondary. Other secondary observation was supplied by infantry units; one of the night fires was adjusted by an infantry sergeant in charge of an infantry OP.

Air observation was maintained at all times and was used on all interdiction missions fired on Nunungamba and adjacent islands. The 169th F. A. Bn. was adjusted on eight points by air observers with very satisfactory results, even though no prior planning had been made before the plane took off.

COMMUNICATION

Wire communication throughout the operation was very difficult. At first, because of the rapidity of the movement,

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

and later because of the number of units involved. The initial problem was solved by having both infantry and artillery wire crews working together to keep a single line forward. If it were not for this combined action, the artillery preparation fired before the landing on Baanga was made would not have been possible. The advancing companies laid W-130 wire as they advanced, but this was systematically cut by the enemy. It was not until troops were committed in numbers and the trails secured that W-110 wire could be carried forward. By this time, communications stayed in very well and W-110 could be brought up to each battalion, wherever it moved.

At the start, all units were "T" spliced in on the single line, and at one point it is believed there were as many as 20 telephones on this line. This confusion was alleviated with the introduction of the BD 71 switchboard at the forward artillery CP, but later so many lines were in operation a BD 72 board had to be installed. Wire issued on DR 5 drums had to be rewound onto DR 4 drums for hand laying in the jungle. It was delaying but necessary work to bring empty drums to the rear for rewinding to make wire available to the troops moving forward.

Radio communication was very satisfactory as far forward as the advanced CP on Vela Cela, using 610 radios with battery packs in contact with the 608 radios in the rear. However, the thickness of the jungle on Baanga Island made too great demands on the liaison and forward observer parties for them to carry radios and to lay wire also. It was felt that wire was more satisfactory in the jungle areas since the transmitting and receiving range of the 610 radios was greatly reduced by the heavy shielding foliage.

SURVEY

The importance of survey, which permitted the massing of accurate artillery fires, was again demonstrated during the Baanga Operation. This survey called for extensive reconnaissance and exposure to enemy fire, as the citation for the

THE BAANGA CAMPAIGN

Legion of Merit awarded to Capt. Dixwell Goff, which follows, so graphically describes.

C.O. #145, Hq. USAFISPA, 27 JANUARY 1944

AWARD OF THE LEGION OF MERIT

DIXWELL GOFF, (0-297954), Captain, Field Artillery, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services from August 1941 to 25 September 1943 on the way to and in the South Pacific Area. After making accurate artillery surveys on New Caledonia and the Russell Islands, Captain Goff from 30 June to 5 July 1943 surveyed, reconnoitered and constructed roads for battery installations with such efficiency on Sasavele Island that incoming units were able to occupy positions without delay and deliver accurate fire during the Munda campaign on nearby New Georgia. During the Munda action, he advanced to within fifty yards of a ridge bristling with enemy machine guns and adjusted artillery fire that drove the Japanese into an infantry battalion's field of fire. On 22 July, he exposed himself repeatedly to enemy fire while making a survey which was used in the formulation of an infantry attack plan in the battle at Horseshoe Hill. Captain Goff's survey work and reconnaissance again were outstanding and permitted the accurate artillery fire in support of the attack on Baanga Island.

Home Address: Providence, R. I.

ANOTHER CHANGE IN COMMAND OF THE 43D INFANTRY DIVISION

No sooner had the Japanese been driven from Baanga and the island occupied by troops of the 43d than the command of the Division was changed for the third time since the invasion of Rendova. The following is quoted from the official U. S. History covering this operation in the *U. S. Army in World War II*.

"On 21 August, on orders from the War Department, General Wing relieved General Barker as commander of the 43d Division. Barker reverted to his former post as Artillery Commander. This relief seems to have resulted from Wing's greater seniority and was not a reflection on Barker's ability."

For Harmon's good opinion of General Barker, Beightler, Collins, and Wing, and of Colonels Ross, Holland, Dalton,

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Ridings, and William H. Arnold (Chief of Staff, XIV Corps), see rad. Harmon to Marshall, No. 2168, 17 August 43, in Gen. Marshall's IN Log)."

Maj. Gen. Leonard F. Wing, an infantryman, had served in all grades from private to general. A National Guard officer from Vermont, he commanded the respect and admiration of all who served with him. His record as Division Commander in World War II was superior.

CONCLUSION

The following is quoted from *Breaking the Bismarcks' Barrier*: by S. E. Morison.

"Concurrent with the New Georgia purge was a vicious little campaign for Baanga Island, a sentinel guarding the channel from Kula Gulf to Munda Point, garrisoned by Munda refugees and fresh troops from Vila. American soldiers of the well-bloodied 43d Division tackled this island on the 10th August. The enemy continued to resist until the 20th, when he pulled the old vanishing trick and left the island to the Americans."

ARUNDEL - KOLOMBANGARA CAMPAIGN. 27 August-4 October

"Arundel Island, the stopper in the bottom of Kula Gulf, still remained in enemy hands. Whoever owned it controlled the Blackett Strait route from the north, and the Diamond Narrows passage from the south. Long range artillery properly emplaced on Arundel could register on Vila or Munda at choice."¹

Orders of the XIV Corps to the 43d Infantry Division called for clearing of Arundel Island of stragglers, protecting the west flank of the Division, securing Diamond Narrows, and providing protection for artillery units harassing Kolombangara. Orders for the Kolombangara operation called for the harassing of installations in the vicinity of the Villa Airfield, Kolombangara, to make the entire position untenable and force enemy evacuation.

ARUNDEL OPERATION

The Arundel Operation started with the occupation of Nauro on the southern tip of Arundel and the securing of

THE ARUNDEL OPERATION

the west side of Diamond Narrows by the 172d Infantry during the last week of August.

"General Sasaki on Kolombangara reacted promptly to this new thrust. Early in September, before the 172d had an opportunity to sweep Arundel from tip to tip, he sent his *13th Infantry* to contain the American advance. He charged this regiment with delaying the 172d long enough to permit the remainder of the *Southeast Detached Force* and the *Eighth Combined Special Naval Landing Force* then on Kolombangara to withdraw from the Central Solomons.

"The *13th* acquitted itself with distinction. Although committed piecemeal to the fighting front, the regiment struck the 172d time and time again. The Americans, who had hoped to clear Arundel of Japanese in only a few days, were forced to send in reinforcements. Even with these, the soldiers found it difficult to withstand a particularly vicious counter-attack early in the morning of 15 September. The drive had come to a standstill.

"That afternoon General Griswold directed Col. D. Sugg, U. S. A., to take the 27th Infantry and the Marine tanks to Arundel and push the foe off the island."²

From 15 until 20 September, it took the combined efforts of the 169th Infantry, the 172d Infantry, and 27th Infantry to force the Japanese back to the final action at Sagekarasa. Most bitter and sanguine fighting took place during this period.

During the night of 20-21 September, General Sasaki withdrew his last survivors from Arundel, Gizo, and the surrounding islands to Kolombangara.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

Fire support for the Arundel Operation was supplied by the 140th and 169th Field Artillery Battalions, plus a Provisional Battalion located at Bustling Point.

The Provisional Battalion consisted of single batteries supplied by the 103d 105mm, the 169th 105mm and the 192d 155mm how., reinforced by Co. B, 82d Chemical Bn. (4.2 mortars). This battalion had the dual mission of supporting the infantry operation and the harassing and neutralizing of Kolombangara. As the operation progressed the 103d and

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

192d each attached an additional battery to the Provisional Battalion.

KOLOMBANGARA OPERATION

The Kolombangara operation was initiated by the movement of two batteries of the 9th Defense Bn. (155mm guns) to Peru Plantation. The shelling of Kolombangara was started by this unit on 31 August. On 7 September Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker was designated as Corps Artillery Officer and was directed to co-ordinate the fires of all guns, howitzers and mortars firing on the Kolombangara area.

The units employed for this mission were: Group 3, 9th Defense Battalion, U.S.M.C. (155mm guns); a provisional battalion from the 43d Division Artillery, located at Bustling Point, consisting of Battery A, 192d F. A. Bn. (155mm How.); Btry. A, 169th F. A. Bn., Battery A 103d F. A. Bn., and Co. B, 82d Chemical Bn. (4.2 mortars); and upon dissolution of the Provisional Bn. the Hq. and Hq. Btry. (less personnel section), Battery A and Battery B, 192d F. A. Bn.; 103d F. A. Bn., and the 89th F. A. Bn.

The mission of this Group was the shelling of installations in the vicinity of Vila Airstrip and East Pier and the neutralization of barge activity harbored at Ringi and Webster Coves.

The Provisional Battalion started its fire on Kolombangara on 12 September. Firing ceased on 5 October after the evacuation of the Japanese.

OPERATION SUMMARY

EFFECTIVENESS OF ARTILLERY FIRE

The shelling of Kolombangara was initiated by Group 3, 9 Defense Battalion USMC (155mm gun) on 31 August 1943. That the opening of fire by artillery was of special significance to the enemy on Kolombangara is evidenced by the entries of Sata, Yoshitaka N. C. O. Hirata Tai,

THE KOLOMBANGARA OPERATION

Yokosuka #7 SNLF, found on Kolombangara after its evacuation.

"Sept. 1, . . . The enemy artillery commenced firing and in cooperation with their observation plane they are very accurate. It seems that the destiny on Kolombangara has been decided."

It is believed that the effectiveness of artillery fire during the Munda Campaign had a strong effect on the morale of the enemy, and that the realization that Kolombangara had become an artillery target altered the plan of the enemy and hastened their decision to evacuate. The effect of the early shelling both in destruction and morale is illustrated in remarks from the diary cited above.

"Sept. 4 . . . The enemy shelling has been very fierce today . . . these shells hit mainly in the vicinity of Headquarters, East Pier, and West Pier . . ."

"Sept. 5, at 0330 the enemy artillery commenced firing. From 0758 the shells started to hit in 5th Co. position but there was no damage. However, the men manning the guns were injured . . ."

"Sept. 7, . . . The enemy artillery fire is very intense today. The shells are dropping mainly in the vicinity of Yamoto Bridge and Central Pier."

Remarks about artillery shelling appear almost daily in this diary.

One entry on Sept. 11 is significant of the effectiveness of our observation:

"At this time the enemy commenced their artillery fire. They spotted our position by our firing upon the enemy planes and they were very accurate. One gun position was destroyed, one man killed and one man injured".

On 12 Sept. at 1400 the Provisional Battalion opened fire on Kolombangara and fired daily until the battalion was dissolved.

Japanese artillery opened fire on Bomboe Peninsula on 13 Sept. with several guns believed to be 77mm field pieces which were immediately taken under fire by the Provisional Battalion and neutralized. A careful search of their area with captured 20-power binoculars showed two guns in

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

position on Kuli-Kuli Point. With ground observation the Provisional Battalion destroyed these.

Harassing fires through Ringi and Webster Coves were placed frequently by the Provisional Battalion with unobserved results. However, after Kolombangara had been taken, several barges were found sunk or severely damaged in these coves.

Counter battery fires were of primary importance in the reduction of Kolombangara. To render it useless as a defensive position, the destruction of their materiel and supplies was necessary. This was systematically undertaken with good results. From the diary previously cited is this entry —

"The enemy artillery is firing as usual and a shell made a direct hit on our 25mm MG and put it out of commission".

From the interrogation of a prisoner of war taken on Sagera on 20 Sept., the following is quoted:

"Many of the AA guns around Vila Field have been destroyed by the U. S. artillery. Losses from bombing from the air have been slight compared to those from artillery fire. There have been about twenty casualties, killed and wounded, from the artillery fire every day until the time the prisoner left Vila."

The enemy supply lines were continuously harassed by naval and air activity, making resupply of Kolombangara possible only by submarine and by parachutes from planes at night.

Because of the continual pounding from bombings and artillery, the enemy lost much of his materiel and supplies and suffered numerous casualties while being unable to retaliate, and therefore evacuated Kolombangara. Fiji scout patrols made no contact except for a few stragglers on 3 and 4 October, and fire ceased.

SELECTION OF BATTERY POSITIONS

One of the most difficult problems during the Arundel-Kolombangara Campaign was the selection of battery positions that would permit the fulfillment of the artillery's

THE KOLOMBANGARA OPERATION

mission, i.e., to support the infantry on Arundel and to fire on Kolombangara.

At the start of the campaign some of the Division Artillery were on the New Georgia mainland; the most advanced units, 9th Def. Bn., 140th F. A. Bn., 169th F. A. Bn., were at Piru Plantation. They took care of the infantry support on the east coast of Arundel, and the 155mm guns of the 9th Def. Bn. started to shell Kolombangara on 31 August. The artillery support for the infantry on the West Coast and the massing of artillery fires on Kolombangara were still unsolved.

Late in August, Gen. Barker, who had an LCP (Landing Craft Personnel) assigned to him, called at the Advanced Navy Boat Pool located on the west shore of Nauro Peninsula to see if any American boats had gone up Wana Wana Lagoon and if there were any known channel. Lt. Dan, a young naval officer, advised that there had been no survey made of the Wana Wana Lagoon, but he volunteered to accompany Gen. Barker on a reconnaissance. Standing in the bow of the landing craft he directed the course to the coxswain as the party proceeded north up the Lagoon. The objective selected by Gen. Barker was the village of Halingi marked on an Air Force map. As the American infantry at that time had advanced but a short distance beyond the boat pool, the party proceeded with caution, keeping the shores of both Arundel Island and Wana Wana Island under careful observation. Finally arriving at the cove where Halingi was supposed to be, nothing but dense jungle and forest could be seen, but on the north shore of the cove was a narrow point of land that appeared to have excellent artillery positions. This was later named Bustling Point. About this time a native in a canoe was observed close to shore and he was signaled to approach. After a time he paddled out and when asked if he spoke any English he replied "Me Evans boy". Evans was the Coastwatcher on

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Kolombangara and this native was one of his men and it was noted he was equipped with a new MI rifle. The first question asked was where were the Japs. By pidgin English and arm signals he advised that the Japs were on the north and east coasts of Arundel and on Kolombangara. At this point a heavy rain storm set in and prevented any further observation. Without the assistance of Lieutenant Dan the party would never have found its way back.*

A report of this reconnaissance was made to Corps and Division Headquarters and infantry patrols started up the west coast of Arundel on 29 August, and by 4 September a beachhead was established at Bustling Point and on 6 September at Bomboe Peninsula.

On 12 September a Provisional Battalion of artillery, consisting of A Battery, 192d, and A Battery, 169th, was established on Bustling Point and immediately started to shell Kolombangara in support of the 172d Infantry on the west coast of Arundel. Later in September the artillery was reinforced to include the 192d F. A. Bn. (155 How.), the 103d F. A. Bn. (105mm) and the 89th F. A. Bn. (105 How.) as well as Co. B, 82d CML Bn. (4.2 in. mortars). This group, together with the artillery at Piru Plantations, was able to fulfill all artillery missions. General Griswold stated that Bustling Point was the best artillery position selected by Barker during the Campaign.

COASTWATCHER ACTIVITIES

The organization of coastwatchers which was set up by the Australian Naval Intelligence immediately after World War I consisted of trusted citizens living in New Guinea, in the Bismarck Archipelago and in the Solomons. In 1929 the New Zealand Navy likewise set up a coastwatching service employing reserve officers. New Zealand and Australia coordinated their coastwatching activities, thus pro-

*The valuable assistance given by Lt. Dan illustrates the spirit of co-operation which existed between the Combat Elements of the different Services in the Pacific War.

THE KOLOMBANGARA OPERATION

viding adequate coverage of all British Empire possessions and mandates in the Pacific Ocean. This organization was known by the name of Ferdinand.

Ferdinand was a small organization, numbering only a few hundred officers and men, in the field and at its bases handling administrative work, supply, and communications. Yet it wove an intelligence network over more than half a million square miles of island and ocean. So secret was this organization of coastwatchers behind enemy lines that even its existence was not admitted during the war. When World War II flared in Europe in 1939 coastwatchers occupied 58 previously assigned posts reaching from the Solomons in the West to Pitcairn in the East Pacific.

At the time of the first Japanese incursions into the Bismarcks and Solomons in 1941, the Australian and New Zealand Coastwatchers were already operating on a 24-hour basis. These men, with their faithful native followers, who had elected to remain behind in the bush when the Japs moved in, consisted of part-time officers, traders, planters and missionaries, all of whom were experienced bushmen. They now received military commissions from the Australian Government to give them official status if captured.

Their mission was to observe and report any enemy activity in their vicinity. The Government furnished small radios for this purpose. In addition to Japanese Air and Navy movements, they reported on Japanese installations, fortifications, troop movements, assembly areas and gun emplacements. Initially their reports were the only source of information for artillery targets.

COASTWATCHER PERSONNEL IN THE WESTERN SOLOMONS

Donald Kennedy, District Officer of the Western Solomons, operated first on Santa Isabel and later at Segi Point, New Georgia; Martin Clemens, stationed on Guadalcanal, did a magnificent job assisting the American forces that

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

landed there; Hugh Mackensie, who first operated at Rabaul and later in the vicinity of Vila, Kolombangara; Flight Officer J. A. Corrigan in the vicinity of Rice Anchorage; A. R. Evans on Kolombangara and Flight Lieutenants Dick Horton and R. A. Robinson on Rendova. A. M. Andressen had manned a post in the Russell Group until those islands were occupied by the 43d Division. Harry Wickham, a Eurasian who had previously been enlisted by Kennedy, worked with the 43d Division staff when the plans were being drawn up for the New Georgia Operation on Adm. Turner's flagship "McCawley" at Noumea, and accompanied the troops when they moved through Roviana Lagoon where his family lived on a small island. On these men, and others like them, fell the responsibility of reporting enemy land, air and naval movements and of organizing among the natives a system of resistance to Japanese domination of the Solomons. Their exploits were legend.³

TOPICAL SUMMARY

1. TARGETS AND OBSERVATION

a. Targets were of three general classifications. *First* were those reported by the Photographic Interpretation Unit, G-2 Section XIV Corps, which were designated by CICSOPAC coordinators and overlay with a written description of each target. This information was extremely valuable because of difficulties in observation. *Second* were targets along the shore which could be seen by ground observers. *Third* were targets of opportunity located by air and ground observers.

b. Ground observation was effective only on coastal targets, which were camouflaged but discernible from Sagekarasa after its capture. Observation along the coast from East Pier north toward Jack Harbor was maintained by 9th Defense Bn., from Tunguirili Point.

THE KOLOMBANGARA OPERATION

c. Air observation played an essential role for targets inland through coordination with the Photographic Intelligence Unit target overlay. Because of inability to locate specific targets on the ground by air, targets were grouped geographically and the area covered with fire by the air observer. It was found advantageous to have the air observer up during air strike to observe the location of AA firing at the attacking planes, and then immediately following the strike, to direct artillery fire on these locations. That this system was effective is seen in an entry in the captured diary previously quoted:

"Sept. 25 . . . It has become very difficult to fire the anti-aircraft guns as the enemy artillery place their fire upon our positions immediately after we commence firing the AA guns."

2. JAPANESE TACTICS

The enemy was most aggressive during this operation. Counter-attacks and infiltrations were continuous. Communications and supply were continually cut in the Stima area. Night attacks and harassing tactics were constantly, even if unsuccessfully, employed.

3. ENEMY ARTILLERY

Enemy artillery was of two types: *one*, naval and field pieces firing at our ground installations; *two*, AA guns firing at our planes.

In the initial phase of the shelling of Kolombangara, enemy field pieces were firing during the daylight hours on Arundel from the vicinity of Kuli-Kuli Point and several other places inland. However, the neutralization and destruction of the guns at Kuli-Kuli Point discouraged daylight firing and from then on only occasional firing was done at night.

Naval 12cm. guns were emplaced north of Disappointment Cove and fired occasionally at night, principally in the vicinity of Ondongo Diamond Narrows area. Their fire was

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

not accurate and a high percentage of their rounds were duds, with the net result of practically no damage.

Enemy field and naval pieces habitually fired six or eight rounds at apparently the same elevation and deflection and then ceased firing. Occasionally as many as twenty rounds were fired but this was the exception. Apparently no effort was made to adjust fire and the objective seemed merely to have the shells fall in enemy territory.

Firing was generally by single piece and occasionally by two pieces at different positions. On the whole the enemy artillery was ineffective against our ground forces.

The enemy was aware of the location of the elements of the 9th Defense Bn., as evidenced by entries in the captured diary.

"August 27 . . . Looking through the 12cm. binocular the enemy walking about on the hills in Munda (Ondongo Area) can be seen as if they were on the palm of my hand. Probably the enemy is constructing an artillery position and below it are many tents."

Despite this knowledge and their observation facilities, all enemy fire at that position was ineffective.

Enemy anti-aircraft artillery was numerous and well emplaced. Although heavy AA fire was observed during early September, this decreased and had slight effectiveness by October.

4. COUNTERBATTERY

Counterbattery was vigorously conducted throughout the campaign, utilizing Corps P.I.U. target designation and observed fires for both air and ground. The decline of AA fire against our air attacks was indicative of the effectiveness of our counterbattery work.

5. COMMUNICATION

a. Within battalions and to OPs wire was established and maintained satisfactorily throughout despite short underwater lines. In all cases at least two lines were laid and there was no break in communications.

THE KOLOMBANGARA OPERATION

b. From Artillery Headquarters to units communication was by SCR 193 radio. Because of the excessive difficulties in laying extremely long lines under water and maintaining them, wire communications were not established after many futile attempts. Radio was fair, but the necessity for encoding and decoding all messages and excessive static at night often caused delays of up to two hours. Although pre-arranged codes were used extensively, delays were unavoidable between Artillery Headquarters and its units.

6. TRANSPORTATION

Transportation was principally by water. All supplies were carried by LCT, LCM and LCVs. Cooperation with the Navy was excellent and despite a shortage of landing craft in the area supply was efficiently carried out without interruption. (LCT — Landing Craft Tank; LCM — Landing Craft Mechanized; LCV — Landing Craft Vehicle.)

7. USE OF 4.2IN. MORTARS WITH HE SHELL

The employment of Co. B 82d CML Bn. (4.2in mortar) in the firing on Kolombangara was effective against supplies and personnel within the limit of their range from Sagekarasa, but because their organization did not have delay fuses, fire against emplacements was not destructive. With the rapid rate of fire this was an excellent weapon and with delay fuses should be increasingly efficient. Company B 82d CML Bn. was tied into the Fire Direction Center of the 43d Division Artillery and operated most efficiently during the Kolombangara Operation.

The use of 4.2 mortars, controlled and coordinated with artillery, was successful in preparations for attack and in prearranged anti-boat barrages. Their rapid rate of fire was especially valuable in the above employments. Some arrangement to permit a wider traverse of these mortars would add greatly to their effectiveness.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Extracts of interest from diary found on Kolombangara of Sato, Yoshitaka, NCO., Hirata Tai, Yokosuka #7 SNLF.

Sept. 18th . . .

"The 13th Infantry Regimental Commander was killed in action day before yesterday and it is said that his courageous death could have made a devil cry. Until now he was known as a courageous commander but his courageous soul will remain on this isolated island in the South Sea. The Commander of the 3rd Bn. took over the Regimental Commander's post who was killed on Arundel Island and became the guiding spirit of the country."

Sept. 19th

"Today I was on duty and since everyone was sick I was on alone, but I went to chow just the same, and the Commander bawled me out. I know I was doing wrong but that was all that I could have done."

Sept. 22nd

"Last night I had to visit the latrine three times so I'm a little weak today. During the forenoon there wasn't much artillery shelling but in the afternoon they started to drop in our position and 4 of our men were seriously wounded. We are finding out more and more that artillery is a dangerous weapon. It is bad when they start firing during meal times, etc. What makes it worse is that our AA MG Company are not able to do anything against the enemy artillery."

Sept. 29th


"Last night it was very dark and at times it rained and I believe the first echelon was able to reach their destination safely. This too was through the Grace of God and we must be thankful. Today the suicide squad (rear guard) was selected and fortunately I was selected from the Command Section. I am glad that I will be able to die gloriously. Although I may die here my soul will remain in the soil of Kolombangara and it will serve for the Bushido and the country."

OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF THE NEW GEORGIA CAMPAIGN


As the New Georgia campaign was brought to a successful conclusion, it was obvious that the excellent state of training and the high performance of the artillery enabled it to meet changing situations promptly and efficiently. The importance and value of the Fort Sill doctrine and the Army Ground Force Battalion Firing Tests were demonstrated time and time again.

CONTACTS WITH FRONT LINE INFANTRY UNITS


The performance of the personnel employed in maintaining




Fire Direction Center, 169th F. A. Bn. Sasaville Island (New Georgia) Sept. 1943.
 From left to right: Sgt. Waller, Operations Sgt.; Major DeBlasis, S-1; Capt. Davis, Asst. S-3; (standing);
 Corp. Grondin, C-Battery Computer; Corp. Parascandola, B-Battery Computer; Sgt. Easton, Chief Computer,
 (standing); Corp. Hunter, A-Battery Computer; Brenn, HCO, Maher, VCO, Peterson, Journal Clerk.



50 Cal. anti-aircraft gun crew in action on New Georgia during Japanese bombing raid.



American troops of 43rd Division making the beachhead on Arundel Island.
8/2/43



Reeling out wire from an RL31, in the jungles of New Georgia.
7/6/43



Conference in Fire Direction Center, 192nd F. A. Bn., New Georgia, Sept. 1943. From left to right: Major J. S. Blair, Capt. George Renoff, Lt. Col. George Hill.



Two howitzer guns of the 192nd Field Artillery fire on Arundel Island.
9/24/43

THE KOLOMBANGARA OPERATION

contact with front line infantry units, such as liaison detachments, forward observers, survey parties and communications personnel was superior. At least 60% of all artillery officers were with the infantry, on the mainland, at all times. The following extract from the 43d Division Artillery Quarterly Historical Report, 1 July 1943 to 30 September 1943 is an example of the importance placed on contacts with front line Infantry Units:

"General Barker was in the front lines every day throughout the entire Munda Operations to assure himself that artillery fires were being delivered when and where needed. On several occasions he was pinned down by machine gun fire and mortar shells bursting nearby, but always managed to escape without injury as though leading a charmed life. After a number of narrow escapes brought on by his determination that nothing should escape his attention as to the situation, the division commander ordered General Barker to make fewer trips to the front. After this General Barker made only one trip daily but arranged it so that he was always in the front lines nearly all day and upon every important occasion. It was due to his disregard for his own safety and ability to visualize the enemy situation that the artillery emerged from the campaign with an outstanding reputation and the praise of the Infantry."

THE MASSING OF ARTILLERY FIRES

The Massing of Fires by Corps, Divisions and Battalions in this Operation was skillfully done and Japanese reports indicate the deadly effectiveness of such fire.

INFANTRY — ARTILLERY TEAM

One of the most gratifying results of the New Georgia Campaign from the artilleryman's viewpoint was the confidence and enthusiasm displayed by our infantry for their artillery. As the infantry's confidence in and appreciation of the artillery increased, their demands became greater and sometimes were embarrassing. Many requests for fire covered targets that normally belonged to infantry heavy weapons. Nevertheless, as a rule the artillery gave them what they wanted.

Another sign of confidence was the infantry's willingness and insistence that artillery protective fires be placed close

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

to their front lines. As a matter of fact, they wanted their fires placed as close as 50 yards from their front lines time and time again; this was obviously out of the question.

The infantryman's attitude towards the artillery, combined with the artilleryman's appreciation of the many difficulties overcome by the infantry, resulted in the formation of a "Mutual Admiration Society" that paid dividends during the entire campaign. *No one realizes better than the field artilleryman that the infantry has the toughest and most difficult job of all the ground troops.*

XIV CORPS REPORT ON ARTILLERY SUPPORT AND EFFECTIVENESS NEW GEORGIA CAMPAIGN

Artillery support was very effective and played a large part in the success of the troops. Captured sick books, diaries and other documents, and prisoner of war interrogations gave vivid evidence of the effectiveness of artillery fire on the Japanese. Support fires within 100 to 200 yards of our lines were fired on many occasions when the situation warranted the risk. Constant harassing and interdiction fires played a large part in the demoralization of the enemy.

A Japanese prisoner of war stated that U. S. Artillery and mortar shells caused the greatest damage to their positions and produced the greatest number of casualties. Another prisoner of war made the same statement, remarking that heavy casualties were caused by direct hits, and that outright deaths were more numerous than the wounds. Prisoners of war have repeatedly stated that the Japanese feared only U. S. Artillery fire, and felt that their defense of Munda could have been continued in its absence. One PW remarked that many Japanese troops, during periods of enemy shelling, preferred to remain outside rather than take cover in a bomb shelter because there were 5 or 6 cases of his comrades being buried alive. Most of the demoraliza-

THE KOLOMBANGARA OPERATION

tion and fear produced by U. S. Artillery and mortars resulted from an overt recognition on the part of Japanese troops that they had no weapons of comparable effectiveness and consequently did not have an even chance against these weapons.

Evaluation of all available information indicates that constant artillery fire, extended through both day and night, completely demoralized many units and reduced numerous Japanese troops to a state of acute neurosis. Because of the neurotic condition the troops were never able to sleep soundly, and were awakened at night by the slightest noise. Mortar and artillery shelling caused frequent disruptions of Japanese communication lines, leaving telephone wires constantly in need of repair. Respect shown by Japanese officers for U. S. Artillery is brought out in numerous operational orders. The troops were commanded to disperse and deploy themselves as much as possible to avoid concentrated fire. Because of the almost continuous artillery barrages, with shells coming in rapid succession, many Japanese troops suspected that the enemy had some sort of automatic guns. Several prisoners made this inquiry. It was brought out in several PW interrogations that Japanese troops failed to distinguish between mortars and 155mm howitzers; most of them classified the latter as mortars.

LIEUT. GENERAL MILLARD F. HARMON, ARMY COMMANDER

Gen. Harmon, who was Admiral Halsey's subordinate commander of all Army troops in the South Pacific Area, had this to say about the New Georgia Campaign.

"One of the major difficulties in the New Georgia Campaign was the fact that the Americans had underestimated the task at hand. Munda was a tough nut — much tougher in terrain, organization of the ground and determination of the Jap than we had thought. In Guadalcanal and New Georgia we greatly underestimated the force required to do the job."

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Headquarters
43d Division Artillery
A. P. O. 43, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, Calif.

27 December 1943

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 6)

1. The following letter by Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, Commanding General, USAFISPA, has been received by Brigadier General Harold R. Barker and is published herewith for the information of all concerned.

HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA
A. P. O. 502

24 December 1943

Brigadier General H. R. Barker
Hq. 43d Division Artillery
A. P. O. 43

My dear General Barker:

It was with great satisfaction that I read the translation which you forwarded to me showing the effects of your artillery fire on Kolombangara. That is what we want to see repeated each time you are within range of the Jap.

First indications were that the Jap learned to respect our artillery. Your report shows that he has learned to fear our artillery. That is the state in which we are going to keep him.

My congratulations to you and your men for putting the shells he didn't want where he didn't want them — a fine job, well done.

Sincerely,

S/M. F. Harmon
t/M. F. Harmon
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.

2. This order will be read to all troops at the first formation following its receipt.

OFFICIAL

By Order of Colonel Files
Edwin S. Knowles, 1st Lt., F. A.

In June 1944 General Harmon received orders for a new assignment as the South Pacific Area had pretty well been cleared of the Japanese. He and some of his staff took off by air and disappeared in the Pacific. No word or trace of

THE KOLOMBANGARA OPERATION

his plane was ever found. It was a real loss of a most efficient general.

CONCLUSION

The taking of New Georgia and Kolombangara completed the mission of the New Georgia Operations Force.

In addition to rebuilding the Munda and Segi airfields, the allies swiftly built another airfield at Ondonga Peninsula on New Georgia. The use of these three airfields brought all of Bougainville within range of Allied fighters.

The New Georgia Campaign revealed a number of inadequacies and inefficiencies; but these are far overshadowed by the gains achieved and the lesson of unification learned. This campaign was over, but ahead lay Bougainville, another barrier on the road to Rabaul that must be taken before the Allies could approach the Far East. And at Bougainville, as in succeeding campaigns, the lessons of the New Georgia Campaign would be applied.

"The New Georgia Campaign ranks with Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona for intensity of human tribulation. It had been lengthy and costly. Planned as a one-division affair, it had used up elements of four divisions. It would be months before the 25th, 37th, and 43d Divisions would be ready to fight again. The Campaign had consumed four months' time."⁴

The Campaign in New Georgia was typical of the *Jungle Warfare* which took place in this theater of operations and the following should be borne in mind:

1. the Japanese soldier was the *best trained jungle fighter* in the world,
2. *climate* — the Solomon Islands as well as New Guinea are located in the tropics and in some of these areas no civilized people can live.
3. *health* — in spite of all precautions the troops were subjected to Malaria, Dengie fever, Typhus and many forms of jungle sores. This resulted in fighting both the Japanese and the climate.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

The casualties in the 43d Division alone were:

Killed	581
Wounded	2059
War Neurosis	1552
Malaria	1171
Other causes	597
Total	5960

The Allied troops who suffered death, wounds, illness or who just served in the campaign without injury had served their cause well. *NEW GEORGIA WAS A SUCCESS.*

DEFENSE OF NEW GEORGIA (Oct. 1943 to Feb. 1944)

After Kolombangara had been occupied by Allied troops, the 43d Division received orders for the defense of New Georgia and moved back to the mainland. Defense positions were occupied and plans for the defense of New Georgia formulated to include patrols, O.Ps. and security installations.

No enemy air attacks in force were received, as the Japanese confined their efforts to harassing raids which petered out by the end of September.

Munda Airfield was extended and made operational for use of planes to bomb Japanese installations in Bougainville, New Britain, New Ireland and the Shortlands. Munda, Ondonga and Segi airfields were the basis of our air offensive for the Bougainville Operation which started November 1943 with the seizure of Empress Augusta Bay by the 1st Marine Amphibious Corps.

On 15 December the XIV Corps, (Gen. Griswold) relieved the 1st Marine Amphibious Corps in Bougainville.

On 20 December the 43d Division was relieved from attachment to XIV Corps and passed to operational control of COMGEN, Forward Area, for defense of New Georgia.

While fulfilling the New Georgia defense mission the troops of the 43d Division availed themselves of the opportunity to improve living conditions and were rehabilitated

THE DEFENSE OF NEW GEORGIA

as much as possible. On Armistice Day, 11 November, a most impressive ceremony was held at the Military Cemetery at Munda, paying tribute to the members of the 43d Division who had made the supreme sacrifice during the New Georgia Campaign.

OFFICER CANDIDATES SCHOOL

As the Division became more settled, attention was again directed towards training, and the Division Artillery inaugurated an Officer Candidates School.

The outstanding non-commissioned officers, who had in combat shown ability and qualifications for promotion, were selected to attend this school. A most comprehensive schedule was carried out, including service firing for two days a week. The entire school would bivouac at the old Japanese Boat Pool in Ringi Cove on Kolombangara. Using the high ground back of the Boat Pool as an O. P. and batteries in position on Arundel for firing, the set-up permitted many forward observer problems. Communication was by radio and excellent results were obtained.

Following is the list of members of this Officer Candidate School.

1. T/Sgt.	John M. Feeney	192d F.A.
2. S/Sgt.	Everett J. Campbell	103d F.A.
3. S/Sgt.	Thomas K. Lewis	192d F.A.
4. S/Sgt.	Paul B. Richardson	103d F.A.
5. S/Sgt.	Paul J. Cassidy	152d F.A.
6. S/Sgt.	Lee R. Hartell	192d F.A.
7. T/4	Fred Ligtenberg	169th F.A.
8. M/Sgt.	Everett J. Bartlett	Div. Arty.
9. Cpl.	Clyde R. Mills	169th F.A.
10. Sgt.	Michael R. Peters	103d F.A.
11. S/Sgt.	Ralph F. Whitehead	103d F.A.
12. M/Sgt.	William R. Quimby	Div. Arty.
13. Sgt.	Russell J. Giliman	152d F.A.
14. T/4	James E. Sweeney	192d F.A.
15. 1/Sgt.	Charles A. Cefalo	152d F.A.
16. S/Sgt.	Sigfred A. Ronn	103d F.A.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

17. S/Sgt.	Walter J. Gostyla	192d F.A.
18. 1/Sgt.	Rodney M. Clewley	152d F.A.
19. S/Sgt.	Charles J. Schreckgost	152d F.A.
20. T/4	Fred P. Oliver	152d F.A.
21. Cpl.	Carl J. Gray	103d F.A.
22. Cpl.	Leo F. McKenna	169th F.A.
23. Sgt.	William H. Gilpin	192d F.A.

The majority of these candidates were commissioned together with:

Valere H. Dewey	103d F.A.
John H. Flanagan, Jr.	103d F.A.
Bernard D. McClellan	152d F.A.

JAPANESE ARTILLERY POSITIONS ON KOLOMBANGARA


The cessation of hostilities permitted a thorough examination of the Japanese artillery positions on Kolombangara. A survey of the Jap 77mm howitzer position located in Bere Cove, Kolombangara was of particular interest. On 13 Sept. this enemy battery opened fire on our infantry and shells dropped near the 27th Infantry Command Post on Arundel. Battery A, 192d F. A., quickly neutralized it, destroying two guns with direct hits.

These Japanese howitzers had been emplaced separately in casements, connected by trenches, with telephone communications. Their field of fire included Grant, Arundel and Sagekarasa Islands. Camouflage was excellent and the position had been located only by the gun flashes.

There were two battery positions of 140mm heavy guns on Kolombangara, one located on the eastern shore of Stanmore Plantation and the other near Parapatu Point. The position at Parapatu Point was one of the best organized Japanese artillery positions encountered during the war. Guns were casemated, connected by trenches and the entire position was wired for telephone. The field of fire extended northeast, east and southeast in Kula Gulf, to include Hathorn Sound. Two guns could rapidly cover any one of these three sectors. Camouflage of the entire position was



These Japanese 5-inch guns were found on Baanga Island when American forces decided to take it over. The Japs used the guns to shell Munda Air Field when it, too, fell to U. S. Troops. 25 Aug. 1943.



Captured Japanese anti-aircraft gun on New Georgia.



View of guns of 192 F. A., Arundel Is. showing method of correcting deflection after firing. Man at fore gun is putting on brakes. If change in deflection is too great, one man loosens the brake while the men correct for the change — then he brakes it. 9 Sept. 1943.



155mm howitzer of Battery C ready for action. New type circular emplacement for the gun is shown with the overhead camouflage net. This outfit is part of the island defense on New Georgia. 192nd F. A. 12/24/43



Infantry await zero hour on shore of Arundel, prior to their crossing and tracking down of retreating Jap troops on Sagekarasa Island just across the narrow strait. 13 Sept. 1943.



Infantrymen knee-deep in murky water push on toward enemy lines, during jungle fighting on the islands of Arundel and Sagekarasa, New Georgia Group, 26 November 1943.



Firing Exercise — Officer Candidates School students at the O.P. on Kolombangara — Nov. 1943.
Major Raymond D. Kells, instructor.

THE DEFENSE OF NEW GEORGIA

the very best and one could pass along the shore line without any evidence of an artillery position. Housekeeping also was excellent and the entire position gave evidence of hard work and constant supervision.

"On 4 July, 1943, when Rear Adm. W. L. Ainsworth's cruiser force (Task Force 36.1) which was convoying the Northern Landing Group, New Georgia Occupation Force, consisting of the 1st Marine Raider Regt. (Col. H. B. Liversedge), was approaching for a landing in the Rice Anchorage area, it was brought under fire by Japanese 140mm guns located on Kolombangara and also a battery of 140mm guns which had been concealed in the vicinity of Enogai Inlet on the New Georgia mainland. This fire caused confusion among the landing details and the *U.S.S. Waters* had her main truck shot away. These Japanese 140mm gun batteries were part of the Takemura heavy artillery unit."⁵

MOVEMENT OF THE 43D DIVISION FROM THE SOLOMON ISLANDS TO NEW ZEALAND (Jan. - Feb. 1944)

By January 1944, there were many rumors as to where the 43d Division would go to obtain and train replacements to bring it up to combat strength, as the Division was critically short of combat troops, especially infantry. Finally the official word was received and, to the delight of all, it was the area that had been occupied before in New Zealand.

Guadalcanal was an interim staging area and the Division began its movement to the rear on 23 January.

Thus ended the service of the 43d Infantry Division in the Solomon Islands.

CHAPTER VII

RETURN TO NEW ZEALAND

February (1944)

FOLLOWING is the schedule of movement of the Division Artillery from the staging area in Guadalcanal to Auckland, New Zealand.

On 13 Feb. 1944, the transport *John Pope* departed Guadalcanal and arrived in Auckland on 17 Feb. with Hqs. and Hqs. Battery Division Artillery, 152d F. A. Bn., and advance detachments of the 169th F. A. Bn., the 103d F. A. Bn., and the 192d F. A. Bn.


On 27 Feb. by transport *Willard Holbrook* came the 192d F. A. Bn. and the 169th F. A. Bn.

On 19 Mar., by transport *Torrens*, came the 103d F. A. Bn.

Upon their arrival in New Zealand the artillery units were assigned to the following areas:

Hqs. and Hqs. Battery and the 192d F. A. Bn. were installed in the Manurewa Area. The 152d F. A. Bn., with the 103d Infantry, in the Warkworth Area. The 169th F. A. Bn. at Opoheki. The 103d F. A. Bn. at Cambria Park, near Puhinui. All of the camping areas were equipped with permanent facilities, including mess halls, latrines and recreation huts.


For the first month after their arrival the troops were given liberal pass privileges and many availed themselves of the opportunity of visiting historic places in the North and South Islands of New Zealand. The food in New Zealand was excellent and in abundance and it gave the men a chance to regain some of the weight lost during combat in the tropical jungles of the Solomons.



Officers of the Division and Division Artillery on Guadalcanal after the New Georgia Campaign, February 1944.
 Back row : Lt. Col. M. T. Olson, Lt. Col. C. G. Cox, Lt. Col. I. W. Schaefer, Major J. M. Haffner, Lt. Col. P. W. Bean, Lt. Col. J. C. Kerkering, Major R. H. Lau, Colonel S. P. Marland, Jr., Lt. Col. C. W. Capron, Colonel G. A. Union, Front row : Major I. M. Ramsey, Major W. R. Bailey, Lt. Col. P. Rose, Lt. Col. H. E. Pressey, Colonel C. A. Files, Lt. Col. H. C. Marden, Lt. Col. J. P. Maguire, Lt. Col. J. K. Connelly, Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker, Colonel J. P. Cleland, Lt. Col. E. W. Berry.



Gen. Wing's birthday party — Nov. 12, 1943.



Gen. Barker's hut with native builders. New Georgia — Nov., 1943.

THE RETURN TO NEW ZEALAND

When the month of play had elapsed the units resumed training. As replacements arrived they were integrated and schools conducted for essential artillery subjects. The matter of rebuilding of the Infantry-Artillery Teams was given special attention, as there had been many changes in personnel occasioned by losses in combat.

PIPER CUB OBSERVATION PLANES

One of the most important and vital additions to the Division Artillery was the assignment of the Artillery Observation planes while in New Zealand.

During the New Georgia Operation we had to depend on the Air Force for planes and pilots. Now, with our own planes and pilots, we were able to train more aerial observers and commanders; both infantry and artillery were taught to make valuable air reconnaissances. In the operations and campaigns to follow a most prominent part was played by this branch of the field artillery.

The original assignment of planes to the Division Artillery was 10 Piper Cub planes, together with the following trained personnel.

Capt. Robert D. Martz	assigned to Div. Arty. Hqs.
1st Lt. Raymond C. Chapman	assigned to Div. Arty. Hqs.
1st Lt. Duncan H. Doolittle	assigned to 103d F. A. Bn.
1st Lt. Dominic J. Braucci	assigned to 103d F. A. Bn.
1st Lt. Thos. H. Hardie	assigned to 192d F. A. Bn.
1st Lt. Julian H. Marshall	assigned to 192d F. A. Bn.
1st Lt. John W. Wyne	assigned to 152d F. A. Bn.
1st Lt. Barney E. Meadows	assigned to 152d F. A. Bn.
1st Lt. Raymond W. Lyden	assigned to 169th F. A. Bn.
1st Lt. MacDonald Lowe	assigned to 169th F. A. Bn.

Later assignments included the following pilots:

Capt. Ralph Newby
1st Lt. Elmer F. Mindedahl

All pilots agree that one of the most important parts of an Air Command is its maintenance section and this section of the 43d Division Artillery was one of the best. Following are some of its personnel.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Division Art. Hqts.	T-5 John Valiska, T-4 Orville Harper.
103d F. A. Bn.	S/Sgt. Otis E. Lamb, T-5 Lester Seafeldt.
169th F. A. Bn.	S/Sgt. G. W. Brooks, Corp. F. C. Burkett.
152d F. A. Bn.	S/Sgt. Harry Baker, T-5 Regebian.
192d F. A. Bn.	S/Sgt. Francis Kappelman, T-5 Vernon Baker.

155MM HOWITZER MI

While in New Zealand the old World War I Schneider howitzers, with which the 192d F. A. Bn. had done such excellent work in the New Georgia Campaign, were replaced by the new 155mm how. MI. This new weapon permitted a greater traverse than the old howitzer and increased the range by approximately 5000 yards. The maximum range of the new howitzer is 16,000 yards compared with 11,000 to 12,000 yards with the old howitzers. During the New Georgia Operation targets at the extreme ranges had to be assigned to the 155mm guns of the 9th Defense Battalion. Now the Division Artillery could handle these missions with its own weapons.

FIELD TRAINING

Starting in April the division resumed small unit training and operated on a strict training schedule. In May the Division Artillery Hqs. moved to a base camp at the race track in Rotorua in preparation for a series of field maneuvers to be held at the Rerewhakaito Range, near Rotorua, a training area previously used by the New Zealand Army.

Each artillery battalion moved to Rotorua on a staggered schedule which permitted each unit to use the range for a two-week period. The combat team problems called for artillery firing over the heads of the infantry regiments normally supported in combat. This permitted the rebuilding of the Infantry-Artillery Team and gave the replacements a thorough workout. Artillery firing problems in general conformed to Army Ground Force firing tests.

These maneuvers, the outstanding feature of the training in New Zealand, were a pronounced success.

THE RETURN TO NEW ZEALAND

CHANGE IN OFFICER PERSONNEL

During this stay in New Zealand a call came from the United States for an artillery cadre for activation of new units. With the understanding that those selected would be in line for promotion, the following officers were returned to the States in response to the demand.

Lt. Col. George M. Hill	192d F. A.*
Lt. Col. Norman E. Whitney	152d F. A.*
Major Willard A. McDonald	192d F. A.
Capt. Mills D. Barber	152d F. A.
Capt. John J. Cahill	192d F. A.
Lieut. Robert M. White	192d F. A.

The loss of these officers resulted in new assignments within the Division Artillery. The following officer roster gives the assignment as of 31 May 1944.

HQ. 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

H. R. Barker	Brig. Gen.	Commanding General
C. A. Files	Col.	Exec.
J. R. Taylor, Jr.	Maj.	S-1 & S-4
E. S. Knowles	1st Lt.	Asst. S-1 & S-4
N. M. Southwick, Jr.	Maj.	S-2
J. R. Pavka	1st Lt.	Asst. S-2
E. W. Berry	Lt. Col.	S-3
F. C. Burnaby	Capt.	Asst. S-3
C. E. Remick	Capt.	Com. O
G. H. Rosser	1st Lt.	Asst. Com. O.
L. M. Cutler	Maj.	Surgeon
L. Palmer	Capt.	Dental O.
B. L. Tyler	Capt.	Chaplain
J. J. Flynn	Capt.	Chaplain
R. D. Martz	Capt.	Air O.
R. C. Chapman	1st Lt.	Ln. Pilot
E. F. Mindedahl	1st Lt.	Ln. Pilot
J. H. Soellner	1st Lt.	Sr. Aide
W. F. Straight	2nd Lt.	Jr. Aide
A. R. McAndrew	2nd Lt.	Jr. Aide
W. J. Walsh, Jr.	2nd Lt.	Unassigned
R. H. Alber	W. O.	Motor O.

*Lt. Col. George M. Hill was awarded the Bronze Star for skillful supervision of the Battalion in action at New Georgia.

Lt. Col. Norman E. Whitney was awarded the Bronze Star for the performance of meritorious services as Commanding Officer of an Artillery Battalion during the operations at New Georgia, Solomon Islands.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

HQ. BTRY. 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

C. E. Remick	Capt.	C. O.
G. H. Rosser	1st Lt.	Asst. C. O.

HQ. 103D F. A. BN.

W. B. McCormick	Lt. Col.	C. O.
R. W. Kenny	Maj.	Exec.
W. K. Covill	Capt.	S-2
W. D. MacDonald	1st Lt.	Asst. S-2
R. G. Kells	Maj.	S-3
W. B. Foster	Capt.	Asst. S-3
J. H. Congdon III	Capt.	LN 1
R. S. Pine	Capt.	LN 2
R. W. Patenge	Capt.	LN 3
R. D. Walters	Capt.	Surgeon

HQ. BTRY. 103D F. A. BN.

D. M. Twachtman	Capt.	BC. Com. O.
E. C. Herbert	1st Lt.	Asst. Com. O.
T. W. Woodward	1st Lt.	MO
D. H. Doolittle	1st Lt.	Air O.
D. J. Braucci	1st Lt.	Air O.
J. E. Horgan	W. O.	Pers. O.
W. W. Thorup	2nd Lt.	N.P.A.

BTRY. A

J. C. Young	Capt.	C. O.
A. W. Hoyt	1st Lt.	Exec.
C. H. Schubert	1st Lt.	RO
F. Maxwell	2nd Lt.	MO

BTRY. B

P. A. Hoghaug	Capt.	C. O.
R. E. Jones	1st Lt.	Exec.
R. J. Vilyus	1st Lt.	RO
G. E. Stevick	2nd Lt.	MO

BTRY. C

A. C. Stevens	Capt.	C. O.
E. L. Saul	1st Lt.	Exec.
R. H. Shilling	1st Lt.	R. O.
E. E. Goldsberry	2nd Lt.	M. O.

SER. & AMM. BTRY.

C. L. Pollitt	Capt.	C. O. & S-4
S. D. Long	1st Lt.	BN. MO.
R. D. Walters	Capt.	Surgeon
A. F. Pristupa	1st Lt.	TN. CO.
C. K. Vogste	2nd Lt.	Btry. MO.
R. H. Moshimer	W. O.	Asst. 4

THE RETURN TO NEW ZEALAND

HQ. 169TH F. A. BN.

R. L. DeBlois	Lt. Col.	C. O.
W. N. Bailey	Maj.	Exec.
E. R. Davis, Jr.	Capt.	S-2
J. H. Gong	1st Lt.	Asst. S-2
R. N. Rainey	Maj.	S-3
W. A. Farrell	Capt.	Asst. S-3
F. A. McAuliffe	Capt.	LN 1
W. H. Bremer	Capt.	LN 2
N. H. Bennett	Capt.	LN 3
C. S. D'Avanzo	Capt.	Surgeon
H. S. Einkenkel	1st Lt.	N.P.A.

HQ. BTRY. 169TH F. A. BN.

E. J. Keegan	Capt.	BC. Com O.
E. J. Brichta	1st Lt.	Asst. Com. O.
K. V. Swanson	2nd Lt.	M. O.
R. W. Leyden	1st Lt.	Air O.
Mac. Lowe	1st Lt.	Air O.
C. A. Newman	1st Lt.	N.P.A.
C. Hachadorian	W. O.	Pers. O.

BTRY. A

M. J. Butler	Capt.	C. O.
W. H. Van Camp	1st Lt.	Exec.
J. L. Bivenour	1st Lt.	R. O.
E. T. Lammert	2nd Lt.	M. O.
D. J. Knafla	2nd Lt.	N.P.A.

BTRY. B

E. S. Downing	Capt.	C. O.
E. M. Blain	1st Lt.	Exec.
E. G. Johnson	1st Lt.	R. O.
R. J. Rapisardi	2nd Lt.	M. O.

BTRY. C

T. J. Zebrowski	Capt.	C. O.
A. W. Merck	1st Lt.	Exec.
H. B. Miller	1st Lt.	R. O.
B. J. Jurewicz	2nd Lt.	M. O.

SER. & AMM. BTRY.

A. F. Maffei	Capt.	C. O. & S-4
D. J. Goul, Jr.	1st Lt.	BN. M. O.
J. W. Mayne	1st Lt.	TN. C. O.
A. Seidman	2nd Lt.	Btry. M. O.
L. H. Waterman	2nd Lt.	N.P.A.
H. A. Gagner	C. W. O.	Asst. 4

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

HQ. 152ND F. A. BN.

W. E. Bradt	Lt. Col.	C. O.
W. H. Fish	Maj.	Exec.
R. E. Deglow	Capt.	S-2
S. F. Pierson	Maj.	S-3
T. B. Mason	Capt.	Asst. S-3
F. W. Burns	Capt.	LN 1
D. M. Mushik	Capt.	LN 2
T. A. DeWolfe	Capt.	LN 3
B. G. Green	Capt.	Surgeon

HQ. BTRY. 152ND F. A. BN.

J. M. Ackerson, Jr.	Capt.	B. C. & Com. O.
J. G. Bink	1st Lt.	Asst. Com. O.
S. A. Stachelski	2nd Lt.	M. O.
B. E. W. Meadows	1st Lt.	Air O.
J. W. Wyne	1st Lt.	Air O.
R. H. Scherr	C. W. O.	Pers. O.

BTRY. A

R. L. Averill	Capt.	C. O.
G. V. Taylor	1st Lt.	Exec.
M. J. Tamburro	1st Lt.	R. O.
L. E. Maples	2nd Lt.	M. O.

BTRY. B

R. S. Hussey	Capt.	C. O.
J. G. Groves	1st Lt.	Exec.
E. M. Meier	1st Lt.	R. O.
H. R. McAninch	2nd Lt.	M. O.
S. J. Levanthal	2nd Lt.	N.P.A.

BTRY. C

W. C. McIntire	Capt.	C. O.
S. P. Lanier	1st Lt.	Exec.
C. A. Tripp	1st Lt.	R. O.
E. L. Woerner	2nd Lt.	M. O.
G. S. Hodges	1st Lt.	N.P.A.

SER. & AMM. BTRY.

W. D. Saylor	Capt.	C. O. & S-4
J. M. Landers	1st Lt.	BN. M. O.
A. A. Brooks	1st Lt.	TN. C. O.
H. V. Lyons	2nd Lt.	M. O.
C. J. McCluskey	W. O.	Asst. 4

HQ. 192ND F. A. BN.

S. L. Nichols	Lt. Col.	C. O.
J. S. Blair, 3rd	Maj.	Exec.
G. T. Fielding, III	Capt.	S-2

THE RETURN TO NEW ZEALAND

P. B. Lyle	1st Lt.	Asst. S-2
D. M. Goff	Maj.	S-3
H. E. Ryan	Capt.	Asst. S-3
G. C. Witt	Capt.	LN. O
D. F. Parker	Capt.	Surgeon
W. Sleeper	2nd Lt.	N.P.A.

HQ. BTRY. 192ND F. A. BN.

S. M. King	Capt.	B. C. & Com. O.
S. E. Winget	1st Lt.	Asst. Com. O.
J. W. Richards	1st Lt.	M. O.
T. G. Hardie	1st Lt.	Air O.
J. H. Marshall	1st Lt.	Air O.
E. A. Taylor	W. O.	Pers. O.

BTRY. A

L. M. Higgins	Capt.	C. O.
H. B. Newhall	1st Lt.	Exec.
E. J. Solberg	1st Lt.	R. O.
B. J. Vinyard	2nd Lt.	M. O.

BTRY. B

W. B. Craig	Capt.	C. O.
A. J. Papa	1st Lt.	Exec.
W. H. Houlahan	1st Lt.	R. O.
J. F. Pershern	2nd Lt.	M. O.

BTRY. C

T. E. Crary	Capt.	C. O.
F. M. Dugan	1st Lt.	Exec.
J. A. Federer	1st Lt.	R. O.
L. D. Brock	2nd Lt.	M. O.

SER. & AMM. BTRY.

E. W. Robinson	Capt.	C. O. & S-4
H. G. Drinkwater	Capt.	BN. M. O.
B. Zimmer	1st Lt.	TN. C. O.
E. F. Yanner	2nd Lt.	M. O.
L. H. Stallings	C. W. O.	Asst. 4

N.P.A. (No Position Assignment)

Upon completion of the Field Maneuvers it was indicated that the Division would soon return to combat. In spite of five months of outstanding New Zealand hospitality the men were again anxious to get on with the war. Alert orders by code were received about the middle of June and by 1 July plans for movement were completed — destination, "Somewhere in New Guinea."

CHAPTER VIII

NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN (July - Dec. 1944)

AITAPE OPERATION — MOVEMENT TO AITAPE
OPERATIONS OF PERSECUTION TASK FORCE.
DRINIUMOR RIVER LINE, TADJI DEFENSE PERIMETER.
PREPARATION FOR INVASION OF LUZON.

THE ALERT orders, received in the middle of June, calling for “somewhere in New Guinea”, meant that the 43d Division would leave the South Pacific Command and join the forces of General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific area — SOWESPAC. The Division became part of the Sixth Army, commanded by General Watler Krueger.*

On 19 June 1944 an order was received by the Division calling for an advanced detachment to report to the Commanding General Sixth Army at Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea, for instructions.

The following artillery personnel were included in this detachment.

Lt. Col. Edward W. Berry	Hqs. Div. Arty.
Major Nathan W. Southwick	Hqs. Div. Arty.
Capt. Wm. A. Farrell	103d F. A.
Capt. Earl R. Davis, Jr.	169th F. A.
Capt. Geo. T. Fielding III	192d F. A.
1st Lt. R. E. Deglow	152d F. A.
Cpl. Burleigh S. Richardson	Hqs. Div. Arty.


STRATEGY OF THE FORCES IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided that Pacific strategy would entail the reconquest of the Philippines. The strategy

*General Walter Krueger was a hard-bitten professional soldier who never hesitated to visit the front lines to get a first hand picture of what was going on. He was admired and respected by all who served with him in the Pacific.




Lt. D. Doolittle — Gen. Barker — Capt. R. Martz, Div. Art. Air Officer.
New Guinea, 1944.



Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker and 1st Lt. Duncan Doolittle with observation
plane 'Ready Betty' in New Guinea, August 1944.



Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi,
Commanding General of the Japanese 18th Army, Wewak New Guinea.



Japanese Defenders — 1944.

THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

for the approach to the Philippines was clearly delineated — the forces of the Southwest Pacific Command were to move northwest along the coast of New Guinea and via the islands northwest of the Vogelkop Peninsula, Halmahera, and Morotai into the Philippines. The first step in this drive to the Philippines was the seizure by Southwest Pacific forces of the Hollandia-Aitape region.

To assure success in this area it was decided to obtain land-based air support for Hollandia by seizing an air field site on the northern New Guinea coast east of the main objective. The location chosen was a lightly held area, already partly developed, by the Japanese near Aitape, in Australian New Guinea, about 125 miles east-southeast of Hollandia. The Japanese had used this field as a staging area for aircraft flying between Wewak and Hollandia.¹

THE AITAPE OPERATION

The Allied Task Force for this operation, known as the *Persecution Task Force*, consisted of the 163d Regimental Combat Team of the 41st Infantry Division as its combat nucleus. It, with attached elements, landed near Aitape on 22 April with the objective of seizing and rehabilitating the Japanese constructed Tadjai airstrip, eight miles east-southeast of Aitape. The Task Force was also to provide ground flank protection for Hollandia by preventing westward advance of the Japanese *18th Army* (Gen. Hatazo Adachi), assembling at this time some ninety miles southeast of Aitape at Wewak.

The landings at both Hollandia and Aitape were a complete surprise to the Japanese, as they had expected the Allied attack to be made either at Hansa Bay or Wewak. Bypassing the Japanese in these two areas resulted in successful landings at Hollandia and Aitape with a minimum of casualties. D day for both Hollandia and Aitape was 22 April 1944.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

REORGANIZATION OF THE PERSECUTION TASK FORCE

By 4 May the original units of the Task Force were relieved and the 32d Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Gill commanding, took over from the 163d Regimental Combat Team. At this time Intelligence Officers of the Persecution Task Force and Alamo Force (Sixth U. S. Army) interpreted Japanese activities as indicating that an organized westward movement of *18th Army* units was under way. Since March the *18th Japanese Army* was commanded by Gen. Adachi, who had under his control between 50,000 and 60,000 men. His principal units comprised three *Infantry Divisions*: the *20th*, *41st* and *51st*.

Upon assuming command of the Persecution Task Force, Gen. Gill reorganized the defenses of the Aitape area. The area west of Waitanan Creek was designated *West Sector*, and that to the East, *East Sector*. Later on a *Center Sector* was established between the *East* and *West Sectors*. Outpost patrol lines extended 10 miles inland and as far east as the mouth of the Driniumor River and inland again to the village of Afea, six miles up that stream.

By the end of May every indication showed that Japanese concentrations east of the Driniumor River were increasing. Troops of *20th* and *41st divisions* of the Japanese *18th Army* had been identified and by 1 June attacks were made on Allied troops patrolling at Yakamul and Afua.

On 17 June General MacArthur questioned Alamo Force concerning the advisability of reinforcing the Persecution Task Force, because of the increased activity of the *Japanese 18th Army*. A few days later Gen. MacArthur's Headquarters, which had secured the information from radio intercepts, informed General Krueger that the *18th Army* planned to attack about the end of the first ten days in July, employing 20,000 troops in the forward area and another 11,000 in reserve. He informed Gen. Krueger that the 43d Infantry Division was scheduled for an early move to Aitape

THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

in order to stage there for operations further west, but that the Division could not arrive at Aitape before the end of the first week in July.

The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team was immediately shipped to Aitape, where it arrived 27 June and efforts were also made to speed the shipment of the 43d Division from New Zealand to Aitape.

When all the reinforcements arrived, the Persecution Task Forces would equal two and two-thirds divisions. Gen. Krueger therefore decided that a Corps Headquarters would be needed at Aitape. He chose for the Command Maj. Gen. Charles P. Hall* who, together with his Staff of the XI Corps Headquarters, had recently arrived in New Guinea from the United States.

DRINIUMOR RIVER LINE

On 29 June the mission of the Persecution Task Force was changed. Gen. Krueger, who had maintained close touch with the situation at Aitape, ordered that the Japanese be met and fought to a decision as far on the east flank as possible. The Driniumor had been the Outpost Line; it now became the Main Line of Resistance and Gen. Hall ordered the Covering Force to retreat from this line only in the face of overwhelming pressure.

At 2355 on 10 July the Japanese launched a vigorous attack, the Driniumor Line was penetrated, and a gap developed in the center. The Commander of the Covering Force ordered a general withdrawal to Akanai Creek. A counterattack on 13 July restored the Driniumor Line.

On 15 July the first elements of the 43d Infantry Division began to arrive at Aitape. American lines were very thinly

*Gen. Hall was a professional soldier possessing notable ability. With a quiet and understanding manner he obtained the best efforts from those who served in his Command.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

held at the time the 43d landed. The Japs moving up from Wewak were a serious threat. There simply were not enough American troops to defend the Driniumor River Line and protect the perimeter guarding the airfield. Immediately upon debarkation from the transports *Shanks* and *Torrens*, the 103d Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, and the 118th Engineer Battalion were sent into the Main Line of Resistance in the Western Sector Command. Their mission was to hold.

Upon debarkation, on 19 July, the remainder of the 169th Infantry, the 152d and 192d Field Artillery battalions went into positions in defense and support of the Western Sector of the Main Line of Resistance. Upon its arrival at Aitape, the 172d Infantry was deployed in defense of the airdrome.

On 21 July, the 2d Battalion 169th Infantry (Maj. Wm. F. Lewis) was sent to Anamo and on 22 July had moved to the right flank of two battalions of the 124th Infantry (32d Division) already on the Driniumor. The 2d Battalion played a leading role in repelling the attacks and later this battalion launched out from its prepared positions on the river to track down and destroy the enemy.²

On 25 July the 43d Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Leonard F. Wing) took over the mission of the Perimeter Defense Force of the Persecution Task Force.

Following are extracts from the Artillery Annex to Field Order #1 of the Headquarters Perimeter Defense, Persecution Task Force, dated 25 July 1944.

2. The general mission of the artillery with the PDPT is the direct and general support of the perimeter defense, with the mass of fires 400 yards in front of MLR to limit of range.
3. a. Artillery groupments:
 - (1) (a) East Groupment: (Col. McCreary)
126th F. A. Bn. Direct support 126th Inf.
148th F. A. Bn. Direct support 114th Eng. and
875th A. B. Eng.

THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

- | | |
|----------------------|------------------------------|
| (b) West Groupment : | (C.G. 43d Div. Arty.) |
| 103d F. A. Bn. | (On occupation of position) |
| | Direct support 172d Inf. |
| 152d F. A. Bn. | Direct support 103d Inf. |
| 169th F. A. Bn. | Direct support 172d Inf. |
| | General support on relief by |
| | 103d F. A. Bn. |
| 192d F. A. Bn. | General support. |

(2) (a) Check Points.

Eastern Group #523

Western Group #103

All battalions will register on both check points where they are included in their zones of responsibility.

- (b) Registration will be vigorously conducted to include close defense fires.
- (c) 169th and 192d F. A. Bns. will be prepared to execute counterbattery missions. (Coordinate with C.B. section XI Army Corps).
- (d) Artillery of both groupments will be prepared to mass their fires on high ground approach to western end Tadjji Drome. (Grid Block 95.0 to 97.0 and 46.0 to 48.5).
- (e) For positions and sectors of responsibility see Annex #1 overlay.
- (f) Detailed fire plans, coordinated with infantry fire plans will be completed without delay. One copy to be forwarded to this headquarters.
- (g) All night harassing and box security will be coordinated through this headquarters.
- (h) Firing chart: 1/20,000 metric grid.
- (i) Targets designated by Photomap coordinates will be grid firing chart.
- (j) Minimum range line: all battalions will be prepared to fire in direct support of RRL.
- (k) Survey: Basis 32d Div. Arty. Extension will be continuous. Coordination by Division Artillery Survey Officer.
- (l) Local security against air, mechanized, sea-borne or raiding parties is a battalion responsibility, coordinated within the group. Sentries and weapons will be posted for security against demolition raids. Anti-aircraft units will fire only when being attacked.

3. b. Artillery with the PDPTA:

- (1) Batteries B & C. 743d AA (90mm) will be prepared to execute terrestrial fires, coordination by East Groupment.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

- (2) Anti-aircraft protection as now organized by the 383d AAA AW (Reinf.)
- 4. a. Ammunition :
 - (1) One unit of fire will be kept at the battery positions and two units of fire will be kept in battalion dump.
 - (2) Battalions expending in excess of one unit of fire in a single day will notify this headquarters without delay (through Group Headquarters).
- b. Other details no change.
- 5. Plan of signal communication, see Annex #2 Signal Plan. C.P.'s No change. See overlay Annex #1.

BARKER

BERRY

Annexes: #1 Positions, zones of fire.
#2 Communication Plan.

DISTRIBUTION:

B	64
Add. XI Corps (Arty)	2
43d Div.	100
East Group	15
	181

The Persecution Covering Force was still commanded by Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Gill of the 32d Division and bitter fighting for this Force still continued along the Driniumor Line during the second half of July.

On 31 July Gen. Hall (XI Corps.), commanding the Persecution Task Force, launched a counterattack and advanced to the east of the Driniumor. This attack overwhelmed important elements of the Japanese *18th Army*, fighting desperately but hopelessly to escape being cut off. On 3 August Gen. Adachi issued detailed plans for the withdrawal of all *18th Army* units to the east side of the Driniumor.⁸

On 7 August orders were received that the 32d Division was to be relieved and the 43d Division was to take over all of the Aitape defensive installations. This included the line of resistance guarding the airfield and the Driniumor River line.

THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

TADJI DEFENSE PERIMETER

Following is the Artillery Annex to Field Order #1 of the Headquarters Tadj Defense, dated 8 August 1944.

SECRET

Headquarters Tadj Defense
A.P.O. #43, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

ANNEX #3 to F.O. #1. ARTILLERY

SECRET

C.G.TD Arty.

Headquarters Tadj Defense
Artillery
A.P.O. #43, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
8 August 1944

FIELD ORDER

No.1

Maps: Aitape and adjacent areas.

1. a. See Intelligence Annex Basic Order.

b. (1) Tadj Defense will defend the air fields, and destroy the enemy in the Aitape-Tadj area.

Troops: 43d Infantry Division
112 Cav. Regiment
148 F. A. Bn.
181 F. A. Bn.
Co. B 44th Tank Battalion
383d AAA AW Bn. (attchd: Btry B & C,
743d AA Gun Bn., 1 Pl. Btry C,
227th AAA SL. Bn.)

(2) Persecution Task Force Reserve:

Troops: 32d Inf. Div.
124th Regimental C.T.
872d Engr. Avn. Bn. (A/B)
875th Engr. Avn. Bn. (A/B)
632d T.D. Bn.

(3) Allied Air and Naval Elements:

2. Tadj Defense Artillery supports the Tadj Defense. It will be prepared to place the mass of its fires in support of any sector, support beach defenses and outposts within the limits of its range.

3. a. Covering Force Artillery: C.O. Lt. Col. Bradt.

(1) 152d F. A. Bn. Direct support of covering force.
Relieves
149th F. A. Bn. at Chakila by 1200 10 August (Initially
supports the
124th Infantry) Upon the relief of the 124th Inf. by the
103d Infantry It is attached to the 103d Infantry
(2) 181st F. A. Bn. Reinforces the fires of the 152d F. A. Bn.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

b. *Perimeter Defense Artillery:* C.G. 43d Div. Artillery

- (1) 103d F. A. Bn., Direct support 172d Inf. (less O.P.L.R.)
Relieve 169th F. A. Bn. effective 1800 8 August.
- (2) 169th F. A. Bn. Direct support 169th Inf. on relief
from direct support 103d Inf.
- (3) 148th F. A. Bn. Direct support OPLR Bn. 172d Inf.
- (4) 192d F. A. Bn. General support.

c. *Artillery With The Tadjil Defense:*

- (1) Btry. B & C 743d A.A.A.: Terrestrial Fires (90mm). Reinforce and deepen the general support fires of the Perimeter Artillery.
- (2) Anti-aircraft security as now organized.
 - x. (1) Perimeter Artillery check points #102, 103, 590, and 600.
 - (2) Registration will be vigorously conducted to include close defense fires.
 - (3) 181st and 192d F. A. Bn. will be prepared to execute counterbattery fires (Coordinate with C.B. section XI Army Corps).
 - (4) For position and sector of responsibility see Annex #1 overlay.
 - (5) Detailed fire plans to include M7 and 90mm will be completed without delay. One copy to be forwarded to this headquarters.
 - (6) All night harassing and close security fires will be coordinated through the headquarters.
 - (7) Firing chart 1/20,000 metric grid. Extension of Perimeter Survey.
 - (8) Targets designated by Photo Map. Coordinates will be restituted to grid firing chart.
 - (9) Minimum range for all battalions close support RRL of supported units.
 - (10) Local security against Air, Mechanized, Sea-borne or raiding attacks is a battalion responsibility.
Fires will be coordinated with sector commanders.
 - (11) O.P. reports to be forwarded thru channels to AA — OP warning center, this headquarters.

4. a. *Ammunition:*

- (1) One unit of fire will be maintained at the battery positions, and two units in battalion dumps.
- (2) Battalions expending in excess of one unit of fire in a single day will notify this headquarters without delay.

b. Other administrative details. No change.

THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

5. a. Plan of signal communication, see Annex #2. Signal plan.
- b. C.P. 152d F. A. to be reported. Other Artillery C.Ps. No change.

BARKER

BERRY

ANNEXES: #1. Positions Zones of Fire
#2. Signal Plan

DISTRIBUTION :

B	64
Add. XI Corps Arty.....	2
43d Div.	80
383 AAA AW Bn.	4
148 F. A. Bn.	5
181 F. A. Bn.	5
	160

On 11 August the 103d Infantry, 43d Division, began to relieve all units of the Persecution Covering Force still on the Driniumor River.

The Persecution Covering Force ceased to exist as a separate unit on the 15 August and its missions were assumed by a new organization which, designated as the Tadjji Defense Perimeter and Covering Force, was commanded by Maj. Gen. Leonard F. Wing of the 43d Infantry Division.

From 16 to 25 August the principal combat missions in the Aitape area were carried out by the 43d Division. During this period scattered contacts were made with the enemy between the Driniumor River line and Wewak. Patrols also were dispatched southerly into the hills to a distance of 35 miles to detect enemy movement, and easterly along the coast, and inland for a comparable distance. Skirmishes with the enemy were frequent, and by November 1944 thirty-seven prisoners of war were captured and thirty-four members of the British Indian Army, captured by the Japanese in Malaya in January and February, 1942, were recaptured by our forces. Needless to say, these Indians were most happy to be liberated.⁴

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

On 25 August Gen. Krueger, Alamo Force Commander, convinced that the *18th Japanese Army* no longer constituted any threat to the Aitape Perimeter or the Tadjai airstrips, declared the Aitape Operation at an end.

TRAINING AND PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT OPERATION

Immediately upon cessation of organized enemy hostilities (there were still active patrol engagements with Japanese stragglers) an intensive training program was instigated in preparation for the next operation.

The following are extracts from Headquarters 43d Division Artillery Training Memorandum under date of 31 August 1944.

OUTLINE OF ARTILLERY TRAINING

August 28/44 — Dec. 1/44

Schedule

Aug. 28 — Sept. 25	Amphibious Training. Individual Training. Complete area and command inspections by Sept. 15. Service firing all Battalions using 152d F. A. Bns. emplacements. 152d F. A. Bn. to remain in Driniumor area.
Sept. 26 — 30	Inspections.
Oct. 1 — Nov. 1	Combined Infantry and Artillery maneuvers to include firing artillery service ammo. over heads of troops.
Nov. 1 — Dec. 1	Army Ground Force Firing Tests (Modified)

In carrying out this Training Program the following subjects were especially emphasized.

1. *Service Firing on the Driniumor.*
152 F. A. Bn. week of Sept. 24.
103 F. A. Bn. week of Oct. 1.
169 F. A. Bn. week of Oct. 8.
169 F. A. Bn. week of Oct. 15 for officers of the 192 and 181 F. A. Bns.

THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

Ammunition Available.

<i>105mm Ammunition</i>	(50% T — 40% H.E. — 10% S)	
800 rounds per battalion	(4 x 800)	3200
Total available		3700
Reserve		500
<i>155mm Ammunition</i>		
300 rounds per battalion		600 rounds

Types of Problems.

Time Fire. Register & Determine Time Setting	3 x 10	30
Forward Observers Register	2 x 10	20
Bn. Concentration	2 x 12	24
Airplane Adjustment	2 x 8	16
Registration	2 x 10	20
Transfers		
Bn. Concentration	2 x 12	24
		134
Direct Laying (HE)		26
	(per day)	160
5 days (5x100)		800

Use of Air Photos

High Burst Adjustment

2. Service Firing From Tumleo Island by 192d F. A. Bn.

With the 192d F. A. Bn. using battery positions on Tumleo Island and a target area southwest of Mt. Anna on the New Guinea mainland, another series of service firing problems was carried out. Critiques and Battalion Commanders' meetings followed each phase of service practice.

All service practice conformed in general to the Army Ground Force Firing Tests, with modification necessitated by the terrain.

3. Spotting of Naval Gun Fire.

Training was also carried out in the spotting of naval gun fire. This was adjudged important since it was anticipated that Joint Assault Signal Company units (JASCO) might not be available for the campaign. It was fortunate that for this training actual enemy targets were available a few miles west of Wewak. Destroyers were made available and officers, with radio operators, participated in this practice, becoming very proficient, not only in spotting, but in Navy gunnery and communication procedures. Officers conducted naval gun fire on the enemy installations on the New Guinea coast.

4. Fire Direction Centers.

As the massing of fires of all artillery units is one of the primary objectives in combat and as this depends on the organization and efficiency of the Fire Direction Centers, this aspect of training was given special attention. The personnel of these Centers were specialists and were not subject to assignment with the front line infantry units. To give some idea of the importance placed by Division Artillery Headquarters on the

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

training of this department, the following is quoted from an unofficial letter issued in June 1944 by the Division Artillery S-3 (Col. E. W. Berry) to all S-3s of the Division Artillery units.

“SUBJECT: Comments on Service Practice and Combined Training.
TO: All Division Artillery “3s”.

This is a very personal letter. It has been written to you because you are one of the “3s” of the Division Artillery. It has been made personal because it is motivated by most sincere and concerned feelings. It is straightforward in spite of rhetorical gingerbread, gentle curves and hypocritical applesauce. It has been written with the hope that it will be reread and its contents digested and retained.

As “3s” you are new. By this I mean that you are not combat “3s”. You have all been through combat, but in some other assignment than the “3” section. Your selection for this new assignment has not been haphazard or by lottery. This new job of yours is a tough job. It requires not only long hours but often many sleepless days of continuous duty. It entails necessary and unavoidable responsibility. It requires meticulous and exacting routine. You must have the ability to visualize and understand the combat situation at all times. You will sometimes be called upon to make supplementary decisions. Time will be the controlling factor. You will have to think on your feet. The success of an operation, even the very lives of your supported troops, will depend on your sound judgment in applying flawless technical skill. Your reaction to sudden and unexpected emergencies will sometimes have to be nothing short of instinct.

There are several reasons why the “3” job is a coveted one. Some consider it bomb proof, some a stepping stone to promotion, others like to be “in the know” and have a finger in operations. Here and there we hear the expression “what a soft job”! From the bomb proof point of view, even as there are many wounds and scars received at the front that do not break the skin, there is also many a bomb that lands in the fire direction center that does not crash thru the roof of the dugout, yet lands in the lap of the “3”. I know that you will never understand what I mean until you have been called upon for fire on a narrow pocket, surrounded on three sides by your own troops. When you have lived thru the eternity between the operator’s “On the way”, and the forward observer’s “Range correct, deflection correct”, when you have received the frantic call from the front “Your fire is landing on my troops. I’ve spent three days and lost half my men taking this hill. If you don’t stop firing I’ll have to pull back.” (Of course it’s Jap counterbattery, of course it’s mortar fire — it couldn’t be — or could it?). These are the times you will wish reverently you were up in the lines, and understand what I am trying to tell you.

The many responsibilities of the “3” can be grouped under one heading — confidence. His biggest responsibility is to obtain and retain the confidence of the higher command, his subordinate units and his supported troops. Confidence is an intangible that cannot be inherited nor conferred. It has to be earned. It must be warranted by physical demonstration. A

THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

demonstration devoid of costly blunders. We have just been through what might be called a demonstration. It has been a learning exercise. We have demonstrated technique that can be improved upon. We have made errors. These errors can well be recognized as a basis for corrective training. Profiting by them, we can further improve our team so that it will warrant more solidly both the confidence of our supported troops and a mutual confidence in ourselves among ourselves.

These following notes cover the items which I believe are in the most urgent need for improvement in so far as service practice is concerned as demonstrated during the past several months.

Following are the items without the detailed comment.

- Failure to Make Check by Alternate Methods*
- Failure to Properly Keep Situation Map*
- Scarcity of Sensing and Information*
- Failure of Units to Establish a Command Post*
- Confusion at the Fire Direction Centers*
- Failure to Continuously Organize Positions*
- Improper Identification of Orienting Line*
- Loss of Time*
- Incorrect Quadrant Setting*
- Wrong Range Table*
- Height of Burst*
- Vertical Control*
- Vehicular Parks*
- Camouflage*
- Telephone Operators*
- Laying of Wire*
- Selection of Base Point*
- Verification of Base Point*
- Improper Application of K.*
- Laying Battalion on Base Point*
- Air Adjustment*
- Declining Station*
- Jamming of Lines*
- Local Security Measures*
- Use of Chemical Shell*

In choosing these items to comment on in this letter, I have been guided by the A. G. F. Tests. I have confined myself to those things which are rated and also to the fine points that umpires are asked to observe in order to form and express opinions on the tests. There are probably many other errors which you have seen, and have already instituted plans for the correction of.

In rereading this letter I find that I have given vent now and then to some pent-up feelings and perhaps did a little "dishing out". You also must have some interesting comments on this firing, or other things. I

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

am always at the old stand on the corner, drop in and unload. You will find that I also can "take it".

EDWARD W. BERRY
Lt. Col., F. A.
S-3

5. *Field Artillery Air Observation.*

The Aitape Operation was the first opportunity to employ our own planes and flying personnel in combat. The Driniumor River combat area was particularly difficult to operate in, because of the jungle which made observation almost impossible and rough air which made steady flight something to be desired. Nevertheless a great deal of valuable experience was obtained as both infantry and artillery officers were rotated in flights, for observation and conduct of fire in the combat zone. Procedures for Air Observation were worked out and Training Memoranda issued.

6. *Perimeter Defense Exercises.*

In each campaign against the Japanese the importance of individual defense for each installation was most apparent. The Japanese are past masters in the art of infiltration and no unit was free from a possible Japanese attack. A Perimeter Defense Exercise was included in the Training Schedule.

7. *Infantry — Artillery Maneuvers.*

During the last part of October a series of Infantry—Artillery maneuvers were conducted which included the firing of artillery service ammunition over the heads of the infantry. The maneuver called for an amphibious landing, the establishment of a beachhead and an attack inland.

Artillery battery positions were on Tumleo Island and the beach area was on the mainland in the vicinity of Aitape. Because no landing craft were available the infantry assembled on each flank of the coast road running through the beach area. An artillery preparation was fired on the landing beach and when the fire was lifted the infantry went forward behind the artillery fire. The infantry made their attack inland with artillery fires covering their advance. This maneuver was repeated until all infantry regiments had participated.

8. *Inspections*

During the training period at Aitape inspections were held as follows:

Battalion inspections of batteries,
Division Artillery inspections of battalions,
Corps inspections of the Division Artillery and attached units.
XI Corps Inspection

The inspections and associations with the XI Corps Artillery Section were of great assistance to the 43d Division Artillery. The work of the Division Artillery during the Aitape operation was made more effective by the interest and co-operation of the XI Corps Artillery Officer, Brig.

THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

Gen. George V. Keyser. The notable efficiency and keen artillery sense of this officer was again to be encountered during the Luzon Campaign in 1945.

I Corps Inspection

This inspection had special significance as it developed that the 43d Division was to serve in this corps in its next operation.

Copy of this Inspection Report was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS I CORPS ARTILLERY

UNITED STATES ARMY

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 301

22 October 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of Division Artillery
43d Division.

TO: Commanding General, I Corps, APO 301.

1. There is no particularly outstanding battalion in this Division. All are equal as to training, maintenance of materiel, and housekeeping. The state of training is very satisfactory. Every indication points to a study of the Battalion Officers by the Commanding General and a placing of these officers to balance his battalions.

2. The training is along the lines desired by I Corps. Sufficient motor transportation is on hand for rapid displacement.

3. The housekeeping of this unit while satisfactory left much to be desired. Tent arrangements were uniform but could have been better planned. Motor shops, supply rooms and messes while clean were not orderly.

4. Effort is being made to provide the men with more conveniences.

5. The morale and esprit of the men is excellent.

R. L. JOHNSON

Lt. Col., F. A.

Asst. Arty. Officer

CONCLUSIONS

The most obvious result of the Aitape operation was that two and one-third reinforced Japanese divisions of the *18th Army* had been shattered in vain attempts to recapture the Aitape area and delay the Allied drive towards the Philippines — neither of which objectives had been achieved. Instead, the *18th Army* suffered a decisive and costly defeat;

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

it could no longer be a serious threat to Allied Forces anywhere in New Guinea.

The Aitape Operation had served a number of other purposes for the Allies. *First*, the Tadjai airstrips had provided a base from which planes could have flown missions for ground operations at Hollandia, had such support proved necessary. *Second*, the Persecution Task Force's victory over the *18th Army* prevented the latter unit from threatening more important Allied positions at Hollandia. *Finally*, the Aitape area served as a staging base for troops engaged in three later operations along the New Guinea coast and in the Philippines.⁵

THE ARTILLERY DURING THE AITAPE OPERATION

Although the artillery of the 32d Division bore the brunt of the artillery support for the Covering Force on the Driniumor River Line, nevertheless the artillery of the 43d Division could be included in the commendation given by General Krueger to the artillery during the Aitape Operation.

Quoting from his book "From Down Under to Nippon" —

"Throughout the entire Aitape Operation, the artillery played a very important part. It was handled aggressively and effectively and contributed greatly to the success of the operation."

PLANS FOR THE REOCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

The initial phase for the reoccupation of the Philippine Islands envisaged footholds in the southern and central Philippines for the establishment of bases and airfields from which subsequent operations could be supported. The first operation planned for 1 November 1944 was to be the seizure of the Sarangani Bay area in southern Mindanao, for the purpose of establishing land-based air forces to augment the carrier-based air support for the advance into Leyte. The 43d Infantry Division was to be part of this Operation Force.

THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

On 15 September the plans were changed and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Gen. MacArthur to cancel the Sarangani Bay operation and invade Leyte on 20 October. The 43d Division was not scheduled for this operation.

On 3 October Gen. MacArthur was directed to occupy Luzon on 20 December 1944. The 43d Division, as part of the force in this Operation, was assigned to I Corps, Sixth Army, and was scheduled to leave Aitape on 20 December, but the movement was postponed until 28 December.

On 28 December 1944, having turned the Aitape area over to the 6th Australian Division, the 43d Infantry Division boarded transports and left Aitape to join other troop convoys for the attack on Luzon, Philippine Islands.

CHAPTER IX

LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN (9 January 1945-30 June 1945)

JAPANESE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1944

BATTLE OF LUZON :

The Preparation Phase, The Amphibious Movement, The Seizure of the Beachhead, The Stotsenberg Action, The turning of the Shimbu Line, The Ipo Dam Operation, Reports and Conclusions.

JAPANESE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1944

IN APRIL 1944 the defense of the Philippines, and the Japanese conquest in the south and west, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, Thailand, Borneo, French Indo-China, the Moluccas and New Guinea, were made the responsibility of Field Marshal Count Hisaihi Terauchi. From his headquarters at Manila he controlled seventeen Japanese armies totaling about 925,000 men. Terauchi, a typical Japanese jingoist, had been Minister of War and commanded the armies which set out in 1937 to sack China. In the fall of 1943 he had assumed command of the southern armies with headquarters at Singapore. He moved his headquarters to Manila a half year later when the Philippines came under his command. The *14th Area Army* in the Philippines was under the direct command of Lt. General Shigenori Kuroda.¹

On 19 October 1944 Naval Task Force 78 (Rear Admiral D. E. Barbey) and Naval Task Force 79 (Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson) approached the east coast of Leyte with elements of the Sixth Army, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger commanding, aboard. The Sixth Army's mission was to seize the island of Leyte. At sea Admiral Halsey's mighty



Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi,
Commander-in-Chief, Southern Army.



General Tomoyuki Yamashita,
Commanding General of the Japanese 14th Area Army, Luzon, Philippines.



First assault wave troops of the 43rd Infantry Division take cover behind their amphibious alligator, 300 yards inland from White Beach #3 and enemy fire. Lingayen Gulf, Luzon Island, P. I. 1/9/45



A crater made by a Jap 12 inch gun in Demeritus, Luzon, P. I. The shell landed twenty feet from foxholes in which men of the 43rd Division were located on Feb. 6, 1945.

LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN

carrier task force, which helped prepare the way for the landings by air bombardment, now stood watch for possible Japanese naval opposition to the landings. It was not long delayed, for that day the pilot of a Japanese search plane discovered this great amphibious force and reported its presence to Admiral Kurita's Singapore fleet, which then constituted sixty percent of Japan's major naval units. This report precipitated one of the decisive battles of history. The Japanese made the decision to commit their fleet in the battle to prevent America's return to the Philippines.

"The naval Battle of Leyte Gulf was the result, and by any standard was the greatest sea fight of all time; quite possibly in the sense of a battle of fleet against fleet it may prove to have been the last. Not one but a series of engagements, this vast struggle was fought out over an area twice the size of France in encounters separated by as much as a thousand miles. For four days the fighting continued in scattered and at times uncoordinated action in the air, on the surface, and under the sea, but with the focus always on the beachhead in the Gulf from which the battle took its name. So vast was its extent in space and time that Jutland, in comparison, seems a simple affair; so various and inclusive were the types of action as to make this battle an epitome of the Pacific War.²"

By 26 October it was apparent that the Third and Seventh Fleets had virtually eliminated Japan as a sea power. Her fleet had suffered a crippling blow and the Japanese position in the Philippines had become extremely critical. Gen. MacArthur's land wedge was firmly implanted in the vulnerable flank of the enemy.

Marshal Terauchi no longer had an effective fleet to cover his forces in the Philippines or his communications to the empire of Malaysia so easily conquered two and one-half years before. Nevertheless Terauchi decided that the battle must be fought in the difficult terrain of the Leyte

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

mountains and rice paddies. He relieved Kuroda as commander of the *14th Area Army* and replaced him with General Tomoyuki Yamashita, who had successively conquered Singapore in 1942 and then moved to the Philippines to finish that campaign after Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma had been unable to budge the American forces holding out on Bataan. Yamashita was one of Japan's best known generals. For his victories in Singapore and Bataan he had been elevated to the *First Area Army* in Manchuria, one of the two top field commands in the Kwantung Army.

The Sixth American Army (Gen. Krueger), after establishing a beachhead on the high ground overlooking Leyte Gulf, continued to advance against strong and desperate opposition, and by 26 December closed out organized Jap resistance on the island of Leyte.

Marshal Terauchi, realizing that the Philippines were slipping from his grasp, fled with his Headquarters to Saigon, Indo China.³

BATTLE OF LUZON

PREPARATION PHASE, 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

On or about 10 October 1944 it became known that the 43d Division would participate in the landing operation in the Lingayen Gulf area, Luzon, Philippine Islands. Maps were secured and planning for the operation began immediately. Maps available consisted of Luzon 1/50,000 topographical map, and Luzon 1/25,000 topographical map. Photographs of the area were to be supplied as soon as available. As the contemplated Division sector and sectors of the infantry regiments became known it was possible to make tentative selections for artillery battalion areas which would be occupied initially upon landing. It is interesting to note that the positions occupied by the battalions after the actual landing was made conformed very closely to those selected for use during the planning stage. The study

THE PREPARATION PHASE

of terrain and the probable requirements for employment were of unquestionable value in providing early knowledge for the employment of the artillery. In addition to the study of terrain for the battalion positions, a careful study was made of all the terrain which would probably be included in the scope of the operation. All officers were briefed in the main terrain features of the area, including locations and sizes of towns, probable enemy centers of resistance, and probable targets. A photo-map of limited scope which became available, together with G-2 information, furnished a basis for this. Liaison pilots and air observers were given intensive instruction in order that they would be thoroughly familiar with the terrain by the time the operation started.

As soon as the exact shipping which would be supplied for the movement was known, all units made definite and detailed plans for the loading of equipment and personnel. It was evident from the start that the amount of shipping available for this movement would be greatly restricted. Therefore, most careful plans were required. In general, light artillery battalions were given space in vessels assigned for the Regimental Combat Teams. The majority of the firing batteries were moved in LSMs and LSTs. Some of them, however, were moved on transports. Nearly all battalions were spread throughout six or seven vessels. Plans required that certain equipment must be immediately available upon landing. Other equipment could be loaded so as to be available at a later hour. It is much to the credit of the Transport Quartermasters that, with few exceptions, unloading was accomplished according to the schedule planned.

The artillery available for the operation was as follows:

Organic Troops:

- Hq. and Hq. Battery, 43d Division Artillery
- 103d Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer)
- 152d Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer)
- 169th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer)
- 192d Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer)

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Attached Troops:

181st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer)
470th AAA AW Battalion
161st AAA Gun Battalion (less Batteries C & D)
4th Field Artillery Sound Ranging Platoon
Detachment, 671st Engineer Topographical Company
One battery, less one platoon, 222d AA Searchlight Battalion

Liaison officers were selected to report to the 158th Regimental Combat Team which would operate on our left flank and the 6th Infantry Division which would operate on our right flank, these officers to report to those units immediately upon landing. Four (4) officers were selected for naval air spotting. These officers were ordered to report to the Navy on such short notice, however, that they could not be properly briefed. As a result, their services were of questionable value during the initial phase of the operation.

This Headquarters was assigned shipping space as follows:

		Officers EM			Cargo	Vehicular
<i>USS Cavalier</i>	(APA)	37	8	14	None	None
<i>USS Thuban</i>	(AKA)	19	7	96	20 ship tons	2415 sq. ft.

On 25 November 1944 Field Order No. 1 was issued by the 43d Division Artillery as follows:

TOP SECRET	HEADQUARTERS 43d DIV. ARTY.
Auth: C. G. 43d Div. Arty.	A. P. O. #43, c/o Postmaster
Init: EWB	San Francisco, California
Date: 11/25/44	25 November 1944

FIELD ORDER)
NUMBER 1.)

MAPS: PHILIPPINE Island, Small Scale — 1/1,000,000.
PHILIPPINE Island, Intermediate Scale — 1/250,000.
CENTRAL LUZON, Medium Scale — 1/50,000.
CENTRAL LUZON, Large Scale — 1/25,000.

1. a. See Intelligence Annex #2, to F.O. #1, Hq. 43d Inf. Div. C.S. and additional intelligence reports.

THE PREPARATION PHASE

- b. (1) The I Corps, reinforced, lands in the DAGUPAN-DAMORTIS Area with divisions abreast and establish a beachhead. It will establish and maintain contact with XIV Corps on its right, or West Flank and the 158th RCT on its left, or North Flank.
 - (2) 6th Infantry Division lands in the DAGUPAN-SAN FABIAN Area.
 - (3) 63d RCT (I Corps Reserve) lands on either WHITE or BLUE Beach (as directed by C.G., I Corps) on S+1 Day prepared to reinforce either the 6th or 43d Infantry Divisions.
 - (4) 157th RCT lands on S+2 Day at Beach WHITE ONE (1), establishing and securing a beachhead, and captures RABON.
 - (5) 43d Infantry Division, reinforced, will:
 - a. Land in the SAN FABIAN-RABON Area, establishing an initial beachhead and destroying hostile forces therein. (See Opn Ovly., Annex No. 1).
 - b. Protect the left (East) flank of the Sixth Army.
 - c. Expand the initial beachhead to the limit of the Army beachhead (See Opn. Ovly).
 - d. Establish and maintain contact with 6th Infantry Division on its right and 158th RCT on its left.
 - e. Be prepared to seize crossings of the AGNO River preparatory to continuing its advance to the SOUTH and EAST toward MANILA.
 - (6) S – Day – (To be announced).
H – Hour – (To be announced).
2. a. 43d Division Artillery, reinforced, (less C.T. elements initially).
Troops:
43d Division Artillery – Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker, Comdg.
Hq. & Hq. Btry., 43d Div. Arty.
181st F. A. Bn.
192d F. A. Bn.
4th F. A. Sound Ranging Plat.
Det., 671st Engr. Topo. Co.
- Attached AAA:
470th AAA AW Bn.
161st AAA Gun Bn. (Less Btrys. C. & D. and ½ Bn. Hq.).
1 Btry. (Less 1 Plat.), 222d SL Bn.
- b. The Division Artillery will:
 - (1) Land at Beaches WHITE TWO (2) & WHITE THREE (3).
 - (2) Furnish general support for establishment and defense of the division beachhead area.
 - (3) Be prepared to mass its fires on S – Day in the vicinity of HILL 200.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

- (4) Be prepared to resume control of light artillery battalions upon cessation of combat team condition.

3. *Organization for Combat:*

a. *Division Artillery Headquarters:*

Commands and coordinates fires of organic field artillery battalions; attached field artillery and anti-aircraft units, in establishment and defense of WHITE BEACHHEAD.

Section Organization:

- (1) Normal Field Artillery Fire Direction.
- (2) Counterbattery intelligence center, until relieved by I Corps Artillery.
- (3) Anti-aircraft command group.

b. *Direct Support Battalions:*

- (1) *152d F. A. Bn.* Direct support 103d Infantry (attached 1200 S-12 at AITAPE).
Support attacks on HILL 200. Position zone of action 103d Inf. (See Ovly).
- (2) *169th F. A. Bn.* Direct support 169th Infantry (attached 1200 S-12 at AITAPE).
Support attacks on HILL 470 and HILL 355.
- (3) *103d F. A. Bn.* Direct support 172d Infantry (attached S-12 at AITAPE).
Position zone of action 172d Infantry.

c. *General Support Battalions:*

- (1) *192d F. A. Bn.* (Lands S Day) Missions:
Primary — General Support.
Secondary—Reinforce Fires 169th F. A. Bn.
Position Zone 169th RCT.
- (2) *181st F. A. Bn.* Bn. (-1 Btry.) S Day, 1 Btry. S+2 Day.
Missions: Primary — General support.
Secondary — Reinforce Fires 152d F. A. Bn.
It will be prepared to revert to control I Corps.
Position zone 103d RCT.

d. *Counterbattery Battalions:*

192d and 181st F. A. Bns. initially, in addition to above missions, will be prepared to execute counterbattery missions and long range interdiction fires until I Corps assumes responsibility for these fires.

e. *Anti-aircraft:*

- (1) Bulk of A.A. to be placed initially for defense of WHITE BEACHHEAD and Liaison plane strips, (See Annex #3 AAA).
- (2) 161st AAA Gun Bn. (-2 Btries.) will be prepared for terrestrial fire missions.

THE PREPARATION PHASE

- f. *4th Sound Ranging Platoon:*
Assist in location of hostile batteries, and other targets and in adjustment of fire.
- g. *Det. 671st Engr. Topo. Co.:*
 - (1) Determine initial Grid Direction.
 - (2) Assist 4th Sound Ranging Platoon in establishing base.
- x. (1) Zone of operation, special missions and general position areas (See Ovly).
 - (2) *Positions:* Anti-aircraft units have priority on positions. All battery positions will be located so that fires may be massed in area HILL 200 (see Ovly). Battery positions will not obstruct landing beach dumps or exits therefrom.
 - (3) Division Artillery Check Point — CROSSROAD (247465 Approx.) (See Ovly).
 - (4) Registration will be vigorously conducted.
 - (5) Firing Chart: 1/25,000 Grid as established by 671st Topo. Co. Initially observed firing chart.
 - (6) Targets Designated by Photo Map. Coordinates will be restituted to grid firing chart.
 - (7) Initial landing strip for L-4H — vicinity of MABILAO (See Ovly).
 - (8) Local security against air, mechanized, seaborne or raiding attacks is a battalion responsibility. Fires will be coordinated with sector commanders.
 - (9) No Field Artillery anti-aircraft units will fire on air targets unless being directly attacked.

4. a. *Ammunition:*

- (1) Two units of fire will be maintained at battery positions. Re-supply from Division Ammunition Dump.
- (2) Battalions expending in excess of one unit of fire in a single day will notify this Headquarters without delay.

b. Other Administrative Details — no change.

5. a. Plan of Signal Communication — See Annex #2.

- b. Command Post 43d Division Artillery MABILAO opens 1200 S Day. Battalion Command Posts will be reported without delay.

BARKER

Berry

Annex #1 — Positions, Zones of Responsibility and Check Points.

Annex #2 — Signal Communication.

Annex #3 — Anti-aircraft.

Annex #4 — Schedule — Prearranged Fires.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

HQ & HQ BTY., 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

ROSTER OF OFFICERS

20 DEC. 1944

Commanding General	Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker
Executive Officer	Colonel Chester A. Files
S-1 & S-4	Major John R. Taylor, Jr.
Asst. S-1	1st Lt. Rudolph H. Schilling
S-2	Major Franklin E. Carpenter
Asst. S-2	1st Lt. Paul B. Lyle
S-3	Lt. Col. Edward W. Berry
Asst. S-3	Capt. Frederick C. Burnaby
Div. Air Officer	Capt. Robert D. Martz
Senior Aide	2d Lt. John H. Soellner
Junior Aide	2d Lt. William F. Straight
Surgeon	Major Lawrence M. Cutler
Chaplain	Capt. John J. Flynn
Chaplain	Capt. Barrett L. Tyler
Hq. Btry. C.O. (Com. O.)	Capt. Charles E. Remick
Asst. Com. O.	2d Lt. Glen H. Rosser
Motor Officer	WO (JG) Robert H. Alber
Liaison Pilot	1st Duncan H. Doolittle
Liaison Pilot	1st Lt. Elmer F. Mindedahl

ATTACHED OFFICERS

Captain William F. Ahern	Hq. Btry., I Corps.
1st Lt. F. Lyman Battle	671st Engr. Topo. Bn.
1st Lt. Erling G. Solberg	192d F. A. Bn.

THE AMPHIBIOUS PHASE

In the first week of January a second American amphibious assault force gathered east of Leyte, slipped through the Surigao Strait over the sunken wrecks of Japanese warships that had gone down in their attempt to turn aside the invasion more than two months before, and passed into the Mindanao and Sulu Seas. This American Force was steaming through the heart of the Philippine Archipelago and through waters where the Japanese Navy and Air Forces had for two years maintained unchallenged supremacy, to invade Luzon by effecting a landing in Lingayen Gulf, its classic point of greatest vulnerability.

En route to the objective area and after arriving there this force was covered by carrier and land based planes.

THE AMPHIBIOUS MOVEMENT

Nevertheless, the force was struck by severe air attacks which between 3 and 8 January sank three of our ships, inflicted major damage on fourteen and minor damage on thirteen others. Kamikazes accounted for twenty-seven of these. A Kamikaze that struck the bridge of the battleship *New Mexico* killed Rear Admiral Theodore Chandler, Lt. General Herbert Lumsden (British Army), war correspondent William Henry (Bill) Chickering, and wounded a number of others.⁴

On 9 January 1945 the U. S. Sixth Army (Gen. Krueger) initially composed of the I Corps, (Gen. I. P. Swift), (6th and 43d Infantry Divisions), and XIV Corps (Gen. O. W. Griswold), (37th and 40th Infantry Division), hit the beaches in Lingayen Gulf. By nightfall 68,000 troops were ashore and in control of a 15-mile beachhead, 6000 yards deep.

The landing had caught every major hostile combat unit in motion with the exception of the Japanese *23d Infantry Division*, (Lt. Gen. Nishivama), to the southeast of the beachhead in the central Luzon plain and its supporting *58th Independent Mixed Brigade*, (Maj. Gen. Sato), twenty-five miles to the north of Lingayen Gulf. General MacArthur's swift and deceptive moves, the action of Filipino guerrilla forces, and the effectiveness of Gen. Kenney's aircraft made it impossible for Yamashita to cope with his, by now, impossible situation. He was forced into a piecemeal commitment of his troops. The *10th* and *105th Divisions* from the Manila area, which were to secure Highway No. 5 on the eastern edge of the central Luzon plain, failed to arrive in time. The brunt of defending this withdrawal road in the north fell to the *2nd Japanese Armored Division* which seemingly should have been defending the road to Clark Field. In appreciation of the enemy's predicament, General Krueger immediately launched the Sixth Army's advance toward Manila across the bend of the Agno River,

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

which presumably should have been a strongly held Japanese defense line.

General MacArthur had deployed a strong portion of his assault force on his left or eastern flank to provide protection for the beachhead against the strong Japanese forces to the north and east.

I Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, and including the 43d Infantry Division, had heavy fighting on the east flank where the Japanese were strongly entrenched in hill positions. For the time being they were to be held there to secure the supply line for the advance on Manila.⁵

The Amphibious Phase included the landing of all units of the 43d Division Artillery in the vicinity of San Fabian on S Day, 9 January 1945, and their employment in that area.

With the Lingayen Gulf landing the 43d Division Artillery had taken part in four amphibious assaults. The Russell Islands and New Guinea landings were made without enemy opposition. Establishing beachheads in New Georgia and Luzon were made against Japanese resistance. Of all amphibious operations the landing at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon was the best planned and most efficiently executed. Copy of landing time table and route of Advance Division Artillery Message Centers to Initial Command Post follows:

HEADQUARTERS 43d DIVISION ARTILLERY
A. P. O. #43, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
20 December 1944

SUBJECT: Landing Time-table and Route of Advance Div. Arty.
Message Centers to Initial C.P.

TO

1. H+25 - W#1

Capt. Foster - 181st F. A.

Capt. Schwandt - 470th A. A.

Lt. Solberg - 192d F. A.

Lt. Goldsmith - 470th A. A.

Lt. Straight - Div. Arty.

Lt. Battle & 14 E.M.

These Officers and Men will proceed to route of Advance Div. Arty.
Message Centers and join Div. Arty. at Message Center.

THE AMPHIBIOUS MOVEMENT

2. H+40 – W#2. Gen. Barker's Free Boat – LCVR #3 with:

a. Lt. Col. Berry	Capt. Burnaby
Major Carpenter	Capt. Martz
Lt. Lyle	Lt. Soellner
	Capt. Remick

Enlisted Men:

M/Sgt. Bartlett	S/Sgt. Murphy	T/4 Conners
M/Sgt. Wahl	S/Sgt. Whitaker	T/5 Dewey
T/Sgt. Smith	Sgt. Becker	Pfc. Van
S/Sgt. Backus	T/4 Oefinger	Pvt. Neal
S/Sgt. Morrell	T/4 Hagerthy	

Agents:

S/Sgt. Elliott – 470th A. A.	Cpl. Drelicharz – 169th F. A.
Cpl. Verbanets – 181st F. A.	Cpl. Clifford – 152d F. A.
Cpl. Jones – 192d F. A.	Pvt. Swailes – 103d F. A.
From: 169th F. A. –	Maj. Rainey & 4 E.M.

b. 610 Radio – A.W. & Div. Arty. "D" Channel.

3. H+40. Advance Div. Arty. Message Center Setup:

a. Message Center will advance as situation allows along the road leading from beach at (148546) (100 yds. South of Coconut grove on shore in middle W2) to Highway 251, (700 yds.) at Road Junction (156544). It will then move North on Highway 251 to MABILAO.

b. Radio will set up Div. Arty. "D" Channel Net Control Station.

4. H+45. – Officers & E.M. of Par. 1 above will join at Div. Arty. Message Center.

5. H+50. 169th F. A. Lands W#2. 152d F. A. lands at W#3.

6. H+70. (On Call) – 192d F. A. lands W#2, 181st F. A. Lands at W#3.

7. After H+70. (On Call) 103d F. A. Lands W#1.

By command of Brigadier General BARKER
CHESTER A. FILES
Col., F. A.
Executive.

OFFICIAL: Edward W. Berry
EDWARD W. BERRY
Lt. Col., F. A.
S-3

THE SEIZURE OF THE BEACHHEAD

THE LINGAYEN GULF LANDING

The landings of the 43d Infantry Division at Lingayen Gulf were made on Beaches White One, Two and Three,

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

which extended in the order named from Alacon south to San Fabian. Initially there was no opposition, but shortly after landing 75mm and 30mm fire began to fall on the White Beaches. This hampered the unloading and made it necessary for some of the landing craft to pull back out of range into the Gulf. Sharp resistance was met on the left of the Division, where troops advancing north towards Rabon were stopped by heavy fire north of Mabilao. Pushing rapidly forward on the rest of its front, by the end of the day the Division had established a beachhead running from Mangaldan through San Jacinto and Binday to a point about a mile north of Mabilao — a front of about 8,000 yards with a dept of 8,000 yards.

THE DIVISION ARTILLERY

The Division Artillery Headquarters closed station aboard the *USS Cavalier* at 0830, 9 January, beached at approximately 1030 and opened station in the vicinity of the 43d Division C.P. at 1115. By 1345, two (2) Light Battalions, the 152d Field Artillery Battalion and the 169th Field Artillery Battalion, which landed simultaneously, reported that they were in position and would be ready to fire as soon as registration could be accomplished. Shortly thereafter the 103d Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) was likewise in position. The 192d Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer) landed during the afternoon of 9 January 1945 and by dark was in position. All landings were made under sporadic artillery and mortar fire. A few casualties and a small loss of equipment were sustained. Of the attached units, the 181st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer) (less one battery) started unloading late 10 January and was in position by 1030, 11 January. The remaining battery arrived at Lingayen Gulf in a later echelon and did not join its battalion until 1000, 17 January. All other attached

THE SEIZURE OF THE BEACHHEAD

units landed on 9 January and at least partial protection was available by 1800 against enemy aircraft. Artillery liaison planes of the organic artillery landed on 9 January but due to the necessity for preparing landing strips did not become available for use until the following day. Attachments during this phase of the operation were as follows:

	Attached	Relieved
181st F. A. Bn. (155mm Howitzer)	20 Nov. 1944	12 Feb. 1945
4th F. A. Sound Ranging Platoon	20 Nov. 1944	19 Jan. 1945
470th AAA AW Battalion	20 Nov. 1944	13 Feb. 1945
161st AAA Gun Bn. (90mm)	20 Nov. 1944	13 Feb. 1945
Btry. C, 222d SL Bn. (-1 platoon)	20 Nov. 1944	13 Feb. 1945
I Corps Liaison Section	25 Nov. 1944	31 Jan. 1945
147th F. A. Bn. (105mm Howitzer)	13 Jan. 1945	13 Feb. 1945
53d F. A. Bn. (105mm Howitzer)	20 Jan. 1945	30 Jan. 1945
90th F. A. Bn. (155mm Howitzer)	23 Jan. 1945	26 Jan. 1945

JAPANESE ARTILLERY

A conservative estimate indicates that approximately 150 enemy artillery pieces of calibers down to and including 75mm were in position to oppose the landing in the initial phase of the operation. These were generally distributed in the hill mass extending from north to southeast of the Bued River from Mt. Alava to Natangalan and in an area north and south of the Damortis-Rosario-Baguio road with the largest concentrations west of Rosario. As the operation progressed, many of these guns were knocked out by our artillery, others were overrun and captured by our infantry, and still others were withdrawn to the east. It is estimated that our counter-battery fire accounted for approximately 75 of these field pieces.

Counter-battery during the entire operation was handled through our Fire Direction Center. Some help in this department was furnished by the counter-battery section of I Corps.

Some idea as to the initial effect of the Japanese Artillery fire can be obtained from the following citations and awards.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

CITATIONS

SILVER STAR.

Posthumous Awards.

Sgt. John Cordeiro. (169th F. A. Bn.)

Pvt. Sylvester M. Beckman.

Act. For gallantry in action against the enemy 21 January 1945 at PALGUYOD, Luzon, P.I. On the morning of 21st January, Sgt. Cordeiro's Battery was in position at PALGUYOD and was being shelled by enemy artillery. His battery was given orders to fire counter-battery. Rather than expose his whole section to enemy fire he ordered them to their dugouts and he proceeded to fire counter-battery single handed, but in the act of loading his gun was killed by enemy artillery. His outstanding courage and devotion to duty were an inspiration to his men.

Pfc. Sylvester M. Beckman, a member of Sgt. Cordeiro's section, immediately and on his own volition, left the security of his fox-hole and went to the assistance of his chief of section. Disregarding enemy shells that were landing nearby, he picked up a projectile and was in the act of loading the gun when an enemy shell landed in his howitzer position, mortally wounding him. Pvt. Beckman's gallant courage and full devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest tradition of the Army.

By 13 January the initial Beachhead had been extended and the following Division order covering the general advance north and east to destroy all enemy artillery and to seize high ground dominating the beachhead was issued.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS, 43d INF. DIV.

Auth: Comgen, 43d Inf. Div.

A. P. O. 43, c/o Postmaster

Init:

San Francisco, California

Date: 13-1-45

13 January, 1945

FIELD ORDER)

NUMBER 2)

1. a. Elements of the Japanese *58th IMB* (Independent Mixed Brigade), estimated strength 5,000, are occupying defensive positions in the hill area South of the Damortis-Cataguintingan Road. About 3,000 men are in this area with an additional 2,000 in the vicinity of Rosario. The main defensive position is along the high ridge line (Hills 580, 585, 565 and 655). The ridge line 1000 yards inland and paralleling the coast is lightly held. 105mm artillery supporting the *58th IMB* is in positions North of Highway #3 to the East of Rosario, northeast of Cataguintingan, and East of Amlang. Heavy coast artillery pieces are located 600 yards East of Rabon, 1200 yards West of Cataguintingan, and Northeast of Damortis. Battalion and Regimental guns are within organized defensive positions throughout the area. Enemy forces will put up a stubborn defense, making full use of artillery and mortars in the area south of the

THE SEIZURE OF THE BEACHHEAD

Damortis-Rosario Road. When forced to withdraw, he will occupy prepared positions in the hills north of Damortis, Northeast of Amlang, on both sides of the Rosario-Pugo Road and on the Baguio Road North and Northeast of Camp One. Any counter-attacks will probably be organized North of Rosario and hit our lines from the East or Northeast.

- b. (1) 43d Infantry Division (reinf), as designated in Field Order No. 1, this headquarters, dated 25 Nov. 1944, is further reinforced as follows:

158th RCT
63d RCT (less 1 Bn.)
98th Cml. Bn. (1 Plat., A Co.)
atcd 169th RCT

(2) Elements of Sixth Army on our right have reached the Agno River Line.

2. 43d Infantry Division (reinf) will advance North and East, seeking out and destroying all enemy artillery, and seizing high ground dominating Beachhead.
3. a. (1) 158th RCT will seize and hold Damortis.
(2) Outpost high ground (152665) to (137663).
(3) Establish roadblock at Namonitan (132662).
(4) Move East on Damortis-Rosario Road searching out and destroying enemy artillery positions in this area.
(5) Be prepared to seize and hold high ground North of Damortis-Rosario Road between (132662) and (185640).
- b. (1) 63d RCT (less Bn.) will advance in its sector, destroying all enemy therein.
(2) Seize and hold that portion of the Damortis-Rosario Road in its sector.
(3) Be prepared to seize Rosario and high ground to North.
- c. (1) 172d RCT (less Bn.) will seize successively Hills 580 (205557), 585 (205570), and the ridge line running North to Cataguintingan (190632).
(2) Deny enemy access to the corridor formed by the Bued River.
(3) Establish close liaison with 63d RCT (-) on its left to coordinate assault on high ground so as not to endanger 63d RCT's right flank.
(4) Be prepared to assist in seizure and occupation of Rosario-Damortis Road and high ground to North.
- d. (1) 169th RCT will seize Hill 355 and Mt. Alava.
(2) Be prepared to employ 716th Tank Bn.
- e. (1) 103d RCT will destroy remaining enemy on Hill 200 (242432) and vicinity.
(2) Hold Manaoag, denying enemy access to road net and corridor in the Manaoag area.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

- (3) Outpost road net East of Manaoag and patrol aggressively to Urdaneta and Pozorrubio.
 - (4) Reconnoiter roads and bridges to Pozorrubio and North in direction of Rosario, selecting route for motor movement to Sison area (255570).
 - (5) Be prepared to move one battalion with elements of 43d Rcn. Trp. on 12-hour notice by motor to position East of Mt. Alava in area (265535) and to attack enemy rear in the hill mass 355 and Mt. Alava.
 - (6) Maintain contact with the Right Flank, 169th RCT, denying undetected movement of enemy strength into the Division Sector.
- f. 43d Div. Arty. will:
- (1) Be prepared to mass fires on Hill 355, Mt. Alava and Ridge Line, Hill 580 and North.
 - (2) Be prepared to displace appropriate strength to the support of the Damortis-Rosario Line.
 - (3) 192d F. A. Bn. furnishes direct support to 63d RCT (-).
- g. (1) 716th Tank Bn. will conduct necessary reconnaissance to assist 169th RCT in seizure of Hill 355.
- (2) Be prepared to move North in the Manaoag-Pozorrubio-Rosario Road to exploit possible enemy withdrawal from Mt. Alava area.
- h. (1) 118th Engr. Bn. will reconnoiter all roads in San Fabian-Damortis-Rosario-Pozorrubio-Manaoag road net by coordination with respective Combat Teams, and prepare plan for early improvement of roads and bridges to accommodate medium tanks.
- i. Naval gunfire Support within range and Air Support on request.
- x. The destruction of enemy artillery positions commanding Division Sector is the primary mission of all elements of this command.
4. No change.
5. a. Communications:
- (1) Increasing use of SCR 193 voice nets will be necessary. Security will be carefully observed.
 - (2) See SOI.
- b. Command Posts:
- 43d Infantry Division (reinf) - (145525).
158th RCT - Vicinity Damortis.
63d RCT - Initially (165565) advance to (190632).
172d RCT - Initially (180555) advance progressively
in sector to Rosario.
169th RCT - No change.
103d RCT - No change.

WING

MARLAND
G-3

THE SEIZURE OF THE BEACHHEAD

The 43d Division had encountered great difficulty in its assault on the enemy's main position on the high ground east of the Pozorrubio-Rosario Road, and north of the Rosario-Damortis Road. The enemy not only offered very stubborn resistance, but launched several violent counter-attacks, supported by tanks and artillery, against the Sison front. The Division repulsed all of them with heavy loss to the enemy and, having captured the Mt. Alava position on 21 January, continued to pound the main hostile position preparatory to launching a coordinated attack against it.

On 23 January our attack had progressed to such an extent that our Artillery Battalions were widely dispersed and it became necessary to organize a groupment for operation in the southern sector which extended generally from Cauringan to Binalong.

On 24 January the Division ordered a general attack for the purpose of securing the high ground east of the Pozorrubio-Rosario Road and north to the Damortis-Rosario Road. At this time, as will be noted in the foregoing, several artillery units were attached for this phase of the operation.

Following is the Division Artillery Order covering the attack of 24 January.

S E C R E T

Auth: CG 43d Div. Arty.

Init:

Date:

HEADQUARTERS 43d DIVISION ARTILLERY

A. P. O. 43, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
24 January 1945

F. O.

MAPS: LUZON - 1; 250,000
LUZON - 1; 50,000

1. a. See current intelligence annexes.
- b. The 43d Division attacks from its present positions at 250800 Jan. seizing high ground North of Rosario and East of Bued — Maloquial River. (See Ovlv).

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

- c. Counterbattery and reinforcing fires by I Corps Artillery.
 - 55th F. A. Bn. (155 H)
 - B Btry., 168th F. A. Bn. (155 G)
 - 90th F. A. Bn. (155 H)
- 2. 43d Division Artillery, reinforced by 147th, 53d, 181st F. A. Bns., supports the attack with preparation fires in vicinity of Rosario-Camp One. A 30 minute preparation from H-30 Minutes to H-Hour and during attack with mass of fires in zone of action supported troops.
- 3. a. *Files Groupment:*
 - Direct and general support of Starks Troops
 - (1) 152d F. A. Bn. Direct Support 103d Infantry
 - (2) 169th F. A. Bn. Direct Support 169th Infantry
 - (3) 181st F. A. Bn. General Support and reinforce 152 F. A.
 - (4) 90th F. A. Bn. Counterbattery and reinforcing call fires
 - (5) For positions (See Ovly)
- b. *Barker Groupment:*
 - (1) 53d F. A. Direct Support 63d Infantry
 - (2) 103d F. A. Direct Support 172d Infantry
 - (3) 147th F. A. Direct Support 158th Infantry
 - (4) 192d F. A. General Support
 - (5) For positions (See Ovly)
- x. Preparation Fires:
 - (1) Medium battalions will conduct observed fires on known targets in areas, (See Intelligence Ovly) H-20 Hours to H-30 minutes — not to exceed .2 units of fire.
Interdiction fires — Road net Camp One, UDIA O-Dongon and road net, CARUONAN 2269 — INABAAN 2168 — SAN LUIS 2368 Area.
 - (2) Light battalion will conduct registration throughout entire zone of advance by dark D-1 Day.
 - (3) Preparation — 30 minutes from H-30 to H-Hour.
Direct support battalions as arranged with Infantry. (See Ovly).
 - (4) Fires during attack. (See Ovly).
 - (5) Scheduled call fires, will not deliberately be interrupted by Air Raid Warning, Counterbattery or Infiltration.
 - (6) Rates of fires will not exceed — 3 rds per Min for 105 and 2 rds per Min for 155 How.
- 4. a. 2 units of fire will be in battery dumps by dark D-1 Day and a level of 1 unit maintained.

5. No change.
Berry

BARKER

THE SEIZURE OF THE BEACHHEAD

ITEMS OF INTEREST DURING THIS ATTACK PERIOD

JAPANESE INFILTRATION OF ARTILLERY POSITIONS

There were numerous attempts by the enemy to infiltrate into our battalion position areas, all of which were successfully repulsed. Casualties resulting from these attacks were 2 officers, 11 enlisted men. On one occasion only was any of our materiel put out of action by these attacks, namely, one (1) 155mm Howitzer of the 181st Field Artillery Battalion as the result of an attack made on its position on 0200, 21 January. The total number of Japs killed by the artillery in repelling these attacks was 127. All battalions employed aggressive tactics in patrolling areas in the vicinity of their positions. With the assistance of Division Engineers, positions were protected by barbed wire entanglements. The men of the artillery battalions, after some practice, became proficient in the erection of these entanglements. Howitzer positions in all cases were protected by parapets. The work required in preparation for positions was facilitated by the use of bulldozers.

ANOTHER FORM OF JAPANESE COUNTER-BATTERY

In the Pozorrubio Sector it was decided to move a battery of the 181st F. A. Battalion to a new position. The position was selected with great care and the work on the position was done prior to the movement. The Camouflage Platoon had the position well camouflaged and we used Filipino laborers to do the digging. The Battery moved in at night and registered the following morning. That afternoon a battery of Jap 155s went to work on it. The net result was it had to move back into the old position the next night. The day following a detail was going back to pick up some of the ammunition and discovered a Jap officer and a man with a radio, sitting in one of the gun positions. They had been conducting fire on our positions by means of the radio after

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

infiltrating into our territory. No wonder their fire had been accurate. Needless to say, no one in the detail waited to ask the Japs any questions. Two more Japs died "gloriously".

USE OF ARTILLERY LIAISON PLANES

The use of liaison planes throughout the operation was continuous and the accomplishment of air observers in the matter of reconnaissance and in the adjustment of fire was notable. It is estimated that approximately 90% of the fire delivered by the artillery was observed and of this fully one-half was accomplished by air observers, thus showing the tremendous importance of liaison planes for this work. While in the air no planes were lost as a result of enemy fire. Two (2) planes were destroyed by artillery fire while landing or on the ground. Three (3) planes were rendered unserviceable by crack-ups in taking off and landing. One plane of the 181st Field Artillery Battalion was lost by collision with another plane while in the air. The pilot and observer of this plane were killed. Other planes suffered minor injuries which were repaired by the ground crews. All planes which were lost were replaced within a few days by the Sixth Army. It was possible to construct landing strips as air forces moved forward which were readily accessible to battalions as well as to the Division Artillery Headquarters.

SURVEY CONTROL

Survey control was established by Corps within a few hours after landing and despite the extended distances, rapid movements and dispersal of units, was always available to the battalions. It was thus always possible to mass fire of battalions at any time desired.

ARTILLERY MOVEMENT

Although all battalions were equipped with low speed tractors as prime movers, much of the movement was accomplished by the use of trucks. This was due to the condition

THE SEIZURE OF THE BEACHHEAD

of the terrain and the rapidity with which movement was made. Also, to a certain extent, it was due to the fact that not all vehicles could be brought into the theater initially and trucks were favored at the expense of the tractors since they were more flexible in fulfilling the requirements of the battalions in movement as well as bringing forward supplies.

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE DURING THIS PERIOD

The following is a tabulation of ammunition expenditures by the Artillery of the 43d Division including attached units during this period (9 January 1945 to 14 February 1945):

105mm Howitzer Battalions:

	H. E.		Smoke	
103d F. A. Bn.	24 030		1 746	
152d F. A. Bn.	27 223		2 096	
169th F. A. Bn.	32 063		1 477	
53d F. A. Bn.	6 402		332	
147th F. A. Bn.	11 293	101 011	185	5 836
155mm Howitzer Battalions:				
192d F. A. Bn.	12 141		543	
181st F. A. Bn.	10 506		52	
90th F. A. Bn.	1 247	23 894	0	595
155mm Gun:				
Btry. B, 168th F. A. Bn.	317	317	14	14
		<u>125 222</u>		<u>6 445</u>
	Total H. E.			125 222
	Total Smoke			<u>6 445</u>
	Grand Total			131 667

The 43d Division, reinforced, had by 28 January secured the heights east of the Pozorrubio-Rosario Road and north of the Damortis-Rosario Road, thereby assuring the safety of the Army's beachhead base.

The situation of the Japanese troops confronting the 43d Division during this period is described by them as follows:

"From around the 11th January, American units attacked the positions of Lieutenant General Fukutaro Nishiyama's *23d Division*. The Japanese sought to cling to their defenses during the daytime, and to engage in hand-to-hand combat during the night; but they could not improve the over-all situation. After about 23d January, the positions of the *23d Division* were cut to pieces and surrounded."⁶

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

On 13 February, after twenty-six days of offensive action, the 43d Infantry Division had completed the seizure and mopping up of its objectives. The Sixth Army beachhead had been secured; the vast column of men and equipment comprising the Liberation Force had poured into the Lingayen Plain and the Central Plain, while the enemy's main strength had been driven to the North, its offensive gestures at no time seriously threatening the success of the invasion. Manila and its coveted harbor had been secured, and the once vital beaches at San Fabian and Alacan no longer were the lifeline to the Army.

The 43d Infantry Division had counted 7831 dead Japs during the first phase of the Luzon Campaign. Our losses totaled 593 killed and 1644 wounded. Enemy artillery pieces, captured or destroyed, totaled 126 of all calibers from 75mm to 300mm. Thousands of tons of supplies of all classes, uncounted ammunition dumps, and hundreds of vehicles of all types were overrun or destroyed during the operation.

The Division was ordered into reserve for rehabilitation and re-equipment on 13 February 1945, as the 33d Infantry Division landed at San Fabian and initiated relief. The 43d Div. Art. was relieved by the 33d Div. Art. commanded by Brig. Gen. A. G. Paxton. Command passed to the Commanding General, 33d Infantry Division, 1200, 15 February, and the 43d Infantry Division assembled near Santa Barbara to train replacements and reequip. Movement to the Santa Barbara area was completed 1200, 16 February.

The 43d Infantry Division was relieved from attachment to I Corps 0800, 17 February and passed to Sixth Army Reserve.

On 24 February, fourth anniversary of the Division's call to active duty, a simple, impressive ceremony was held at the San Fabian cemetery to honor those of the Division who had made the supreme sacrifice in the stiff fighting since 9 January. General Krueger, Commanding General,

THE STOTSSENBERG ACTION

Sixth Army, addressed those assembled, which included representation from all elements of the Division as well as units attached to the Division during the combat period. The Army Commander lauded the Division on its combat proficiency and spirit. Major General Swift, I Corps Commander, in his address expressed his gratitude for the Division's contribution to the successes of I Corps.

At the time the Division was assembled in the Santa Barbara area, battle and non-battle casualties had weakened the Division seriously. At this time the Division was short 215 officers and 3805 enlisted men. Replacements received during the period 23-26 February totaled 53 officers and 1853 enlisted men. In addition, 31 officers and 607 enlisted men, previously wounded, were returned to duty.

An extensive training program for the replacements to provide battle indoctrination was planned in detail. Complete reequipment and reconditioning of men and equipment were undertaken with dispatch.

However, bitter resistance by the Japs at Fort Stotsenberg necessitated a change in plans, and while replacements were still being distributed to infantry regiments the Division was ordered to relieve the 40th Infantry Division west of Fort Stotsenberg.⁷

THE STOTSSENBERG ACTION

Orders were received 25 February directing the 43d Infantry Division to relieve the 40th Infantry Division, heavily engaged in the hills west of Stotsenberg on or before 2 March. The Division moved by motor from assembly areas at Santa Barbara, Camiling and Guimba to positions in the vicinity of Bamban. Reconnaissance was initiated at once by all elements.

The 172d RCT closed Bamban 1430, 26 February and the 169th RCT, upon relief in the Tarlac-Port Sual sector, closed at Bamban 1200, 01 March, moving directly to front

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

line positions. The 103d RCT closed Mabalacat, near Bamban, 01700, 01 March in division reserve, not to be committed except with prior approval of Commanding General, XI Corps.

Enemy forces in this area consisted of the former garrison of Clark Field, known as the "*Ran Force*", composed of former Japanese air, army, navy, and air-borne troops, all now completely reorganized as infantry.

This force, totaling 12,000 men, had abandoned Clark Field when it was attacked by elements of the 37th and 40th Infantry Divisions in early February and had withdrawn to the rugged hills north and west of Fort Stotsenberg. The crafty enemy had for many months been preparing cave positions and stocking them with the materials of war. Full advantage was taken by the enemy of every opportunity afforded by the difficult terrain. This force had but two choices: surrender or fight to the death from their fortresses. Maneuver or withdrawal meant starvation in the mountains. With few exceptions the defenders elected to fight to the death.⁸

THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

This command, less the 152d Field Artillery Battalion, effected the relief of the 40th Division Artillery in the Bamban-Fort Stotsenberg area on 2 March 1945, the 43d Division at this time being under the command of the XI Corps. Division Artillery Headquarters was established at Bamban. The positions vacated by the 40th Division Artillery were occupied only in part since the situation had changed to such an extent that more forward positions were needed. Corps Artillery available, in the support of the operation, consisted of the 150th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer), 983d Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Gun), two (2) batteries of the 544th Field Artillery Battalion (240mm Howitzer), and Able Battery 518th AAA Battalion (90mm Gun).

THE STOTSSENBERG ACTION

The operation to a large degree developed into two separate actions, the 172d Infantry supported by the 103d Field Artillery Battalion in the North, or Bamban area, and the 169th Infantry supported by the 169th Field Artillery Battalion in the South, or Fort Stotsenberg area. Since the 150th Field Artillery Battalion was already in position to reinforce fires of the 169th Field Artillery Battalion, the 192d Field Artillery Battalion was disposed to reinforce the fires of the 103d Field Artillery Battalion. The enemy was firmly dug in and much of the fire was of necessity directed against point targets. Battery A, 518th AAA Battalion (90mm Gun) was employed aggressively by moving into positions where targets could be taken under direct fire. The results were excellent and proved beyond question the worth of this type of artillery for this purpose.

The north, or Bamban sector, proved less difficult to reduce than the south, or Fort Stotsenberg, sector; therefore, when on 5 March 1945 one battalion of Field Artillery was required for another mission, the 192d Field Artillery Battalion, less one battery, with one battery of the 103d Field Artillery Battalion attached, was withdrawn from positions in the north sector.

The wide space which separated direct support battalions, with high hill masses intervening, made wire communications in this operation unusually difficult. Radio communication, however, worked very well.

The sector had been well covered by survey of the 40th Division Artillery so that it was only necessary for the Survey Officer of the Division Artillery to continue target area survey and this was readily accomplished. As previously, air liaison planes proved of distinct value. Two fields were maintained, one near Bamban which furnished facilities for all planes except those of the 169th Field Artillery Battalion, which used the other field at Fort Stotsenberg.

There is no record of any enemy artillery fire being

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

received during this period so attack of ground targets therefore received the entire attention of the artillery.

On 5 March enemy troop concentrations and supply dumps in the ravines southwest of Sugar Loaf Hill were heavily bombed with napalm and then strafed; this was followed immediately by a heavy artillery concentration in the same areas; later investigation proved that more than 600 Japs were killed by this combination attack.

On 6 March the enveloping forces had reached their forward assembly areas and a coordinated attack was launched, driving hard against the enemy's left flank. Advances were made on all fronts.

On 7 and 8 March the division exploited to the full the gains of the preceding days. The 1st Battalion, 172d Infantry, sweeping up the Malago River Valley west of Sugar Loaf Hill, overran extensive bivouac areas where fanatical resistance from sickly and poorly equipped enemy service troops was quickly eliminated. A total of 267 Japs was killed and patrols counted 590 additional dead Japs, the majority of which were believed to have been killed by the combination napalm-artillery attack of 5 March in this area. The 2d Battalion, 172d Infantry, established strong trail blocks on enemy escape routes west of High Peak. The 169th Infantry redispersed elements in its zone of action while continuing to attack Mullen Ridge against heavy mortar and machine gun fire as well as ground fire from 40mm AAA guns.

On 8 March the division, less the 169th RCT, was ordered to concentrate in the Taytay area, east of Manila, preparatory to relieving the 1st Cavalry Division in the Antipolo area with the mission of attacking the southern anchor of the formidable Shimbu Line. The 38th Infantry Division, 169th RCT attached in position, relieved the 43d Infantry Division in the Stotsenberg area.

Upon completion of relief 0915, 10 March by elements of the 38th Infantry Division, the division initiated move-

THE STOTSSENBERG ACTION

ment to the Taytay area, where the 103d RCT had by this time assembled.

Tactical command of the Fort Stotsenberg area passed from the Commanding General, 43d Infantry Division, to Commanding General 38th Infantry Division effective 1800, 10 March; simultaneously control of the 169th RCT, including the 169th F. A. Battalion, passed to Commanding General, 38th Infantry Division.

During the period 11-12 March, the division (less 169th RCT attached to 38th Infantry Division) continued its movement; all elements closed Taytay area at 0830, 12 March and preparations were made to complete relief of the 1st Cavalry Division on 13 March.

Although the greater part of the Division was engaged only ten days in the Stotsenberg area, a total of 1729 Japs was counted killed. Our losses were 70 killed and 193 wounded. Countless automatic weapons, vehicles and supply dumps had been overrun, and the wide envelopment of the enemy left flank had substantially disorganized his well planned defenses.⁹

When the Division was relieved on 12 March 1945, the 169th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the 169th Infantry Regiment and remained in position. The following is a tabulation of ammunition expenditures by the artillery of the 43d Division during this period.

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

	105mm How.	155mm How.	90mm Gun
<i>Organic:</i>			
103d Field Artillery Battalion	2 113		
169th Field Artillery Battalion	4 199		
192d Field Artillery Battalion		267	
<i>Attached and Supporting:</i>			
150th Field Artillery Battalion		2 492	
"A" Btry., 518th AAA Battalion			387
TOTAL	6 312	2 759	387

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

THE TURNING OF THE SHIMBU LINE

Leaving the 169th R. C. T. attached to the 38th Division in the Stotsenberg Area, the balance of the division relieved the 1st Cavalry Division in the Taytay area and on 12 March initiated the turning of the Shimbu Line which was not completed until 3 May 1945.

The zone of action of the 43d Infantry Division (less 169th RCT) upon relieving the 1st Cavalry Division 1500, 13 March included a front of 20,000 yards. The left zone was assigned to the 172d Infantry; the right to the 103d Infantry. The 43d Division Artillery relieved the artillery of the 1st Cavalry Division. Available initially for the operation were: 103d Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) in direct support of the 172d Infantry; 152d Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) in direct support of the 103d Infantry; and 192d Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer) which was in general support. The XI Corps Artillery Commander, Brig. Gen. George V. Keyser, continued to demonstrate his keen Artillery sense and spirit of co-operation and made available the following artillery for reinforcing the fires of this division.

544th F. A. Bn.	(240mm Howitzer)
757th F. A. Bn.	(155mm Gun)
465th F. A. Bn. (less C Btry.)	(8" Howitzer)
Detachment 289th F. A. Sound Ranging Bn.	

This artillery, however, remained under Corps control.

The campaign resolved itself into three phases, each consisting of a series of coordinated attacks with definite objectives.

The first phase, following the relief of the 1st Cavalry Division, called for launching coordinated attacks to envelop the left anchor of the Shimbu Line.

THE TURNING OF THE SHIMBU LINE

Following is the Division Artillery Order covering the attack of 14 March.

S E C R E T

Auth: CG, 43d Div. Arty.

Init:

Date: 12 March 1945

HEADQUARTERS 43d DIV. ARTY.

A. P. O. 43, c/o Postmaster

San Francisco, California

12 March 1945

ANNEX #3, to F. O. #8, 43d Infantry Division.

1. a. See Intelligence Annex to F. O. #8, Hq. 43d Inf. Div. c.s.
b. 43d Inf. Div. relieves the 1st Cavalry Div. and launches a coordinated attack 1408001, to seize and secure the commanding ground East and North of Morang Valley (See Overlay).
c. The XI Corps Artillery Group reinforces the fires of the 43d Div. Arty. and executes counterbattery.
2. The 43d Div. Arty. (less 169th F. A. Bn.) supports the attack with the mass of fires in the vicinity of Mount Tanauan – Bench Mark #23 (See Overlay).
3. a. 103d F. A. Bn. – Direct support of 172d Inf.
b. 152d F. A. Bn. – Direct support of 103d Inf.
c. 192d F. A. Bn. – Primary Mission: – General support
Secondary Mission: – Reinforce the fires of 152d F. A. Bn.
 - (1) For all positions – See Overlay.
 - (2) Firing chart – Grid Sheet 1/25,000.
 - (3) Div. Arty. Check Point – House on road East of ANTIPOLLO
Grid Coordinates: 04.444 – 64.458
 - (4) Target designation maps (other than Artillery Grid) Photo Map – Taytay – 1/15,000.
Battle Map – Luzon – 1/50,000 – Taytay & Antipolo Sheets.
 - (5) Combat Team conditions cease 1312001.
 - (6) From 1312001 to 1408001, all Battalions will execute normal artillery support of front line troops.
 - (7) Direct support Battalions will prepare fires for the attack, in conference with their supported Infantry. Fire plans will be submitted to this Hq. by 1316001. Plan of general support fires later.
4. a. One Unit of Fire will be maintained within the Battalions at all times.
b. Units expending in excess of one-half unit in any 24 hour period will notify this Headquarters without delay.
5. Command Post: 43d Infantry Division – Vicinity Taytay opens 1312001.
Command Post: 43d Division Artillery – Vicinity Cainta opens 1312001.

BERRY

BARKER

[171]

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Substantial gains were made in all zones on 14 March, as stubborn enemy strong points were engaged in force. Of unusual interest was the rapid 25 mile sweep of mechanized forces, penetrating behind the enemy's strongly fortified positions North and South of Teresa. During the next few days the 103d Infantry exploited its encirclement of the enemy main line, mopping up isolated resistance pockets, and seizing Teresa and the entire Antipolo-Maybancal road net.

During the period 14-17 March, the 172d Infantry made slow, bitterly contested advances of 600 - 1000 yards along critical ridge lines against the enemy, defending successive positions in depth.

Japanese medium artillery continued active against our rear areas during the period, firing long range missions into the suburbs of Manila, and harassing our road net and rear areas. This firing was confined largely to the hours of darkness when our counter-battery fire could be conducted only by sound and flash plots.

On 17 March, the 43d Reconnaissance Troop drove mechanized patrols East along the shore of Lagune De Bay. Artillery elements of the 152d F. A. Bn. displaced to Maybancal to support the action, and observed fire was brought on the enemy defenders at Tanay. Misled by our show of strength, the enemy destroyed his dumps of ammunition, fuel and rations in Tanay, and attempted evacuation. Of 200 Japs retreating to the North, few escaped the time fire of our artillery, directed by forward patrols of the reconnaissance troop.

The rapid advance of the 103d Infantry on the right (south) flank necessitated frequent movement of the 152d Field Artillery Battalion and corresponding displacement of the 192d Field Artillery Battalion in order to provide general support for the entire Division sector.

THE TURNING OF THE SHIMBU LINE

THE DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMAND POST

The Division Artillery took over the C. P. of the Artillery of the 1st Cavalry Division with complete wire net installed in the ruins of an old Spanish monastery at Cainta, Rizal Province. The thick walls of the monastery were still standing, although the roof was long gone. Up to this time the artillery C. P. of the 1st Cavalry had experienced no interference from Japanese artillery fires; the nearest shells had fallen in a cemetery located 500 yards on the flank.

Early in the morning of the 14 March Japanese artillery fire started to fall in the cemetery and then immediately shifted to the Artillery C. P. Direct hits were obtained resulting in the death of our Chaplain, Capt. Barrett L. Tyler, who was loved and respected by all. A direct hit was also made on the telephone switchboard, killing the operator, Tech. 5 Henry S. Longo, and severing all telephone communication. During the bombardment Chaplain, Capt. John J. Flynn, Capt. Robert D. Martz, the General's Aide, 1st. Lt. John H. Soellner, and Corp. Anthony A. Amato were wounded and evacuated. For gallantry displayed in this action Tech. 5 Vernon G. Davis was awarded the Silver Star. On 15 March the Division Artillery C. P. was changed to a location outside of Taytay, where it remained until 2 April.

By 17 March, because of the desperate and skillful defense by the enemy, the situation in the 172d Infantry zone of action was rapidly approaching a stalemate.

THE SECOND PHASE

The stalemate at Sugar Loaf was broken by the 172d Infantry making a wide envelopment of Mt. Camayuman as the 103d Infantry seized Mt. Tanauan and the Bosoboso River Valley on 20-21 March.

On the night of 20-21 March the enemy, realizing the threat caused by the 1st Bn., 172d Infantry pushing north into Mt. Camayuman, reorganized and attacked in battalion

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

strength against our positions on the slopes. Approximately 800 rounds of artillery fire from the supporting 103d Field Artillery Battalion completely broke up the attack, and our advance was resumed.

Also on 21 March, supported by extremely heavy artillery and mortar preparations, and assisted by elements of the 754th Tank Bn., the 103d Infantry made the final assault on Mt. Tanauan under a heavy smoke screen. Twelve heavy machine gun positions in rock caves were overrun, numerous light artillery pieces destroyed and 100 tons of assorted ammunition captured.

During the period 22-24 March, the 172d Infantry continued to exploit its envelopment of Mt. Camayuman, and by 25 March all opposition had been overcome on Mt. Yabang, Mt. Camayuman and Sugar Loaf.

During the period that the division, less the 169th RCT, had been attacking east of Antipolo, the 169th RCT, including the 169th F. A. Bn., had been continuing to attack, under control of the 38th Infantry Division, in the hills west of Stotsenberg. On 24 March the combat team was relieved from attachment to the 38th Infantry Division and, reverting to 43d Infantry Division control, assembled in the Santa Maria Bulacan area for reequipment and rehabilitation. The 169th met the same type of terrain and enemy action experienced by the Division while in the Stotsenberg area. In the twelve-day period the 169th RCT killed an additional 1081 Japs and seized the Corps objective, Mullen Ridge, against fanatical resistance.

After regrouping his strength on the captured hill masses of the Shimbu Line, the Commanding General, 43d Infantry Division, decided to take Hill 1200, and probe east on Laguna De Bay. Following intense air bombardment and artillery preparations, attacks were made on 29-30 March, northeast along the trails south of Hill 1200. In this action numerous enemy installations were overrun, and our forces consoli-

THE TURNING OF THE SHIMBU LINE

dated on Hill 1200. Mopping up continued through 1 April, with continued aggressiveness displayed by the enemy against this position for a considerable period.

THIRD PHASE

On 30 March, the division received orders to drive East on Laguna De Bay, cross the Jala Jala peninsula and seize the Santa Maria Valley, making contact with the 1st Cavalry Division advancing East along the south shore of Laguna De Bay. Regimental boundaries were again changed and the 103d Infantry was given the mission of seizing the Santa Maria Valley.

Following is the Division Artillery Order covering the initial phase of this mission.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 43d DIV. ARTY.

Auth: CG, 43d Div. Arty.

A. P. O. 43, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Init:

30-3-45

301900 March, 1945

FIELD ORDER)

NO9)

MAPS: LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS - 1/50,000.

1. a. See Intelligence Annex No. 2 To F. O. #9, Hq. 43d Inf. Div. c.s.
 - b. 43d Inf. Div., (less 169th RCT) will hold the New Boso-Boso - Maybancal line and attack Southeast, seizing SINILOAN and adjacent road net, denying enemy troop movement in that part of LAGUNA PROVINCE within its zone and establish contact with XIV Corps vicinity SANTA CRUZ (308280). It will deny enemy landings on the shore line of LAGUNA DE BAY from PILILLA to SANTA CRUZ.
2. 43d Division Artillery (less 169th F. A.) supports the division with defensive fires along the OPLR from NEW BOSOBOSO to TANAY and supports the attack on SINALOAN and SANTA CRUZ.
3. a. *103d F. A. Bn.* (Btry. C, 192d F. A. attached)
Mission direct support 172d Inf.
Position: See overlay. Occupy by 011800 I
 - b. *152d F. A. Bn.* (attached to 103d Inf.)

[175]

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

- c. *192 F. A. Bn.* (less Btry. C.)
 - Primary mission: General support
 - Secondary mission: Reinforce fires of the 152d
 - Positions: See overlay: Occupy and register by 131800I
- x. (1) For positions of zones of action and sectors, see overlay.
- (2) Firing Chart: 103 F. A. – grid sheet: 192d and 152d F. A. Initially observed fire chart. Convert to Corps grid by 031800L.
- (3) Division Artillery check point. Coordinates for observed fire chart. RJ 31.9-47.0. Accurate coordinates for grid chart later.
- (4) Target Designation. (other than arty. grid) Battle Map: LUZON –1/50,000. ANTIPOLLO, SANPLOK, TACLIGAN POINT, BINOLONAN, PANGIL AND LABAYAT sheets.
- (5) Direct support battalions will prepare fires for their missions in conference with their supported infantry. Fire plans will be submitted to this headquarters by 031200L.
Plan for General Support fires later.
- 4. a. 2 units of fire will be maintained within battalions at all times.
- b. Battalions expending in excess of 300 rounds 105mm or 100 rounds 155mm per battery during any 24-hour period will notify this headquarters without delay.
- 5. a. No voice radio, except liaison planes (held to minimum) in zone of action 103d RCT until line of departure had been crossed.
- b. *Command Posts:*
 - 43d Inf. Div. – vicinity MAYBANCAL opens 021200I.
 - 43d Div. Arty. – 500 yds West MAYBANCAL opens 021200I.
 - 103d RCT vicinity PILILIA opens 311200I.
 - 172d Inf. 1,000 yds West of PANTAY opens 11200I.

BARKER

BERRY

S-3

DISTRIBUTION "G"

Enemy garrisons in the Santa Maria and Sinaloa area were of unknown strength, but artillery observers noted considerable activity in the towns and along the road net.

General Wing decided to move quickly, and if possible secretly, into the mountain road across Jala Jala Peninsula before the enemy could defend it. The 2d Battalion 103d Infantry was relieved by the 172d Infantry and, with two batteries of the 152d F. A. Bn. attached, by rapid motor movement under cover of darkness, and screened by counter reconnaissance patrols of the Reconnaissance Troop, seized the

THE TURNING OF THE SHIMBU LINE

mountain pass at San Miguel without opposition. Motors were quietly withdrawn before daylight, while troops took up concealed positions astride the road and established elaborate observation posts to command the Santa Maria Valley six miles away.

By 1 April all elements of the 103d Infantry had been relieved and assembled in the vicinity of Maybancal.

Infantry elements of the combat team detrucked near San Miguel at 2200 03 April and advanced to arrive at forward assembly areas at 0200 04. Artillery moved to previously surveyed and cleared positions. Tanks assembled in defilade along the mountain pass, and engineers with bulldozers, bridge equipment and power tools took their assigned positions, prepared to move forward at daylight.

The 103d Combat Team attacked at 0300 04 April. Mabitac and the hills north of the town were taken with slight loss; Sinaloan fell similarly, and by dawn patrols had advanced North and seized Famy.

By 1200 04 the mission of seizing Santa Maria Valley had been accomplished. By mid-afternoon the regiment had consolidated armor, artillery, and attached mortars in the Mabitac, Sinaloan area, astride the last North-South highway on southern Luzon available to the enemy for the regrouping of his rapidly diminishing strength.

By the time the high ground east of Pililla had been occupied, a battery of AA, 90mm guns was made available together with a radar unit with the mission of supporting the attack in the vicinity of Santa Maria, Mabitac, Famy, Sinaloan and Pakil. It was thought that the radar would be able to pick up troop movements at night along the roads in that area whereupon fire could be brought to bear against the enemy. This attempt was not successful. It did happen, however, that the installation of this bayyert and radar was very opportune, since it was discovered that the enemy was

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

operating with boats on Laguna de Bay. In fact, another battery of AA guns (90mm) and a second radar were made available and occupied positions in the vicinity of Angono. With these two installations, practically the entire lake was under radar observation, and several enemy boats operating at night on the lake were fired on with excellent results. It would seem from this experience that this type of equipment would always be very effective against enemy night landings by small boats.

On 5 and 6 April motorized elements of the 103d Infantry in battalion strength, supported by a battery of artillery from the 152d F. A. Bn. and a platoon of tanks, drove south along the east shore of Laguna De Bay, seizing Pangil, Pakil and Paete against light opposition. At San Juan enemy anti-tank defenses were encountered but quickly overrun. Moderate resistance was encountered south of San Juan and at Lumban, where enemy forces, squeezed between the 1st Cavalry Division driving east on Pagsanjan and the 43d Division driving south on Pagsanjan, made desperate efforts to hold the highway.

Resistance was brushed aside while strength was thrown swiftly forward to seize the critical bridge over the deep gorge of the Pagsanjan River at Lumban. The bridge was seized initially by the 103d Combat Team Commander's reconnaissance party, including the artillery battalion commander (Lt. Col. Bradt) and their vehicle drivers. As enemy forces attempted to close on the bridge from the south, the artillery commander from the north end of the vital span directed his artillery into a pattern of close-up defense fires until resistance at Lumban was overcome, permitting leading rifle elements to move up.

The following citation covering the award of a Silver Star for gallantry in this bridge action to Lt. Col. Wilber E. Bradt gives further details.

THE TURNING OF THE SHIMBU LINE

CITATION

AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR (OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

Lieutenant Colonel WILBER E. BRADT (0-182711), Field Artillery, United States Army. For gallantry in action against the enemy at Lumban, Luzon, Philippine Islands on 5 April 1945. Colonel Bradt, driving his own light truck equipped with a radio, advanced at the head of a column for the purpose of directing artillery fire in support of a fast moving situation. Along with four other vehicles, he became separated from the rest of the column by a Jap road block. Two vehicles directly in front of his were fired upon and disabled, thus blocking his way. In spite of the great danger involved, Colonel Bradt courageously pushed forward through enemy fire in order to secure a vitally important bridge. Knowing that enemy troops occupied the opposite bank, he raced his vehicle to the opposite bank and with a handful of men established a bridgehead and secured the bridge. With his group now cut off from the rear, with no prospective reinforcements, Colonel Bradt vitally assisted in repelling an enemy counterattack. Immediately after, with his radio he contacted and directed his cub plane pilot to request assistance from friendly troops advancing near the town. Due to the superior enemy forces and the tactical situation, the troops were not in position to render immediate assistance. Colonel Bradt then directed his pilot to land on a nearby road and offer artillery support to the friendly troops. Artillery fire destroyed the enemy forces and allowed our troops to advance. While directing the artillery fire, Colonel Bradt was fired upon by snipers from the rear. During this entire period of several hours, Colonel Bradt remained calm and cool, and displayed outstanding traits of gallantry and utter disregard for danger and his own safety.

(AUTH: CO 311 Hq. 43d Inf. Div. dated 12 June 45)

Contact was established with the 1st Cavalry Division near Pagsanjan at 06 1300, thus consolidating the entire Sixth Army southern front, and forcing the enemy back into the hills to starve or perish of disease.

During the period 1-6 April the 172d Infantry continued to eliminate scattered opposition and stragglers in the new Boso Boso Hill 1200 area.

From 6 April to 30 April was a mopping-up period for the entire Division.

The 43d Infantry Division received a new mission on 30 April, and relief of the 172d Infantry was initiated by the 38th Infantry Division on 1 May. The Division was ordered to move to the Santa Maria, Bulacan area, fifty

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

miles to the north, prepared to attack and seize Ipo Dam. Mutual relief was effected between the divisions and the 112th Cavalry RCT. During the period 2 May - 6 May the Division reassembled in the Teresa-Antipolo area as elements were relieved by the 38th Infantry Division and the 112th Cavalry RCT and movement to the North was begun.¹⁰

PERTINENT ARTILLERY ITEMS

JAPANESE INFILTRATION OF ARTILLERY POSITIONS

Jap infiltration tactics continued throughout the entire Luzon Campaign and were counteracted by daylight artillery patrols and perimeter defense measures around all artillery installations.

INFILTRATION OF B BATTERY 103D F. A.

At 0300, 6 April an undetermined number of Japs infiltrated Baker Battery position from the north and north-east in the vicinity of Teresa, Rizal Province. This was a Jap Infantry raiding party and only grenades and demolition charges were used. Before they were driven off the following casualties resulted.

T/5 Wilbert E. Goldsby was killed in defense of the battery perimeter.

Capt. Philip A. Hoghaug and Lt. Robert J. Vilyus, who were wounded when a hand grenade was tossed into their shelter near the edge of the perimeter defense, were wounded and evacuated.

T/5 Elroy Farley, PFC Roy C. Sealey and PFC William E. Hillis were also wounded. Materiel damage was done to three ½ ton trucks.

INFILTRATION OF 192D FA. BN.

Enemy infiltration efforts continued almost daily, and it became evident that a well planned and concerted effort was being made to destroy our artillery. On the night of

THE TURNING OF THE SHIMBU LINE

the 18th January, Lt. Winget killed one Jap and probably wounded two others with grenades. On the same night Capt. Crary was fired on while patrolling his perimeter. He and his patrol engaged the enemy and killed two, but the total results were not known until the following morning when five dead, including one officer, were counted. This group had been armed with rifles, knee mortars, grenades and magnetic mines. The officer carried a sketch accurately showing the location of the 192d, 181st, 169th and 103d Field Artillery Battalions.

CITATION

SILVER STAR.

Posthumous Award.

Corp. Leo Null, F. A. (Battery A, 192d F. A. Bn.)

Act. On 18th January a young Filipino boy reported that a Japanese infiltration party was located near the battery Position. A patrol was formed and the boy led it to a heavy bamboo clump only two or three hundred yards away where the Japs were hiding. The patrol was fired on, and answered with small arms, hand grenades and bazookas. Corp. Leo Null crept in very close to the thicket and hurled a grenade into the enemy position. The explosion was effective and he pulled the pin on the second grenade and was poised to throw it when struck down by a rifle bullet. He fell, still holding the grenade and it exploded in his hand. Corp. Null died of wounds the following day. All of the Japs in the clump of bamboo were killed and thirteen dead were counted when the action was over, but it cost the battalion three (3) casualties (wounded) in addition to Corp. Null.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

In all operations, to give the maximum artillery support, the massing of artillery fires of all artillery units through a central Fire Direction Center had been habitual. In the Shimbu Line campaign, because of the extensive front held by the Division (over fifty miles) and the use of mechanized detachments for wide envelopments, to give proper artillery support it became necessary to attach battalions and even batteries to infantry units for special missions. This was done with excellent results and again proved that artillery units properly trained in the Army Ground Force Tests were able to function effectively under all conditions.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE INFANTRY

As in all combat operations the Division Artillery gave priority to the support of the Infantry during the LUZON Campaign.

The forward observers, liaison detachments and front line communications details performed in a conspicuous manner.

The following citations and list of personnel cover this subject in some detail.

CITATION

SILVER STAR.

Posthumous Award.

1st Lt. Hugh B. Miller, F. A.

Act. For gallantry in action against the enemy on 19 January 1945 in the vicinity of SISON, LUZON P.I. When the Infantry Battalion was being subjected to intense enemy artillery, mortar and rifle fire, Lt. Miller, in command of a forward observer section, contacted the fire direction center of his artillery battalion and requested fire to break up a strong Japanese counter-attack. When notified that friendly artillery fire was on the way, he left the security of his fox-hole in order to adjust the fire of his battalion. As he was adjusting artillery fire he was killed by enemy sniper fire. His great courage and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Army.

CITATION

SILVER STAR.

1st Lt. Dudley J. Goul, Jr., F. A.

Act. For gallantry in action against the enemy on 23 January 1945 at Hill 355, Luzon, P.I. To accomplish effective adjustments of artillery fire against the enemy, Lt. Goul left his fox-hole and moved to the edge of a ridge which was located outside the defense perimeter of friendly troops. With coolness and courage, without regard for his personal safety, he adjusted his fire and successfully destroyed two (2) enemy field pieces and one (1) machine gun. As he was beginning to adjust his fire on enemy mortar positions he received a face wound from enemy shrapnel.

List of some personnel who also distinguished themselves and received awards for this type of service during the LUZON Campaign.

Major Roger L. Averill
Capt. Norman H. Bennett
Capt. Frank W. Burns

THE TURNING OF THE SHIMBU LINE

Capt. Earl G. Johnson
Capt. Robert W. Patenge
1st Lt. John L. Bivenour KIA
1st Lt. Norbert J. Heidelberger KIA
1st Lt. Billy R. Mahaffay
1st Lt. Charles H. Schubert
2d Lt. Warren Mansfield KIA
Corp. John C. Mown KIA
Corp. Carroll Soucie.
(KIA - Killed in action.)

DIRECT FIRE AGAINST ENEMY POSITIONS

In the Shimbu Line sector the enemy made extensive use of caves and pillboxes, cleverly concealed and strongly defended. The Japanese made it a practice to emplace their artillery in caves. These guns were pushed forward to the entrance of the cave to fire and then winched back for concealment and protection. It was most difficult to locate these guns and equally so to destroy them by artillery fire. On several occasions a battery from the 192d F. A. Bn. (155mm howitzer) was taken to commanding positions near the front lines and effectively used direct laying in the reduction of Jap artillery in caves. This method of employment was also used against pillboxes and Japanese strong points.

USE OF CAPTURED JAPANESE ARTILLERY

There were many pieces of Japanese artillery captured during this operation, consisting of a variety of calibers that were of no use to us. Two of these weapons, after they had been repaired, proved of value and an addition to our equipment. One was the latest Japanese 75mm gun, Model 90, German type muzzle break, which was captured, with ammunition, and used extensively against enemy strong points and caves with direct laying. The other was the American 155mm gun, G.P.F., which the Japs had captured from us when the Philippines fell to them in 1942. After the first gun of this type was captured in the Antipolo sector, with ammunition, a thorough search was made for others

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

and finally, after digging them out of caves and by piecing parts together, three guns were made available and turned over to the 192d F. A. Bn. Lt. Col. Nichols then organized what was known as Dog Battery, under command of Lt. Bernard J. Vinyard of Battery A.

On 6 April ten Filipino guerrillas from Co. E, 2d Bn., General Service Troops, E. C. L. G. A., reported to the 192d F. A. Bn. to act as part of the gun crews of Dog Battery. As other guerrillas were assigned to the 192d Bn. they replaced our own members of the gun crews. This battery was tied into the Fire Direction Center of the 192d F. A. Bn. and was used regularly from then on. The high point of Dog Battery was the visit of General Joseph W. Stilwell on 16 June when a demonstration was fired for him. Several members of the gun crews had previously served under General Stilwell in the Filipino Scouts and a real reunion was held. General Stilwell was known for his ability to talk to the enlisted men and this occasion was one to be long remembered. When the 43d Division left Luzon Dog Battery was turned over to the 38th Division Artillery.

DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMAND POSTS

Some idea of the mobility required to properly command the artillery in the Shimbu Line operation can be obtained from the different locations occupied by the Division Artillery Headquarters, which follows.

- (1) CAINTA, Rizal Province, Luzon, Philippine I.
Date of arrival: 11 March 1945.
Date of departure: 15 March 1945.
- (2) TAYTAY, Rizal Province, Luzon, Philippine I.
Date of arrival: 15 March 1945.
Date of departure: 2 April 1945.
- (3) MAYBAMCAL. (near Morung), Luzon, Philippine I.
Date of arrival: 2 April 1945.
Date of departure: 22 April 1945.

THE TURNING OF THE SHIMBU LINE

- (4) Near ANTIPOLLO, Rizal Province, Luzon, Philippine I.
Date of arrival: 22 April 1945.
Date of departure: 15 March 1945.

S-2 SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, SHIMBU LINE OPERATION

HEADQUARTERS, 43d DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO #43, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
11 June 1945

S-2 SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

From: 12 Mar 1945

To : 2 May 1945

1. *Enemy situation at end of period:*

- a. Enemy organization within the Division front had been reduced to a series of disorganized groups of soldiers. Enemy patrols continued moderately active with a possible indication that an attempt was being made to execute a planned withdrawal protected by a light rear guard action.
- b. Artillery activity, which was heavy during the early part of the period, had dwindled away to occasional single rounds from light weapons of 70 – 75mm caliber.

2. *Enemy operations during the period:*

a. *General Summary:*

The beginning of the period found the enemy holding a line of defensive installations which anchored on Laguna De Bay on the south in the vicinity of Cardona and on the north at Norzgary. This series of fortifications and strong points was known as the SHIMBU LINE. The main defensive installations on the southern end of the line were defenses in depth, starting at the beginning of the hills just east of Taytay and extending east to a general north-south line passing just east of Antipolo in the approximate center of the zone of action of the 43d Infantry Division.

Enemy artillery, firing from cave positions north and east of Antipolo, was quite active during the first seven days of the period. After that time enemy fires decreased steadily until, by the end of the period, there was not a known active enemy gun.

b. *Operations of component elements:*

1. Special "Suicide Attack" demolition groups made several unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate through artillery battery perimeters. On one occasion such a party was supported by moderate knee-mortar fire.

2. In the latter stages of the period many MAKIPILIS were captured on the eastern shores of Laguna De Bay.

3. Enemy counter-battery fires were infrequent and inaccurate throughout this period. Weapons ranged in caliber from 70mm through 155 GPF (American Model 1917).

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

4. The enemy employed a limited number of eight-inch "Stabilized Spin" rocket projectiles with little effect.

3. *Miscellaneous:*

a. *Weather and Visibility:*

Good to fair throughout the period. Several heavy rain squalls were experienced but, in general, the weather was fair with few clouds, visibility limited by haze.

b. *Supplies and Equipment:*

Large quantities of all types of artillery and small arms ammunition were captured. Several enemy guns were captured intact. These included one model 90-75mm gun, two 70 mm Infantry Howitzers, one 3# American gun model 1906, two type 38-75mm guns and one 155mm gun M-1917.

(signed)

FRANKLIN E. CARPENTER

Major, F. A.

S-2 Division Artillery

ARTILLERY SURVEY

Artillery survey was quite arduous due to extensive distances but was nevertheless carried forward aggressively so that at no time was any of the artillery without Corps Survey Control.

LIAISON PLANES

Here again the liaison planes more than proved their worth and fully 50% of observed missions were conducted by them.

ENEMY ARTILLERY

Enemy artillery was much in evidence and approximately fifteen (15) enemy guns were reduced by our counter-battery.

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications, though difficult because of great distances, were surprisingly efficient. Wire lines were in use at all times and radios operated very efficiently.

The work of the communication personnel continued to be outstanding throughout the LUZON Campaign. An idea as to the morale of this personnel will be noted in the following citation and award.

THE IPO DAM OPERATION

CITATION

SILVER STAR.

Posthumous Award.

Corp. John J. Mown, F. A. (Battery B, 192d F. A. Bn.)

Act. On 17th January several forward observer parties were relieved according to schedule but Corp. John J. Mown, radio operator, who was due for relief, volunteered to remain at the front until the next relief arrived three or four days later. Late in the afternoon Corp. Mown was moving with the observer to an exposed position to adjust fire when a 77mm Japanese shell burst almost at his feet, killing him instantly. His devotion to duty and courage were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Army.

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

The following is a tabulation of ammunition expenditures by the artillery of the 43d Division and attached units during this period (12 March 1945 to 2 May 1945):

	H. E.		Smoke	
105mm Howitzer Battalions:				
103d F. A. Bn.	12 644		1 822	
152d F. A. Bn.	12 730	25 374	1 176	2 998
155mm Howitzer Battalion:				
192d F. A. Bn.	4 786	4 786	432	432
Captured Artillery:				
75mm Gun	332	332	0	0
155mm GPF	148	148	0	0
		30 640		3 430
Total H. E.		30 640		
Total Smoke		3 430		
Grand Total:		34 070		

The 43d Division Artillery was relieved by the artillery of the 112th Combat Team on 2 May 1945.

IPO DAM OPERATION

The duration of this operation was from 3 May 1945 to 30 June 1945.

On 29 April 1945 orders were received to move the 43d Infantry Division to the Santa Maria, Bulucan area, relieving containing forces in the sector, and seize Ipo Dam, initiating the attack 7 May.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Manila depended upon Ipo Dam for thirty per cent of its water supply. Underground conduits conveyed the water from Ipo to Novaliches Reservoir, and the enemy had closed the gates at the dam. The water supply at Manila grew critically short. The Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific directed that Ipo Dam be seized without delay, and that every effort be made to secure the facilities intact.

The 112th Cavalry Combat Team had been disposed generally along the line Hot Corner — San Jose — Norzagaray, containing the enemy in the Ipo Dam area for two months. The 169th RCT had been attached to the 112th Cavalry RCT, and had participated in costly reconnaissances in force against the well organized defenses north and south through Bigti.

Efforts to drive in enemy outposts had failed. The aggressiveness and accuracy of enemy artillery in this area was extraordinary. Substantial anti-aircraft defenses precluded the use of artillery liaison planes to search out enemy guns. Jap counter-battery technique was skillful and forceful. Any unusual activity by infantry or other elements west of Bigti brought immediate reaction from enemy artillery.

Local counter-attacks and patrol actions against our outposts were well organized and persistent. Patrols attempting to penetrate the enemy line north and south of Bigti were fruitless and costly. Although intense air and artillery bombardment was conducted for over thirty days against the defenses surrounding Ipo, all efforts to break the defense had failed.

On 3 May 1945 the 43d Infantry Division effected the relief of the "BALDY FORCE" in the area Muzon — San Jose — Hot Corners. The 169th RCT remained in position, having been a component of the "BALDY FORCE" (112th Cavalry Combat Team).

The 43d Division Artillery occupied positions in the vicinity of Hot Corners — San Jose, closing this area by

THE IPO DAM OPERATION

3 May. All movement to positions was made during hours of darkness from a staging area near Bocaue. Movement of each battalion was by battery echelon over a two-day period. Prior to 6 May, the date of attack, all battalions completed registration. These registrations were covered by simultaneous fire from the 169th Field Artillery Battalion and Corps Artillery units already in position. All supply was accomplished at night and battalions were allowed a maximum of five (5) vehicles for movement during the hours of daylight.

Supporting artillery of the Corps for this operation is listed as follows:

PHYFE GROUPMENT:

- 517th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Gun) Btrys. B & C
- 80th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How) Btrys. B & C
- 465th Field Artillery Battalion (8" How) Battery C

Attached to the Division Artillery were Batteries B & C of the 161st AAA 90mm Gun Battalion and also Battery D 198th AAA AW Battalion, 40mm.

The mission of the 43d Division was to capture the Ipo Dam, the surrounding terrain and the Metropolitan Road. The plan for accomplishing this mission involved three (3) phases: an encircling move from Norzagary northeast to a point north of Ipo Dam; a holding action in the Big "T" sector; and a push on the right flank and center, moving due north to seize the Ipo Dam.

The Northern Force was composed entirely of guerrillas (Marking's Fil-American YAY Regiment). The holding action in the Bigti Sector was to be made by the 169th Infantry and the main effort on the right flank was to be made by the 172d Infantry and the 103d Infantry from left to right.

By the night of 5 May all combat elements of the 43d Infantry Division had been concentrated for the attack.

The division attacked the night of 6 May, with regiments

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

of the main effort crossing the line of departure abreast at 2200. A fair moon after midnight assisted the advance and the 103d Infantry on the division right had gained 5000 yards by daybreak. The 172d Infantry in the center drove north from Hot Corner toward Fork Ridge.

By noon 7 May elements of the right battalion, 103d Infantry, had seized positions on Hill 1400, and were continuing north along the critical and dominating ridge line to occupy it completely before it could be reinforced. By nightfall our forces had overcome heavy resistance at the north end of Hill 1400, and other elements had passed on to seize Hill 1200, thus organizing the key features commanding the main route of advance of the division.

Throughout 7 May the balance of the 103d Infantry and 172d Infantry advanced steadily against scattered resistance, overrunning enemy outposts, and securing key terrain features along the route. Gains in all sectors averaged 8000 yards for the day.

The full weight of the 43d Division Artillery, powerfully reinforced, was thrown against targets revealed by aerial photo in the path of the advancing infantry.

The guerrillas of Marking's Regiment on the north advanced 9000 yards over extremely difficult terrain, encountering numerous enemy patrols and driving in outposts.

After 7 May our infantry made rapid progress on the right flank necessitating displacement of artillery to areas in the vicinity of Hot Corner and Big "T". Light battalions followed close behind their infantry over bulldozed roads. At this stage all movement was sharply curtailed due to a period of intense rain. Forward elements could be supplied only by tractor trains and several air drops by artillery liaison planes were also made. These drop missions were restricted to critical items such as medical supplies.

During the period 8-10 May, the 103d Infantry and the 172d Infantry continued to drive with all possible speed

THE IPO DAM OPERATION

toward their objectives. The 169th Infantry probed aggressively into the Bigti positions. In the earlier stages of this action the enemy held all commanding terrain and generally had excellent observation of our elements.

Enemy artillery during the period grew increasingly active. Whereas the complex cave positions had originally been designed to repel an attack from the west, the enemy redispensed some artillery elements in new cave positions to engage our forces to the south of Ipo. Difficulty in detecting enemy artillery positions prevented immediate silencing of the pieces; however, continued dive bomber attacks had sufficiently neutralized enemy anti-aircraft positions to permit our cub planes to fly over the greater part of the target area. As enemy guns were detected, division or corps artillery concentrations were massed on the target with great success. Initially the Japanese artillery was estimated as the equivalent of 2½ battalions. Calibers ranged from 75mm, 100mm and 150mm. Cub planes were our only practical means of spotting targets as our elements held no ground affording observation deep into enemy held terrain.

EMPLOYMENT OF JAPANESE ARTILLERY

In this operation the centralized control of the Japanese artillery was outstanding, maintained presumably by the *8th Field Artillery Regiment*. During the development phase, fire was massed on frontline troops while interdiction fire covered communications routes. At night a small volume of rather disconcerting, harassing fire of heavy caliber was scattered throughout the rear areas. Advancing infantry and points of observation received the bulk of the fire during the attack. Normally more than one gun at a time was fired at a time to confuse our counterbattery efforts. One very interesting item, which tends to prove the type of control maintained, is shown in a captured Field Order, com-

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

plete with position overlay, communications' plan and schedule of fires annexed.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

In close support of our Infantry every effort was made to employ effectively massed fire of Division and Corps Artillery. Fifty-two (52) such missions were fired. These fires were instrumental in the success of our infantry in securing several objectives practically without loss to themselves.

The 90mm AA gun proved to be an excellent weapon for use as field artillery. Both time and percussion fire were used extensively. One gun was emplaced for direct fire against the Chalk Cliff — Big "T" approaches to the Ipo Dam and the fire of this weapon was instrumental in the reduction of this natural strong point.

Considerable use was made of a captured type 90, 75mm gun as a direct fire weapon and of three (3) 155mm GPF guns recaptured from the Japs. These guns were manned by Filipino crews.

EFFECT OF ARTILLERY FIRE

Extract from Prisoner of War interrogation of Private Tetsuo Inouye, captured by 103d Infantry, 17 May 1945:
Par. 3g.

Artillery caused the loss of about one third of the Battalion. Because of the fear of an attack by infantry right after or during the artillery bombing the Japanese stayed out in the open and thus suffered casualties. They did not go into their caves when an artillery attack occurred. American artillery has been very accurate and whenever Japanese artillery opened up the Americans always returned with a terrific barrage. Many Jap guns were knocked out by counter-battery fire and the Japanese are very much afraid of American artillery.

On 15 May detailed plans were laid for an all-out coordinated attack on 17 May to seize the final objectives.

This attack on 17 May was preceded by the massing of fires by the Division and Corps Artillery, also a heavy napalm

THE IPO DAM OPERATION

strike. The 169th Infantry struck north and seized the Bigti Palisades. The 172d Infantry jumped northwest from Hill 815 and quickly seized Red Bank, dominating the Metropolitan Road. The 103d Infantry made decisive advances, securing the junction of the Angat-Ipo Rivers and blocking the evacuation route to the south.

Strength was advanced to the south end of Ipo Dam with its important hydraulic facilities, while guerrillas from Marking's Regiment fought through scattered resistance down the slope from Hill 803 to secure the north end of the dam. All installations were secured intact; the enemy had prepared the gate for demolition with hundreds of pounds of TNT, but he delayed too long in detonating his charges.

On 18 May the attack continued, the 169th Infantry and the 172d Infantry made contact north of Osboy Ridge, while elements drove 1000 yards north of the Metropolitan Road, and by nightfall the two key hill features had been seized, insuring the security of the Metropolitan Road for its entire length. When this road was secured a redeployment of artillery was effected to furnish defense fires and to expedite supply. Active patrolling was maintained in the area and much fire was directed against the enemy evacuation north along the Angot River.

On 19 May all enemy resistance in the Ipo Dam area had ceased.

During the period 20 May - 2 June mopping up continued in the countless caves and ravines that had been the Ipo defenses.¹¹

ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR MARKING'S REGIMENT (GUERRILLAS)

In many respects the artillery support of this Regiment, during the Ipo Dam Operation, was unique. In the first place, the only Americans attached to this force were a liaison officer and party, with two Forward Observers and their parties from the Division Artillery. Capt. Norman H.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Bennett was the liaison officer, Lts. Earl G. Johnson and William F. Straight the Forward Observers. The parties that accompanied these officers shared all the dangers and privations and made possible the success of this artillery group. The direct artillery support came from the 192d F. A. Battalion and the 169th F. A. Battalion.

After the attack of 7 May this force cut all contacts with the Division, except the radio of the Artillery Liaison party. Over this radio all calls for artillery fire were made direct to the 192d F. A. and reports of progress made to the Division. During the period from 7 May until 19 May Marking's force was on its own, carrying their own rations and ammunition. On 9 May they seized Mt. Kabuyao and continued towards the hills north of Ipo. On 12 May, supported by air and artillery, the guerrillas attacked and seized Four Cornered Hill, denying to the enemy this critical feature to which it might have withdrawn. On 14 May a radio report from the Field Artillery Forward Observer stated that the guerrillas had seized Hill 803, dominating Ipo Dam from the north. On 18 May the guerrillas from Marking's Regiment, after bloody hand-to-hand fighting in the mountains to the north, joined the 103d Infantry to secure the north end of the dam.

Col. Marcus Villa Augustine, C. O. of the 1st Guerrilla Battalion, advised Gen. Barker, after the operation was over, that his force had been surrounded and attacked by the Japanese several times and that the artillery defense fires had been the only thing that had saved them. Also, that the artillery supporting fires during their attacks on the Japanese strong points had enabled them to advance.

On 2 June orders were received extending the right boundary of the Division to include Mt. Oro and Mt. Ayaas in the Montalbam sector. The 169th Infantry RCT reinforced by the 192d Field Artillery Battalion (less one battery) moved to this area on 3 & 4 June and attacked Mt.

THE IPO DAM OPERATION

Oro and Mt. Ayaas on 6 June. The attack was preceded by a heavy artillery preparation. The fires of the 169th and 192d Field Artillery Battalions were supplemented by fires of the 517th Field Artillery Battalion at Hot Corners, the two (2) 90mm Batteries and Battery A 192d Field Artillery Battalion from the positions at Big "T". All objectives were secured by 10 June. Aggressive fire directed by cub planes followed enemy elements withdrawing north along the Tanog and Puray Rivers.

With the seizure of Mt. Oro, all missions in the zone of action of the division had been accomplished. During the period 12-25 June the annihilation of enemy stragglers was continued by combat patrols, when orders were received that commencing 26 June the 43d Infantry Division would move to rainy season camp in the vicinity of Cabanatuan.

Effective 01000 11 July, the division was relieved from all combat responsibility on Luzon.

ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION LUZON OPERATION, JULY 1, 1945

HQS. DIVISION ARTILLERY

C. G., Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker
Ex. O., Col. William B. McCormick
S-1 & S-4, Capt. Everett W. Robinson
Asst. S-1, 1st Lt. Rudolph H. Shilling
S-2, Maj. William B. Foster
Asst. S-2, Capt. Paul B. Lyle
S-3, Lt. Col. Waldo H. Fish, Jr.
Asst. S-3, Capt. Frederick C. Burnaby
Air Officer, Capt. D. Martz
Senior Aide, 1st Lt. William F. Straight
Junior Aide, 1st Lt. Bernard C. Bartholome
Surgeon, Capt. Delmar F. Parker
Dental Surgeon, Capt. Joseph Kislowitz
Chaplain, Capt. John J. Flynn
Chaplain, Capt. Johnson L. Griffin

HQS. BTRY. 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Co. Capt. Robert W. Gibbons (Comm. O.)
Asst. Co., 1st Lt. Glenn E. Rosser
Liaison Pilot, Capt. Ralph D. Newby
Liaison Pilot, 1st Lt. Elmer F. Mindedahl
Motor Off., W. O. (jr) Robert B. Alber

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

BATTALION STAFFS AND BATTERY COMMANDERS

103D F. A. BATTALION

Bn. C.O., Lt. Col. Walter J. Lampton
Ex. O. Maj. Albin C. Stevens
S-2, Capt. Charles E. Remick
S-3, Maj. Warren K. Covill
S-4, Capt. Charles L. Pollitt
Ln. O., Capt. Tilden B. Mason
Ln. O., Capt. Robert S. Pine
Ln. O. Capt. Robert W. Patenge
Surgeon, Capt. Harold I. Miller
Hq. Btry. Co., Capt. David M. Twachtman
Liaison Pilot, 1st Lt. Duncan Doolittle
Liaison Pilot, 1st Lt. Raymond C. Chapman
Service Btry., See S-4
Btry. A., Capt. Jay C. Young
Btry. B., Capt. George V. Taylor, Jr.
Btry. C., Capt. Johns H. Congdon II

152D F. A. BATTALION

Bn. C.O., Maj. Franklin E. Carpenter
Ex. O., Maj. Samuel F. Pearson
S-3, Maj. Roger L. Averill
Asst. S-3, Capt. Norman H. Bennett
S-2, Capt. Riner E. Deglow
Asst. S-2, 1st Lt. Loran E. Maples
Ln. O. Capt. Frank W. Burns
Ln. O., Capt. Robert S. Hussey
Ln. O., 1st Lt. Taliaferro Anderson
S-4, Capt. Wilbert D. Saylor
Surgeon, 1st Lt. Frederick W. Gissal
Hq. Btry, C.O., Capt. Gordon S. Hodges
Liaison Pilot, 1st Lt. John W. Wyne
Liaison Pilot, 1st Lt. Bernard W. Meadows
Service Btry., See S-4
Btry. A. Capt. John M. Ackerson, Jr.
Btry. B., Capt. Alvin A. Brooks
Btry. C., Capt. William C. McIntire

169TH F. A. BATTALION

Bn. C.O., Lt. Col. Robert W. Kenny
Ex. O., Maj. John R. Taylor, Jr.
S-3, Maj. Wilton H. Bremer
Asst. S-3, Capt. Theodore J. Zebrowski
S-2, Capt. Joe E. Gong
Ln. O., Capt. John R. Pavka
Ln. O., Capt. Francis A. McAuliffe
Ln. O., Capt. Robert I. Smith
Over Str., Capt. Edgar S. Downing

Division Artillery Staff



Lieutenant Colonel Waldo H. Fish, Jr. — S-3.



Major William N. Bailey.

Battalion Commanders



Lieutenant Colonel Rene L. DeBlois — 169th Field Artillery Battalion.



Lieutenant Colonel Stephen H. Nichols — 192nd Field Artillery Battalion.

Battalion Commanders



Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Kenny — 169th Field Artillery Battalion.



Lieutenant Colonel John S. Blair III — 192nd Field Artillery Battalion.

Battalion Commanders



Lieutenant Colonel Franklin E. Carpenter — 152nd Field Artillery Battalion



Lieutenant Colonel Walter J. Lampton — 103rd Field Artillery Battalion

THE IPO DAM OPERATION

Surgeon, Capt. Milton Mendlowitz
Hq. Btry. C.O., Capt. Ewart M. Blain
Liaison Pilot, 1st Lt. Raymond W. Leydon
Liaison Pilot, 1st Lt. MacDonald Lowe
Service Btry., Capt. Sidney D. Long, BC & S-4
Btry. A., Capt. Ernest Saul
Btry. B., Capt. Sidney P. Lanier
Btry. C., Capt. William H. Van Camp

192D F. A. BATTALION

Bn. C.O., Lt. Col. Steven L. Nichols
Ex. O., Lt. Col. John S. Blair III
S-3, Maj. Nathan M. Southwick, Jr.
Asst. S-3, Capt. William G. McIntire
S-2, Capt. George C. Witt
Asst. S-2, 1st Lt. William J. Walsh, Jr.
Liaison O., Capt. Thomas E. Crary
No. Pdy., Capt. William B. Craig
Surgeon, 1st Lt. Leonard F. Kowalski
Asst. Adj., W. O. (jr) Earl A. Taylor

HQ. BATTERY

C.O., Capt. Ernest C. Herbert
Asst. Com. O., 1st Lt. Warren Sleeper
F. O., 1st Lt. Earling J. Solberg
F. O., 1st Lt. Wilfred H. Houlahan
F. O., 1st Lt. Junior A. Federer
Liaison Pilot, Julian H. Marshall
Liaison Pilot, Thomas G. Hardie

SERVICE BATTERY

C.O. & S-4, Capt. Henry Drinkwater
Btry. A., Capt. Lawrence M. Higgins
Btry. B., Capt. Jackson W. Richards
Btry. C., Capt. Earl G. Johnson

The following Commendation was received by the 43d Division Artillery from the 43d Division Commander, Major General Leonard F. Wing, during the Luzon Campaign.

HEADQUARTERS 43d DIVISION ARTILLERY

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 43, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, Calif.
3 February 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : Officers and Enlisted Men of the 43d Division Artillery
and Attached Units.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

1. Herewith is a commendation of the 43d Division Artillery and its attached units by the Division Commander, Major General LEONARD F. WING, U. S. Army.

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : Commanding General and All Ranks, 43d Division Artillery, 43d Infantry Division, APO 43.

1. Since the opening of the Luzon Campaign this Division has been engaged in offensive operations against a well dug in, tenacious, and well equipped enemy. Within the zone of action of this Division, the enemy had a heavy preponderance of well-placed artillery which threatened to seriously interfere with the successful progress of the campaign. These positions were well supported by strong and extremely well prepared Japanese infantry defensive positions, presenting a major obstacle to our advance.

2. Day and night the Division Artillery and attached units have given constant support to the Infantry and other supporting branches, destroying innumerable enemy gun positions and neutralizing enemy infantry preparatory to assault by our Infantry. While accomplishing these results, you were subjected to constant enemy infiltration tactics in considerable strength as well as counter-battery fires. Frequently at night it was necessary for you to continue to fire support missions for the infantry while your own guns were under close-in enemy ground attack from organized infiltration groups in formidable numbers. Your aggressive conduct and unabated effort to support the Infantry constituted a superior performance in combat. The skill and ingenuity which you exercised in the accomplishment of your successful mission rank high in the annals of the fine traditions of the Artillery of this Division.

3. For superior performance in combat I commend all officers and men within the Division Artillery and those units attached to it.

s/Leonard F. Wing
t/LEONARD F. WING
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

2. In forwarding this well deserved commendation, I should like to add my praise to that of the Division Commander.

3. All officers and men, in all units, have performed their duties in an outstanding manner. The combined efforts of all have resulted in this commendation.

4. The very best of Field Artillery traditions have been maintained during this operation and I am personally proud to be identified with the 43d Division Artillery and its attached units.

H. R. Barker (signed)
H. R. BARKER
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Commanding

THE IPO DAM OPERATION

DISTRIBUTION

Hq.-Hq. Btry. 43d Div. Arty.	147th F. A. Bn.
Sound Ranging Plat, Btry. B, 289th Obsn. Bn.	152d F. A. Bn.
53d F. A. Bn.	168th F. A. Bn.
55th F. A. Bn.	169th F. A. Bn.
90th F. A. Bn.	181st F. A. Bn.
103d F. A. Bn.	192d F. A. Bn.

UNIT LEADERSHIP DURING THE LUZON CAMPAIGN

Although the following citation gives an idea of the type of leadership used by the Division Artillery Commander during the Luzon Campaign, let it be emphasized that it would have been to no avail if the same initiative had not been displayed by the Battalion and Battery Commanders. The results obtained were strictly a team effort.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

GENERAL ORDERS) APO 500
: 30 August 1945

EXTRACT

NO142)

II. LEGION OF MERIT - OAK-LEAF CLUSTER. By direction of the President, in addition to the Legion of Merit awarded Brigadier General Harold R. Barker, 0148571, United States Army, by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, as published in General Orders 234, 6 September 1943, a Bronze Oak-Leaf Cluster is awarded to him by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved 20 July 1942 (Sec. III, Bulletin 40, WD, 1942), and Executive Order 9620, 29 October 1942 (Sec. I, Bulletin 54, WD, 1942). The citation is as follows:

Brigadier General HAROLD R. BARKER, 0148571, Field Artillery, United States Army. For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, from 1 March 1944 to 30 June 1945. As 43d Division Artillery Commander, General Barker established and personally supervised a vigorous program of preparatory field exercises in New Zealand and New Guinea, and in the initial landings on Luzon, led his reinforced units ashore to face enemy artillery of vastly superior strength. He swiftly and skillfully thrust his battalions into daring forward positions, always preceding his elements to seek the most advantageous and protected positions

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

for his troops, and throughout 173 days of continuous combat, relentlessly carried the fight to the enemy with all means at his command, suffering extremely light casualties and negligible losses of materiel. In order to augment the division's fire power, he assumed command of three battalions of Corps and Anti-aircraft artillery, and spent virtually all daylight hours in forward areas conferring with infantry commanders and improving gun positions. Through his outstanding tactical skill, brilliant leadership, and superior resourcefulness, General Barker made a distinct contribution to the successful operations of the 43d Division in the Luzon Campaign.

Address: 47 Slater Avenue,

Providence, Rhode Island.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,

Lieutenant General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ B. M. Fitch

B. M. FITCH

Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Adjutant General.

SPECIAL REPORTS — CONCLUSIONS

I FROM REPORT OF LT. COL. J. S. ANDERSEN, OBE, RAA.,
"U. S. ARTILLERY IN LUZON"

The following items were selected from a detailed report made by Lt. Col. J. S. Andersen, OBE, RAA, an Australian Army Artillery Observer, attached to the 43d Division Artillery during the landing at Lingayen Gulf, Philippine Islands, 9 January 1945.

GENERAL

"The fighting by this Division was the most bitter but possibly the least spectacular. The Japanese defenses were well organized and all sound. He used his artillery as machine guns and digging them out was difficult.

FIELD ARTILLERY

"The Comd. Div. Arty. (hereafter CDR) planned to centralize control as early as possible on S Day and, to effect this, landed personally at H + 33.

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

SYSTEM OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

"Initially no Division attack took place. Lt. Arty. Bns. being decentralized to Infantry Regts., planned directly with them. Division control was therefore confined to harassing and counter-battery fire. The Arty. was widespread, and the CDA exercised command by personal daily visits to all units.

"After the first fortnight Arty. had become so dispersed that CDA formed a group Hq. in the eastern sector with the Div. Arty. Executive in Command. (Col. Files)

"Div. Arty. planes were used to great advantage by CDA to reconnoiter and to get around the area. It is also of interest that every time a cub plane took the air enemy shelling ceased. Cubs night flying produced the same results."

TACTICAL HANDLING AND MOVEMENT

"In all cases, artillery was handled aggressively. In the advance it was brought up to within 2000 yards of the front line.

"The difficulties inherent in bypassing a strong point were exemplified, on several occasions, when units found themselves required to support an attack moving, say East, and later an attack moving West against the bypassed position.

"Individual commanders were very good and direction from CDA and Group Hq. formed in Eastern Sector left nothing to be desired in aggressiveness and hitting the enemy. These two commanders (Barker and Files) were imbued with "getting the guns forward."

Guns were always in position ready to give support and infantry were loud in their praises for both the quickness and accuracy of shooting.

"Movement was always deliberate, batteries being stepped up into positions in turn.

COUNTER-BATTERY

"Due to excellent information from guerrillas and civilian

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

population, who actually pinpointed guns, counter-battery results were excellent."

LOCAL PROTECTION

"From the artillery viewpoint local protection is one of the main features of the campaign. All battalions were subjected repeatedly to infiltration attacks by the Japanese. The battalion and battery are well served with small arms and all attacks were repelled, one gun only being destroyed. It is felt that considerable attention must be paid to this Jap activity and to our own counter measures. It is proposed to deal in detail with two attacks so that further attention will be given them.

"Two attacks against the 181st F. A. Bn., attached to the 43d Div. Arty., on nights 18-19 and 19-20 January produce a definite plan and sequence.

ATTACK NO. 1

ENEMY INTENTION

"From documents captured it was ascertained that a force of two Jap platoons with one Artillery Section of 1 officer, 6 men and one section Engineers — a total of approximately 200 Japs — was ordered on the 14 January to attack and destroy all artillery along the BINDAY-ST. FABIAN Road and the F. A. Bn. (not named) and then to carry out a general reconnaissance from St. Fabian north to Rabon. The attacks were to take place on the night 18-19. Maps carried showed the complete layout of the 181st F. A. Bn., less one battery which was moved the day before. The attack on C Battery was to take place between 0200 and 0400 hours. Personnel were to return to base on completion of the task and carried five days' rations.

ENEMY ARMS

"The enemy carried light and sub machine guns, mortars, rifles, grenades, flame throwers, magnetic mines, dynamite and a vast array of explosives.

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

RESULT OF ATTACK

"The only installation destroyed was a radar station. All other areas beat off the attacks. Six U. S. personnel were killed and 6 wounded. Two caterpillar tractors, two $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton vehicles and one $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck were destroyed.

"Enemy losses were 50 counted dead and presumably others wounded. (The Japs always carried off their wounded, if possible.) The dead included the Commander, a Major of Infantry, and his Adjutant.

TYPE OF COUNTRY

"The country in the immediate vicinity was flat rice paddies intersected with small brooks; there were slight terraces of a few feet rise. Roads were lined with trees forming at intervals open woods of coconut palms, bananas, small bamboo clumps and a very light secondary growth. In these woods there was fair visibility by day, closing to about 10 yards by starlight. Woods in the vicinity are shown on sketch, clear spaces are paddies with unobstructed observation.

MOON

"Moonset was at approximately 18 2200 hours and starlight was sufficient to illuminate only a few feet.

WARNING

"Prior to the attack on C Battery 181st F. A. Bn., another had been repulsed on the 192d F. A. Bn. on the previous night, and earlier on night 18-19. On the previous night they had observed a Filipino skulking around at 0200 hours and shot him. Immediate warning was received on the destruction and burning of the Radar Station 200 yards away.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

"The Jap party was first seen by the service battery proceeding northeast along the Angio Road in twos. When challenged, the leading Jap said "Me surrender" and started

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

to pull the pin out of a grenade. The sentry challenging and another post in the vicinity fired and killed three Japs. The remainder began to mill around and moved across the paddies to the East.

"A machine gun post (marked OPI) did not see the Japs until they were right on top of them and realizing the strength of the party (they saw 50) decided it was suicide to engage at that particular moment. Actually, a Jap pointed his rifle into the pit and said "Come out, Filipino", and moved off. As soon as the Jap party passed the MG post engaged.

"The Japs then advanced and made one attack on No. 1 gun but were stopped; they withdrew and kept up a desultory fire for approximately half an hour and then made another charge. This charge got them closer to the gun but they were forced to withdraw. In another half hour they made a two-pronged attack. The main one got to within 5 yards of the gun and using knee mortars they endeavored to pierce the defense. The other attack reached the vehicle park and magnetic mines were placed on two tracked tractors, two $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton vehicles and one $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton vehicle, destroying all five.

"During these attacks a post in OP2 engaged the Jap with a 50 cal. machine gun until all defending personnel were killed.

"Following the failure of their third attempt the Japs made off leaving 27 dead in the battery area.

DEFENSE EQUIPMENT

"Each battery has the following small arms:

- 4 50 Cal. MGs
- 2 30 Cal. MGs
- 15 TSMGs
- 8 Bazookas
- 1 2.36" ground projector for flares
- 1 Carbine discharger
- Carbines for every man not otherwise armed.
- Each prime mover has 1 50-Cal MG which can be removed.

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

ATTACK NO. 2

"A further attack was made on A Battery 181st F. A. Battalion. In this attack a definite formation was used, which is of interest.

ACTION BY ENEMY

"Enemy, strength approximately 80, attacked from North-east. Prisoner reported they were remnants of the previous raiding party which had been hiding from "flushing" patrols all day. They had come from Sison and their wounded had returned there. Attack was timed after moonset at 0305 hours.

"The enemy formed up in three definite lines.

- (a) Demolition parties carrying 9 kilogram explosives with a grenade of 1 second delay on top.
- (b) Ten yards in rear a line of MGs and grenade throwers.
- (c) 15 yards in rear a mortar line with mortars and two flame throwers. In addition, lines d and c carried demolitions.

"The front line advanced until pinned down, and then went to ground. The second line then engaged with MGs over the heads of the first line which endeavored to crawl forward; then followed a similar procedure with the third line.

"Prior to the attack the Jap placed a feint attack along the track to the North and kept up intermittent fire from that quarter throughout the engagement.

"Whilst the main attack was going on, two Japs rushed in from the East and placed a demolition charge on the left sight bracket of No. 2 gun and exploded the charge.

"The gun suffered. The left portion of the shield was blown 30' to the front, all elevating and traversing wheels disappeared. Sights were destroyed and the entire jacket peeled off.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

"At the time of the attack the battery was engaging a target; but No. 2 was out of action owing to some small defect; the other 3 guns were firing. The normal crew of No. 2 had been sent to Post 1 to reinforce it.

"The Japs were finally driven off leaving 25 dead in the Battery area.

CONCLUSION

"As a matter of record a policy was adopted of "no-movement by night, except in gun positions, and anything that moves is a Jap."

The Perimeter Defense Exercises conducted in New Guinea paid off time and time again during the Luzon Campaign.

II THE FILIPINO GUERRILLAS

Few people realize the important and vital part played by the Filipino Guerrillas in the retaking of the Philippines.

The function of the guerrillas was threefold: first, to organize in spite of continual persecution by the Japs who used ground troops, cavalry and planes. Secondly, to obtain information of the enemy, such as location and strength of units, troop movements, strong points, artillery positions, and also continually keeping the enemy on the alert. And finally, developing an organization of veterans, such as Marking's Regiment at Ipo Dam, who joined and coordinated with American forces in the defeat of the Japanese in Luzon.

From the fall of Corregidor in 1942 until the Lingayen Gulf landing in January 1945 continual contact was maintained with the Filipino guerrillas who supplied vital enemy information.

In planning the Luzon Campaign Capt. William A. Farrell of the 169th F. A. Bn., 43d Div. Arty. played a most important part, and the following citation covering the award of the Silver Star to this officer gives details of nearly two

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

months' hazardous service in enemy territory prior to the Lingayen landing.

After the landing of American forces in Luzon, Capt. Farrell continued to serve with Filipino troops and was promoted to the rank of Major in the Philippine Army. This service continued until the end of the Japanese resistance in June 1945 and resulted in an award of the Silver Star and the Legion of Merit, the citations of which follows:

FARRELL, WILLIAM A.	0411608	Capt.	F. A.
Headquarters Issuing Order	Order Number	Date of Orders	
	General Special		
6th Army APO 442	96	8 May 1945	

SILVER STAR

CITATION

For gallantry in action on Luzon, from 23 November 1944 to 13 January 1945. On 23 November Captain Farrell debarked from a submarine under cover of darkness at San Esteban. He immediately contacted the local guerilla leader who hid him from the enemy, provided him with guides and conducted him to the vicinity of Benquet. He coordinated intelligence activities of the guerillas on Luzon and dispatched special agents to obtain specific items of information which had been requested by General Headquarters, South West Pacific. Upon the arrival of our forces in Lingayen Gulf, Captain Farrell paddled a native canoe through enemy held waters to an American destroyer, then proceeded to the headquarters of the Sixth Army in Dagupan where he presented the current intelligence of enemy dispositions and operations on the northern flank of the invading force. Captain Farrell, by his skillful and courageous reconnaissance of a period of almost two months in Filipino territory, made a substantial contribution to the initial success of the liberation of the Philippine Islands.

RESTRICTED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

GENERAL ORDERS)

APO 500

:

30 July 1945

NO81)

Section

LEGION OF MERIT - Awards..... 1

1. LEGION OF MERIT. By direction of the President, under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved 20 July 1942 (Sec. III, Bulletin 40, WD, 1942), and Executive Order No. 9260, 59 October 1942

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

(Sec. I, Bulletin 54, WD, 1942), the Legion of Merit for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services during the period indicated is awarded by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, to the following-named officers:

Captain WILLIAM A. FARRELL, 0 411 608, F. A., United States Army, (Major, Philippine Army). January to June 1945.

Address: 637 Huntington Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island.
AG-PA 200.6

By command of General MacARTHUR.

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/B. M. Fitch
T/B. M. FITCH
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Adjutant General

CITATION FOR LEGION OF MERIT

Captain WILLIAM A. FARRELL, 0 411 608, United States Army, (Major, F. A., Philippine Army). For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services in Luzon, Philippine Islands, from January to June 1945. As Liaison Officer to the Sixth Army, and later as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Headquarters United States Army Forces in the Philippines, Northern Luzon, Captain Farrell aggressively and effectively solved a critical supply problem faced by the guerrilla forces. These numbered more than 20,000 troops, deployed over a wide area in North Luzon, many operating behind enemy lines. Utilizing land, water and air facilities and exploring every available source of supply, he succeeded in providing vital material and equipment to these forces, enabling them to carry out successful operations against a determined enemy. By his resourcefulness, extraordinary initiative and untiring devotion to duty, Captain Farrell solved a vital supply problem and his services proved invaluable to the success of guerilla activities in the Luzon Campaign.

Address: 637 Huntington Avenue
Providence, Rhode Island.

The record of this officer with the Filipino Guerrillas and Philippine Army, together with troop and artillery information of the Japs supplied during the entire Luzon Campaign and the envelopment attack of Marking's Guerrillas Regt. at Ipo Dam, gives some idea of the importance and vital part played by the Filipino guerrillas in the retaking of their country.

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

III AIR SECTION OPERATIONAL REPORT

OPERATIONS

Planes of the Division came ashore at approximately 1330 on S Day, mobile loaded on 2½ ton trucks. Prior to embarkation, tentative plans had been made for a common air strip in a rice paddy at MABILAO. On reconnaissance, it was found to have been badly churned by tanks and amphibious vehicles and could not be used. Consequently, a strip was found on beach White #2, and the Air Sections of the 103d and 169th Field Artillery Battalions began assembling planes in the afternoon. However, this position was severely shelled during the night and the planes were moved to a strip near PALOPAD. During the first day, 1st Lt. Duncan H. Doolittle of the Division Artillery, built a strip near ANGIO and the first plane was airborne the next day (S plus 1). By 12 January, eight (8) planes were flying from strips at PALOPAD, ANGIO, SAN FABIAN, and NATANGALAN: and by S plus 12, two more strips were in operation at RABON and POZORRUBIO.

During the operation, it was found that it was necessary to maintain surveillance in certain areas containing enemy artillery. Patrols were scheduled so that at least one plane was in each sector from dawn to dusk. The FILES Groupment handled patrols in the POZORRUBIO - SISSON - CAMP ONE area and the 103d and 192d Field Artillery Battalions' planes flew surveillance in the DAMORTIS - AGOO - ROSARIO sector. These patrol missions were especially valuable in that a great deal of the enemy's movements were at dawn and dusk. Many campfires were fired upon by the dawn patrol with good effect.

Due to the inability to luminate fields, only one night flight was made. A Division Artillery plane, piloted by 1st Lt. Elmer F. Mindedahl, with 1st Lt. Duncan H. Doolittle as observer, took off in total darkness to conduct a counter-

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

battery mission. Enemy firing ceased upon the appearance of the plane.

Several naval vessels, including a battleship, were fired by artillery planes. Rounds were easily identified, but due to the fact that the Navy fires a vertical sheaf rather than a horizontal sheaf, firing was not too effective. Several requests were made to the JASCO unit for permission to fire a single gun but this permission was not granted.

For the most part, enemy artillery would not fire while a liaison plane was in the air. This was particularly true when our troops were advancing over level terrain. However, when the Japanese withdrew to their heavily fortified positions in the Carabello Mts., it was difficult for aerial observation to spot them. 1st Lt. M. Huie, of the 181st Field Artillery Battalion, hovered over an enemy gun for two hours without seeing it. He could hear the muzzle blast and would send "on the way" to his unit, which was receiving the fire. The usual procedure, upon observing a camouflaged position, was to adjust white phosphorous smoke shells on the area to burn off the camouflage and then switch to H.E. Pilots reported the WP shells were much more effective on personnel than H.E. was. The enemy would remain in their pillboxes and covered foxholes during a time fire concentration but the burning phosphorus would cause them to scatter immediately. Time fire was placed on bivouac area with excellent effect, but the preponderance of fire was placed on enemy material.

During the first week of the campaign, approximately one ton of rations was dropped by L-4s to a battalion along the DAMORTIS - ROSARIO Road. Several leaflet drop missions were flown and it was found that a sufficient coverage of an area could be obtained by throwing the leaflets out by hand at an altitude of 500 feet above the terrain. Leaflets were dropped on MT. ALAVA, HILL 355, CAMP ONE, PUGO, and surrounding areas.

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Nearly every plane was fired upon by enemy small arms, but with little or no effect. Enemy ground fire was heaviest in the valley east of AGAT (coordinate 27-61). The only instance of the enemy employing high explosive anti-aircraft against Cubs was on 14 February. The pilot of the 103d Field Artillery plane reported that three bursts of flak were fired at him over the BAUGIO Road (30.5-66.5). He believed the fire to be at least 40mm. The fire was extremely accurate for altitude but far off in deflection. No damage was done to the aircraft. On 25 January, an enemy plane, believed to have been a ZERO, made two passes at a Cub but was easily evaded. This ZERO later strafed our strip at ANGIO with no effect.

On 1 March, planes were again flying combat missions from strips at BAMBAN and FORT STOTSENBERG. Due to the excellent high ground held by our troops, ground OPs eliminated much of the work of the Cubs. However, planes were used to maintain contact with the Infantry and surveillance missions were flown. The planes met no enemy fire during this operation.

On 13 March, air sections moved south and were based on forward strips at TAYTAY and PASIG. At night the planes returned to GRACE PARK Airfield in MANILA. As the Division attack progressed, strips were built at TANAY and MABITAC. Surveillance patrols were flown twice a day in the NEW BOSOBOSO - SANTA INEZ area and the SAMPLOK - SANTA MARIA - SANTA ADRES sector. Approximately fifty (50) air strikes were led by L4s in this area. The usual method was to adjust smoke on the target and then correct the dive bombers after their first pass. Contact was maintained through the Air Support Party's 608 on the ground. In the event artillery could not reach the target, the Cub would circle the target and lead the bombers in by description.

Concentrated anti-aircraft fire was first encountered in

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

the IPO DAM campaign. Fire ranged from small arms and machine gun to 20mm, 40mm, and 120mm. Most of the fire encountered was east and north of IPO DAM and along the METROPOLITAN ROAD. By experimentation, pilots soon learned where they could fly with relative safety. Due to the great amount of enemy artillery fire received by our troops, counter-battery patrols were flown from 0515 to 1930 daily. Patrol areas were generally divided by the ANGAT RIVER and the area north of the METROPOLITAN ROAD and south of the river under surveillance of both patrol planes.

Planes were constantly employed in dropping plasma, batteries, telephone wire, shoes, and small arms ammunition to the guerrillas and forward elements of our troops south of the IPO DAM. Two surrender leaflet drops were flown over areas north of the METROPOLITAN ROAD. Forward strips were built at SANTA MARIA and SAN VICENTE and planes which used them returned to GRACE PARK Airfield at night.

The average daily number of hours flown by Artillery Liaison Planes of the Division during the entire operation was twenty-four (24). Fifty-nine (59) per cent of all medium artillery missions were air observed and an average of sixteen (16) per cent was maintained by the light battalions.

COMMUNICATIONS

The artillery units of the Division had six (6) frequencies assigned to them for the campaign that could be utilized for air-ground communication. These channels consisted of:

Division Artillery Command Net.

Division Artillery Air Warning Net.

Four (4) Battalion "K" Channels.

These frequencies were employed in the following manner. Each battalion plane had the Division Artillery Air Warn-

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

ing channel and its Battalion "K" channel as its two frequencies. Division Artillery planes used the Air Warning net and the Division Artillery Command net. The 608 radios in the Battalion Fire Direction Centers also had the Air Warning channel. Through these channels, each plane could contact the FDC of any Battalion and could also reach any other aircraft. The Air Warning net was also used to flash air raid warnings to the airborne Cubs.

Artillery planes fired several missions utilizing Naval firepower. Sensings were sent direct to a JASCO unit on the beach, where they were converted to Naval procedure and relayed to the firing ship.

The 610 radios using the "whip type" antenna was very successful and there were no reported instances of interference due to mountainous or jungle terrain. Experiments were made using throat mikes but were not very successful. Many pilots favor the lip mike with the transmitting button on the control stick. It was found that batteries were good for eight (8) to ten (10) hours of continuous operation.

CASUALTIES

The air sections were evidently a high priority target, for the Japanese artillery threw everything they had at the Cub planes. The night of S Day, two sections on the beach were shelled by a 300mm gun. A mechanic of the 169th Field Artillery Battalion had a leg severed and later died of wounds. No damage was done to any aircraft. The following night the air sections of the 103d and 169th Field Artillery Battalions at PALOPAD were heavily shelled, approximately 40 - 50 rounds of 77mm landed in the area. There were no personnel casualties but both wings were destroyed on a plane assigned to the 169th Field Artillery Battalion and the fuselage of a plane of the 103d Field Artillery Battalion was completely demolished. The strip of the 181st Field Artillery Battalion in SAN FABIAN

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

was shelled on the night of 11 January. Although the aircraft were dug into revetments, a shell fragment pierced the fuel tank of an L4 and fire completely consumed the aircraft. On 1 February, the Cub strip at POZORRUBIO was shelled and the left wing of a plane assigned the 181st Field Artillery Battalion was riddled.

There was an air collision on 27 January between planes of the 103d and 181st Field Artillery Battalions. 1st Lt. Chapman, pilot of the 103d F. A. plane, reported: "I was firing at an altitude of 2800 feet and had just given a sensing when I felt a tremendous jolt on the left side of my plane and I dropped 1000 feet before I could regain control. I could see another plane beneath me in a flat spin." Lt. Chapman, who was alone in his plane, made a crash landing at the bomber strip near MANGALDAN. He immediately returned to his unit, where he took off in another plane on a search for the missing aircraft which had crashed into a ravine south of DONGON behind the enemy lines. No activity could be seen around it. 1st Lt. Braucci was the pilot and 1st Lt. Rowe was the observer of the missing aircraft.

Two aircraft assigned to the Division Artillery Headquarters Battery were lost through operational accidents. 1st Lt. Doolittle flipped a plane over on its back when he hit a mud puddle during a takeoff. 1st Lt. Mindedahl was caught up in a severe rain and wind storm and hit a telephone pole when he attempted to land in total darkness.

Total casualties were:

<i>Personnel</i>		<i>Aircraft</i>	
KIA	3	Lost through enemy action:	3
WIA	0	Lost through operational action:	3

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The observation planes were employed generally in accordance with the policies laid down by the Field Artillery School.

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The notable exception was with regard to flying over enemy territory. To have remained behind our lines and fired from there would have been a big waste of time and ammunition. Pilots generally flew a "U" pattern directly over the target. Much of the Intelligence gathered could not have been obtained had the planes operated solely in friendly territory.

It is believed that two L5 aircraft could be used to a great advantage in future operations. Due to their greater speed, range, and load capacity, many reconnaissance missions could be made with greater safety for the pilot and more information could be gathered. These planes should be assigned to Division Headquarters for the use of the Division Commander as he saw fit but could be called on by Division Artillery for missions not so suitable for L4s. Due to the fact that Artillery planes are in continual use for artillery missions, these two additional planes could be used to great advantage by Regimental Commanders, Engineers, and Reconnaissance Troops. Infantry commanders did not make enough use of the planes assigned to their combat teams in this campaign. It is true that due to operational losses, the remaining planes were in constant use for fire missions; but it is believed that the Infantry Commanders do not realize the potentialities of aerial observation as it applies to them. Here again, the L5s would relieve the Cubs of the reconnaissance flights which I feel we shall be called on in future operations. Engineer troops could make rapid and accurate surveys for roads, damaged bridges to be repaired, and malaria control parties would have much of their ground work eliminated. Artillery planes were called on for daily courier and transportation flights for higher headquarters. Although these are important and necessary functions of the aircraft, on several occasions artillery planes were tied up from other equally as important flights. The additional aircraft could readily take over this operation and not hamper the true artillery mission of the Cub.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

It is easily seen where the L5 would be far superior to the L4 in regards to drop missions.

It is recommended that effort be made to stop high-powered aircraft from flying low in areas where Cubs are operating tactically. On several occasions along the DAMORTIS-ROSARIO Road, Cubs, on a firing mission, spent the major portion of their time dodging playful P-38s. The pilots had enough to worry about with regard to enemy ground fire and this additional hazard seriously detracted from the early accomplishment of their missions.

In future operations it is recommended that not more than four (4) aircraft operate off the same strip. The more dispersion possible is what is most desired. Each battalion should have a forward strip from which planes would fly during daylight hours. Through past experiences, we feel planes must be taken to the rear at night, out of the range of enemy artillery fire. More attention should be given to passing on air-raid warnings to airborne aircraft and under no circumstances should observation planes be ordered to remain in the air while enemy aircraft are operating in the near vicinity.

IMPORTANCE OF ARTILLERY CUB PLANES

A Japanese prisoner was asked, "What American Plane do the Japanese fear the most?" He replied that it was a small low flying plane (Cub Plane), because every time it came near or over their lines they received heavy and accurate artillery fire.


IV SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED DURING LUZON CAMPAIGN

1. JAP USE OF ARTILLERY IN DEFENSE:


The Jap builds his defense around his artillery which is strongly and cleverly emplaced. He will fight to the finish




Amphibious Landing Operation, Lingayen Gulf, Philippines, 7 January 1945.
Landing Craft being loaded and lowered into sea.



Landing Craft circling transport, getting ready to line up for dash to shore.
Lingayen Gulf, Philippines, 7 Jan. 1945.



Pfc. Charles Lovett, with the 43rd Division, on Luzon, P. I., looks into the breech of a Japanese 12-inch gun captured in the hills near Rosario, Luzon.
2/6/45



Members of the 43rd Division looking over a Japanese 12-inch shell in the hills near Rosario, Luzon, P. I.
2/6/45



Group of Fijian Scouts commanded by New Zealand Officers on the Munda Trail, New Georgia, July 1943.




Jap prisoners, captured by troops of the 103rd Infantry Regiment, 43rd Division, near the Ipo Dam sector in Lingat, eat a meal of C-rations provided them by generous G.I.'s, guarding the Japs.

5/18/45



From an OP on Hill 600, artillery observers of 152nd F. A. Bn. direct fire on Mt. Tanauan, prior to attack and capture of this key peak by the 103rd Infantry, 43rd Division, Teresa, Rizal, Luzon, P. I. 3/19/45



Troops of Coy. 1, 3rd Bn. 103rd Inf. Regt. 43 Div. start the climb up Mt. Tanauan for the last attack before its capture from the enemy. Rizal, Luzon, P. I. 21 March 1945

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

to prevent the capture of his artillery. The strongest centers of resistance, when overcome, have almost invariably revealed many artillery pieces. Cave positions for artillery pieces have predominated in this operation.

2. CLOSE-IN DEFENSE OF ARTILLERY POSITIONS:

Experience during this campaign has shown that the Jap will use every means possible to infiltrate our positions and attempt destruction of our guns. Constant awareness of this threat is of primary importance, and all possible methods must be employed against it. Such methods have included local perimeters of defense using rifle men and automatic weapons; installations of concertina and barbed wire barriers; trip wire booby traps, mines, grenades and flares for warning and neutralization; regular active patrolling in the vicinity of the position areas. Active daylight patrols are of utmost importance. Attached guerrilla units were used to advantage in reinforcing these patrols. It has been clearly demonstrated that artillery cannot rely upon infantry or other troops for protection, but is definitely "on its own" in matters of defense and the coordination thereof with adjacent artillery units. This is brought into sharp focus by the fact that during the campaign *220 enemy troops have been killed and 21 captured by Division Artillery men in and around their position areas.* Single battalions have killed and captured up to one hundred three (103) enemy in direct contact. It has been likewise shown that rear areas are no less immune to Jap infiltration tactics and must constantly be on guard against them.

3. AA GUNS FOR TERRESTRIAL TARGETS:

These guns have been found very valuable in reinforcing fires of Division Artillery, using regular Field Artillery methods and tied in to our FDCs. Their range, speed and accuracy were outstanding. They are equally valuable for

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

direct fire on enemy caves, fortifications, etc., due to their great accuracy. 90mm guns should be carefully emplaced and well protected. 40mm AA can move into position, fire, and withdraw before fired upon by enemy artillery. The preparation of emplacements can best be accomplished by the use of engineer equipment. It has been found that such "hit and run" employment of 40mm guns requires emplacement at or near roads to insure a high degree of mobility.

Fires of the 90mm guns could be greatly enhanced by making available a quantity of the following ammunition: shell WP and Fuze M-48. During this operation supply of WP was not available; Fuze M-48 could be drawn only in limited quantity. The range limitation of the M-43 time fuze considerably restricted its use. Registration of these guns was hampered by the lack of WP. These registrations were time-consuming and required an abnormal expenditure of ammunition, especially in wooded areas.

Toward the end of the operation VT fuzes were made available. Excellent results were obtained on appropriate targets and our experiences with this type of fuze with the 90mm compare favorably with the results obtained with this fuze in other calibers.

4. AMMUNITION:

(a) *White Phosphorus:*

The value of WP as an incendiary and casualty producing agent, and its use in marking air strikes and targets had proved very high. It is recommended that a greater percentage of WP and colored smoke for marking be allotted.

(b) *VT Fuzes:*

This proximity fuze is designed to function automatically before impact so as to give air bursts at a height of approximately 25 yards over open terrain.

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

These problems hinge on the short arming time (2 to 3 seconds) from the muzzle, the appreciable percentage of early bursts, and the proximity functioning feature.

The following was done to overcome these problems:

1. The use of high angle fire by the Light Bns. This permitted the clearing of all masks and resulted in premature bursts having the same results as anti-aircraft fire over our own personnel.

2. Making provision for clearing aircraft, especially cub planes, from vicinity of trajectory.

3. After a few demonstrations with the use of VT fuzes, our own infantry were most enthusiastic about this effective fire.

The fuze VT (influence) was used for the first time in the latter half of this campaign with highly satisfactory results. Missions accomplished with great success by the use of this type of fuze included neutralization of enemy troops assembling or deploying in the open; pinning down of enemy in his holes; breaking up of attempted assault landings from inland waters; and the harassing and interdiction of enemy column on roads and trails. (Note: In several instances enemy dead have been found in foxholes and trenches, killed by this type of fire.) High angle fire using VT fuzes was most effective. VT fuzes were used on many of our night harassing fires.

4. The effect obtained with VT fuzes in the fire support of Marking's Regiment (Guerrillas) near the IPO Dam would have been only 1/10 as effective had we been forced to use the regular fuzes (time fuzes included). The VT fuze made it possible to drive the Japanese from their fox holes on top of the hill overlooking the Dam. This hill changed hands several times in the final fighting. Our Liaison Officers with the Guerrilla Regiment told us that the use of the VT fuze made

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

the Japs evacuate each time and they were then able to occupy the heights.

5. MASSING OF ARTILLERY FIRES:

Owing to a more integral deployment of infantry elements and the more central positioning and control of artillery, massing of artillery fires during the latter part of this campaign was the rule rather than the exception. This technique proved of highest value in providing maximum artillery support, not only affording tremendous fire power when and where needed, but the important element of surprise fire as well. These were enhanced by the massing of the fires of the artillery with Corps in conjunction with those of the Division brought about with the close cooperation and understanding of common problems between the Corps Artillery and the Division Artillery.

6. T.O.T. (TIME ON TARGET) DELIVERY OF FIRES:

A total of fifty-two TOT concentrations were fired during this phase. Normally, every weapon of the Corps Artillery group and Division Artillery was employed. In some cases, one or more direct support battalions were not required to fire as they were engaged with important missions elsewhere in the sector. The effectiveness of this surprise fire is clearly demonstrated by the fact that objectives covered prior to attack by this type of fire were secured by the infantry almost invariably without opposition and without loss to themselves. In the late phases of this operation TOT missions were fired on various draws known to be used as bivouac areas for Jap troops withdrawing from the IPO area. Inspections of these areas later by patrols revealed terrific destruction of supplies and personnel.

T.O.T. CONCENTRATIONS

These concentrations were based on the time of flight of the projectiles from all different calibers of the artillery in or attached to the Division Artillery. By careful figuring,

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

all artillery rounds landed, without warning, at the same time on the target. This surprise fire was extremely effective.

7. SEARCHLIGHT ILLUMINATION OF BATTLEFIELD:

Searchlight illumination of the zone of action (Artificial Moonlight) was employed for the first time in the experience of this division. Although the use of this medium was generally more advantageous to the infantry troops, the following observations are made with respect to its connection with artillery.

1. Forward Observation was improved.
2. Night displacement and occupation of positions were speeded up.
3. Wire crews, especially those forward parties, could work more rapidly and efficiently.
4. Although, when battery positions were given more light the gun crews could operate more speedily ; such illumination could have been advantageous to the enemy in his infiltration operations.

8. FORWARD AND AIR OBSERVATION:

Because of the abruptly undulating character of the terrain, static observation into corridors, draws, and valleys was extremely limited. The great preponderance of artillery observation was performed by forward observers with assault companies, liaison officers with battalions, and by air liaison pilots and air observers. These observation agencies made possible most of the effective direct support fires. The forward observers conducted, for the most part, close-in adjustments, direct support, and counterbattery, while air observers not only assisted in location of enemy guns and conduct of counterbattery, but proved invaluable in seeking out targets such as assembly areas, troop movements, supply and ammunition dumps. Constantly on surveillance flights, the liaison pilots made possible relentless searching out of the enemy wherever he went. In addition, these observers were of the greatest assistance in marking and orienting for air strikes.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

9. USE OF CUB PLANES FOR AERIAL FLIGHTS OF RECONNAISSANCE

The following citation gives an idea as to the extensive use of Artillery Planes for aerial reconnaissance. All Artillery unit Commanders, as well as Infantry Commanders, made continual use of these planes for reconnaissance.

EXTRACT

II. AWARD OF AIR MEDAL. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9158, 11 May 1942, (Bulletin 25, WD, 1942), as amended by Executive Order No. 9242-A, 11 September 1942, (Bulletin 49, WD, 1942), an Air Medal is awarded by the Commanding General, 43d Infantry Division to the following named officer:

Brigadier General HAROLD R. BARKER, (0148571), United States Army. For meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flights on Luzon, Philippine Islands during the period 9 January to 30 June 1945. During this time, General Barker participated in 73 combat missions, making extensive reconnaissance over enemy territory and being frequently subjected to enemy small arms fire. General Barker's ability in putting this reconnaissance to speedy and effective use was many times proven. The value of his firsthand knowledge was continually in evidence as shown by superior performance of artillery units under his command during the many phases of the Luzon Campaign. Without thought to the hazards involved, if a flight showed promise of producing information of value to his command, the accomplishment of that mission was always foremost. The outstanding application of his professional knowledge and the enthusiasm shown by General Barker in his constant efforts to keep informed of the situation are in keeping with the highest traditions of the service. Home address: Mrs. Beatrice W. Barker, (wife), 47 Slater Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WING:

C. P. ROBBINS,

OFFICIAL:

Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff

10. COORDINATION OF NAPALM (JELLIED GASOLINE FIREBOMBS), AIR SUPPORT AND ARTILLERY FIRE

The coordination of this close air support was both touchy and complex but it was so finely handled that artillery fire was never stopped longer than necessary for a strike to slip in, blast the target, and pull out.

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

11. ENEMY MORALE

Pvt. I Cl. Teizu Makino, rifleman, who was captured approximately 5 miles north of ANTI-POLO, 14 March 1945, had this to say about the morale of his unit:

"Due to the lack of friendly air support and because of intense artillery shelling the men are very discouraged and have come to believe that they are fighting a losing war."

An extract from the Army G-2 Report on enemy morale will give some idea of the effects of our artillery fire; "The story is told by 5 Jap prisoners who surrendered individually in the SISON area. They reported that their officers told them they could not be expected to undergo another night of artillery fire and advised them to go out individually and surrender."

HEADQUARTERS 43d INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 43

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER532

2 August 1945

12. MORALE

The morale of the personnel in the Division Artillery during the entire War was conspicuous. In spite of hardships, danger and enemy resistance, at no time was there any lack of initiative or enterprise. During combat the desire to serve in any capacity was always uppermost in their minds.

The following citations are excellent examples of this service and morale.

1. Engagement – M-I Operation, Luzon Campaign.
2. Name. Tec IV Raymond J. Adams.
3. Act. For heroic achievement in connection with military operations against the enemy in the vicinity of Palguyed, Luzon, P. I. on 8 February 1945. Sgt. Adams was assigned to the motor section and on duty at a machine gun position in an area severely shelled by the enemy. Overhearing a statement by the battalion surgeon that a litter and carriers were needed, Sgt. Adams immediately volunteered for the assignment. After morphine was administered to a seriously wounded man, Sgt. Adams and the carrying party proceeded with the wounded man to safety, many times being forced to hug the ground due to the enemy shells landing only a

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

few feet from their position. Sgt. Adams' extreme courage and performance beyond the call of duty were exemplary.

Mrs. Mary E. Adams (mother), 70 Union St., Pawtucket, R. I.

4. Award — Bronze Star Medal.

5. Pfc. Oscar L. Harpin, a member of the same machine gun detachment as Sgt. Adams, also volunteered as a member of carrying party and under the same hazardous conditions, showed extreme courage and performed beyond the call of duty. Home address, Mrs. Agnes Harpin (mother) 13 Baker St., West Warwick, R. I.

6. Award — Bronze Star Medal.

13. LACK OF ACCURATE MAPS

During the whole Pacific Campaign requests were made for certain photographs based upon Fort Sill ideas. This is a photo taken at 20,000 ft. with a K-9 camera. It gives a Photo Map of extreme accuracy at critical elevations (about 10,000 yds. by 10,000 yds.). It was not until mopping up operations around IPO Dam that such Photo Maps were available. These Maps with or without grids, would have simplified the work all through the Islands and in LUZON. The Photo Maps available were out as much as 2000 yds. in 10,000 yds. Identification of targets would have been much easier with these special photos. The lack of these photos was a definite handicap.

DIVISION ARTILLERY FIRES IN LUZON OPERATION

1. *Percentage of fire missions by size firing unit:*

<i>Firing Unit:</i>	103FA (105H)	152FA (105H)	169FA (105H)	192FA (155H)
Division Artillery	2.2	3.2	3.6	6
More than one Bn.	4.0	7.0	4.6	12
Battalion	5.9	6.0	6.6	7
Battery	87.9	83.8	85.2	73
Single gun or plat.	0	0	0	2
Total:	100%	100%	100%	100%

Missions For Weapons Captured From Japanese:

3 155mm GPF — 37 missions — 488 rounds.

1 Type 90, 75mm gun — 26 missions — 410 rounds.

Division Artillery and Corps Artillery TOT Missions:

52 missions — 2804 rounds of mixed caliber.

VT Fuze Fired:

105mm How. — 990 rounds.

155mm How. — 968 rounds.

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

2. *Percent of Fire Missions by Type Observation used:*

<i>Method:</i>	103FA (105H)	152FA (105H)	169FA (105H)	192FA (155H)
Unobserved	4.4	3.4	2.9	8.
*Air	14.9	20.8	11.9	59
Ground:				
a. F. O. Methods	79.5	73.5	84.2	30.4
b. Other types	1.2	2.3	1.0	2.6
Total:	100%	100%	100%	100%

*How many of these air adjustments were by AAF high performance aircraft? None.

3. *Percentage of Fire Missions by Type Mission:*

<i>Type:</i>	103FA (105H)	152FA (105H)	169FA (105H)	192FA (155H)
Neutralization	54.6	49.2	51.8	33.0
Destruction	4.1	0.	3.4	3.0
Counterbattery	8.5	6.8	2.4	24.0
Harass. & Interdict.	18.8	33.0	32.0	35.0
Smoke:				
a. For screening purpose	1.0	.9	.7	1.0
b. For incendiary effect.	1.1	1.2	.6	0.0
c. For ident. of rds.	11.9	8.9	9.6	1.0
Total:	100%	100%	100%	100%

4. *Percentage of Fire Missions by Method of Request:*

<i>Method:</i>	103FA (105H)	152FA (105H)	169FA (105H)	192FA (155H)
P rearranged	22.2	19.1	13.4	21
Target of Opportunity	77.8	80.9	86.6	79
Total:	100%	100%	100%	100%

5. *Percentage of Fire Missions by Angle of Fire:*

	103FA (105H)	152FA (105H)	169FA (105H)	192FA (155H)
High Angle	14.2	15.0	1.1	1.2
Low Angle	85.8	85.0	98.9	98.8
Total:	100%	100%	100%	100%

6. *Amount of Anti-Aircraft Artillery used to Reinforce Field Arty.*

Number of Batteries (90mm gun reinforcing)	- 2
Number of Radar Sets (detection of targets)	- 1
Number of Searchlights (battle field illumination)	- 10

7. How many times have Tank Destroyers been used to reinforce FA? How many companies? None.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

8. How many F. A. missions have been fired by Cannon Cos.?
How many companies?

103FA (105H)	152FA (105H)	169FA (105H)	192FA (155H)
0	200	22	0

By Command of Brigadier General BARKER
WILLIAM B. McCORMICK
Colonel, F. A.
Executive

OFFICIAL: W. H. Fish, Jr.
W. H. FISH, JR.
Lt. Co., F. A.
S-3

TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

THE SEIZURE OF THE BEACHHEAD:

105mm Howitzer:

103d Field Artillery Battalion	25 776	
152d Field Artillery Battalion	29 319	
169th Field Artillery Battalion	33 540	
53d Field Artillery Battalion	6 734	
147th Field Artillery Battalion	11 478	
Total		106 847

155mm Howitzer:

192d Field Artillery Battalion	12 684	
181st Field Artillery Battalion	10 358	
90th Field Artillery Battalion	1 247	
Total		24 489

155mm Gun:

168th Battery "B"	331	
Total		331
Grand Total		131 667

THE STOTSENBERG ACTION:

105mm Howitzer:

103d Field Artillery Battalion	2 113	
169th Field Artillery Battalion	4 119	
Total		6 312

155mm Howitzer:

192d Field Artillery Battalion	267	
150th Field Artillery Battalion	2 492	
Total		2 759

90mm Gun:

518th AAA Battalion	387	
Total		387
Grand Total		9 458

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

THE TURNING OF THE SHIMBU LINE:

<i>105mm Howitzer:</i>			
103d Field Artillery Battalion	14 466		
152d Field Artillery Battalion	13 906		
Total		28 372	
<i>155mm Howitzer:</i>			
192d Field Artillery Battalion	5 218		
Total		5 218	
<i>Captured Artillery:</i>			
75mm Gun	332		
155mm GPF	148		
Total		480	
Grand Total			34 070

IPO DAM OPERATION:

<i>105mm Howitzer:</i>			
103d Field Artillery Battalion	11 614		
152d Field Artillery Battalion	14 806		
169th Field Artillery Battalion	15 521		
Total		41 941	
<i>155mm Howitzer:</i>			
192d Field Artillery Battalion	9 649		
80th Field Artillery Battalion	3 126		
Total		12 775	
<i>155mm Gun:</i>			
517th Field Artillery Battalion	5 328		
Total		5 328	
<i>8" Howitzer:</i>			
465th Field Artillery Battalion	461		
Total		461	
<i>90mm Gun:</i>			
161st AAA Battalion	6 438		
Total		6 438	
<i>Captured Artillery:</i>			
75mm Gun	488		
155mm GPF	410		
Total		898	
Grand Total			67 841
TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR ALL OPERATIONS ON LUZON			243 036

V CONCLUSIONS

With the final victory, in the Ipo Dam area, the 43d Infantry Division could look back upon its accomplishments in the Luzon Campaign with pride. Throughout the campaign, since the landing on S Day, the Division had been

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

in continuous offensive combat. A total of 173 days had seen the seizure of the initial beachhead and the capture of the hills north of the Lingayen Plain; the destruction of the fanatical enemy defenders at Stotsenburg; the crushing of the left wing of the Shimbu Line; and finally, the seizure of Ipo Dam.

Our losses as compared to the enemy's losses during this operation were as follows:

ACTION	<i>Enemy</i>		<i>Friendly</i>			<i>Ratio of KIA</i>	
	<i>KIA</i>	<i>PW</i>	<i>KIA</i>	<i>WIA</i>	<i>MIA</i>	<i>Enemy</i>	<i>Friendly</i>
Seizure of the Beachhead	7831	44	593	1644	6	13	1
Stotsenburg Operation	1729	32	70	193	0	24	1
Turning the Shimbu Line	2844	64	130	443	1	22	1
Ipo Dam Operation	4062	368	172	708	4	23	1
Totals	16466	508	965	2988	11	17	1

Total enemy equipment captured or destroyed was as follows:

307 field pieces were captured along with hundreds of tons of ammunition,

201 mortars and machine guns,

586 rifles,

In addition to the above, military stores of all types were captured in abundance.¹²

TRIBUTE TO THOSE COMRADES WHO FELL ON LUZON

On Sunday, 24 June, representatives of all units of the 43d Infantry Division assembled at Manila Cemetery to pay final tribute to those comrades who had fallen on Luzon.

General Walter Krueger, Commanding the Sixth Army, joined in the tribute and spoke as follows:

"Members of the 43d Division: On February 24 we assembled at Santa Barbara in a memorial service to honor the gallant dead of the 43d Division. You had just completed securing the vital Pozorubbio-Rosario-Damortis area. That was a most difficult task but, thanks to your determination, skill and valor, the enemy in that area was crushed and the left wing of the Army secured.


"Since that time you have continued to fight bravely and skillfully, first in the hills of Fort Stotsenburg, then on the Antipolo front, and finally



Gen. Walter Krueger, CG, U. S. Sixth Army, meets regimental commanders and division staff members of the 43rd Infantry "Winged Victory" Division, following memorial services at the U. S. Armed Forces cemetery No. 2, Manila, P. I., for soldiers killed during the Luzon campaign. 6/24/45




Infantrymen at the U. S. Armed Forces cemetery No. 2, Manila, P. I., fire volleys in honor of the officers and men of the 43rd Infantry "Winged Victory" Division who were killed during the Luzon campaign. 6/24/45




Jap cave position for U. S. 155 G. P. F. captured from U. S. forces in 1941 and retaken in 1945 on Luzon.



Jap cave position of U. S. 155 GPF.



Brig. Gen.'s G. V. Keyser and H. R. Barker with recaptured U. S. 155 G. P. F.



105mm Howitzer in action.




Jap cave position for U. S. 155 G. P. F. captured from U. S. forces in 1941 and retaken in 1945 on Luzon.




Jap cave position of U. S. 155 GPF.




Brig. Gen's G. V. Keyser and H. R. Barker with recaptured U. S. 155 G. P. F.



105mm Howitzer in action.



Mt. Oro showing terrain in the area of the 2nd Bn., 169th Inf. Regt., 43rd Inf. "Winged Victors" Div., located in the vicinity of Puray River, Novales, Luzon, P. I., 13 June 1945.



Division Artillery, 43rd Infantry Division, Luzon, Oct. 1945.

REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS

in the capture of Ipo Dam; under the able leadership of your Division Commander, General Wing, you have routed the enemy wherever you have met him, brought victory to your arms, and glory to your organization. You may be justly proud of the record you have made.

"Again, however, you have lost many brave comrades. The white crosses and the Stars of David in this cemetery are mute evidence of the supreme sacrifice those comrades made. You feel their passing as a distinct personal loss. You remember them as your friends and close associates, and you recall vividly the things you did together and for each other. But don't forget, the rest of us, and the people at home, will remember the supreme devotion of these heroes who gave their all. Yes, those who lie beneath this ground will be remembered as long as men love freedom and human liberty; as long as men love justice and abhor wrong; as long as men would rather die than submit to oppression; as long as men will fight for the right to lead decent, happy lives without peril and fear. The example of your heroic dead should imbue us with renewed devotion and grim determination to keep on fighting for the things for which they died, until, with God's help, we have won final, decisive victory."

CABANATUAN

The Division closed in the new camp at Cabanatuan on 30 June. The installation was named "Camp La Croix" in honor of the late Sgt. Lawrence La Croix, 43d Signal Co., Providence, R. I., one of the first to be killed in the Luzon landing.

Rehabilitation and a broad recreational program were given high priority. A former airplane hangar was walled and roofed with grass to make the largest "grass shack" of record. This building housed Red Cross, Special Service, Information and Education activities and was equipped with ample stage for United Service Organization shows, including the popular *Oklahoma*. The concrete floor provided two basketball courts and the concrete apron of the building was laid out for a tennis court. It was estimated that 4,000 persons could be seated in the "shack" at a time.

By the middle of July the training of replacements became a matter of vital importance, as all fillers received were infantry trained only, and had to be converted to field artillery. At this time artillery service practice was resumed to retrain all specialists.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

The period 1 May - 15 Aug. 1945 brought about great changes in personnel policies. The "rotation" program and the "point" system made big inroads on artillery personnel. Many of the senior officers and experienced enlisted men became eligible and were sent back to the United States. All of this called for a reorganization in Division Artillery.

On 28 July Alert Plans for an operation against the Japanese Home Empire, in which the Division would participate, were received. Again a War Room, consisting of a separate building guarded 24 hours a day, was established for advance planning. This operation, known as *Operation Olympic*, in more ways than one had to be the "pay off". It called for the landing of the Sixth Army on the island of Kyushu, the southernmost of the Japanese insular homeland. The 43d Division, as one of three divisions of the XI Corps, (43d, 1st Cav., Americal) was to establish a beachhead in the Shibushi-Kurinomine-Kashiwabaruru area of Ariake Wan; attack vigorously to destroy hostile forces, and capture Shibushi and Shibushi airfield, be prepared to seize and secure the general line Aoki - Iwakawa - Takakuma - Kanoya, to rehabilitate and construct airfields, roads, and establish port, base and communication facilities within its beachhead.

Inserted is the Division Artillery Plan covering this operation (Olympic Operation), which fortunately never had to be used.

At about 2100 on 7 August, while many were attending movies throughout the camp, the programs were interrupted to announce that the Japanese Government had expressed a desire to accept terms laid down by the Potsdam Conference.

On 15 August, President Truman announced that Japan had accepted terms for surrender. Immediately a plan for a prompt, unopposed landing on the Japanese home islands went into effect. This was known as the "Blacklist Operation."

CHAPTER X

JAPAN AND CONCLUSION

On 7 September 1945, the 43d Division departed from Manila and arrived at Yokohama on 13 September, being among the first American divisions to land in the Tokyo area.

The Division Artillery, Hqs., 192d and 152d F. A. Bn., after landing at Yokohama were moved by vehicle to the Hara-Machida airfield in the vicinity of Atsugi, fifteen miles southwest of Tokyo. This also was the location of the Japanese Imperial Signal School. After a few days, to permit sufficient progress in Japanese military evacuation, the Division Artillery moved to Mutsugahara Airfield near Kumagaya, about forty-five miles from Tokyo. This installation had been a large Japanese air training center and was replete with hangars, shops, and barracks, which afforded admirable shelter and housing for the larger part of the Division.

Initially under combat team conditions, the 169th and 103d F. A. Bns. moved immediately to the occupation area headquarters at Kumagaya and were billeted in the hangars at the Kumagaya Military Airport.

Upon release from Combat Team conditions, Div. Arty. took over guard of the Main Camp and the town of Kumagaya, and an area bordered by Kumagaya - NW to Fukay - South to electric RR. and East to Kumagaya.

To be guarded — U. S. Military installations, Jap military installations after Jap inventories had been checked, stocks of food, fuel and clothing of any category and all com-

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

munications. No disorders were to be tolerated. Men had been trained in handling mobs and knew what to do.

Areas assigned:

103d F. A. Bn. – Town of Kumagaya

152d F. A. Bn. – Qm and Ord. Dumps

169th F. A. Bn. – Kumagaya Airfield Guard

192d F. A. Bn. – Glider strip and jeep patrol of total area and search for hidden or dispersed equipment.

Japan and the Japanese people were of great interest to all of the American soldiers. Tokyo and all the principal cities had been heavily bombed and were in very poor shape. The destruction and accuracy of this bombing were astounding. The Japanese people certainly earned the title of being the “best disciplined” people in the world. It was amazing how these fanatical people could be changed over night to be humble and to obey all of the provisions of their surrender. As an example, while moving from Yokohama to Hara-Machida at night, one of our trucks containing personnel ran off the road and severed an aviation gas pipeline, spraying the road with gasoline. The hot muffler of the truck ignited the gasoline and the vehicle was instantly enveloped in flames. Both Japanese men and women in the vicinity rushed to the aid of our men, pulled them from the trucks and bandaged their burns with strips of clothing. Ten days before they were our mortal enemies.

Although the Division had planned to spend the winter in Japan, the following instructions were received on 18 September 1945. “In approximately two weeks time all officers with a credit of 85 points or over, and all enlisted men with 70 points or over, will go back to the United States, in the 43d Division, to be demobilized.”

Orders were received to the effect that the 43d Infantry Division was to be relieved by the 97th Infantry Division.

By 5 October all units of the Division Artillery were relieved by elements of the 97th Infantry Division.

JAPAN AND CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

On 29 September the first of a convoy of troop ships left Yokohama with members of the Division and arrived in San Francisco 8 October 1945, exactly three years and eight days after the first ship had left on 1 October 1942.

On 7 October the Division Artillery, embarked on the *U. S. S. Grundy* APA 111, left Yokohama and arrived in San Francisco on 20 October and immediately moved to Camp Stoneman near Pittsburg, California. There, arrangements were made to send each man to the Army separation center nearest his home.

There is an Army saying that "an old soldier never dies, but simply fades away." The 43d Division Artillery did not die at Camp Stoneman, California, but simply faded away, to be ready when the next National Emergency requires its services.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

APPENDIX A

The 43d Infantry Division was the only American Division privileged to participate in the South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and the Philippines Campaigns, and continue on to the enemy homeland. The price paid by the men who served in the 43d Infantry Division during World War II to establish this record follows:

Killed in Action
1966
Wounded in Action
8637

Missing in Action
47
Total Casualties
10,650

(Note: From Report of Activities Army Ground Forces W. W. II. 10 Jan. 1946.)

APPENDIX B

THE ROLL OF HONOR

43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

Those who made the supreme sacrifice for their country.

43d DIV. ARTY. HQ. & HQ. BTRY.

Capt. Barrett L. Tyler
S/Sgt. Walter P. Casey
Corp. Willard Crabtree

Tec 5. Emile J. N. Labrecque
Tec 5. Armand J. Macedo
Tec 5. Henry S. Longo

103 F. A. Bn. 105 MMH

Capt. Elwood J. Euart
1st Lt. Dominic J. Braucci
Corp. James J. Carlone
Corp. Matthew A. Melone
Corp. Daniel L. Roberts

Tec 4. Charles L. Urban
Tec 5. Wilbert E. Goldsby
Pfc. Jerry Di Girolamo
Pfc. William A. Dulong
Pfc. Walter Gula

Pvt. Albert Silva

THE ROLL OF HONOR

152 F. A. Bn. 105 MMH

Capt. Harold A. Slager	Sgt. Marion C. Shaffer
1/Sgt. James D. Sturdivant	Corp. Isaac E. Clewley
Sgt. Frederick Blackburn	Pvt. Nicholas C. Cordell
Pvt. David Sweat, Jr.	

169 F. A. Bn. 105 MMH

1st Lt. N. J. Heidelberger	Sgt. John Cordeiro
1st Lt. Hugh B. Miller	Corp. Norbert F. McElroy
1st Lt. Earl M. Payne	Pfc. Sylvester M. Beckman
2nd Lt. Arthur F. Malone	Pfc. Warren A. Harvey
2nd Lt. Warren Mansfield	Pvt. La Verne M. Anderson
S/Sgt. Richard Gray	Pvt. Willard Chandler

192nd F. A. Bn. 155 MMH

Capt. George T. Fielding, II	Pfc. Angelo Copice
1st Lt. John L. Bivenour	Pfc. Stephen J. Tibai
Corp. John J. Mown	Pvt. Michael A. Colabella
Corp. Leo Null	Pvt. William T. Cravens
Pvt. Alfred W. Dickens	

This Roll of Honor does not contain the names of individuals who became casualties while assigned to an organization that was attached to the Division Artillery.

APPENDIX C

DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS of MEMBERS of the 43rd DIVISION ARTILLERY

The following lists of decorations and citations were received by members of the Division Artillery during World War II. It gives some idea of the many and varied services performed by the Artillery during the War.

This list is unfortunately incomplete but serves to demonstrate the courage and resourcefulness shared equally by enlisted men and officers.

While every effort was made over a period of four years, and every available record carefully checked to make lists

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

complete, there are unquestionably omissions. Rather than holding up the publication of the history for further search, the author had in mind the issuing of a supplemental list later on to include all omissions reported.

This list does not include the names of individuals who were assigned to an organization that was attached to the Division Artillery.

43D DIVISION ARTILLERY HDQTS. AND HDQTS. BATTERY

NEW GEORGIA OPERATION

SILVER STAR

Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker, Oak Leaf Cluster

LEGION OF MERIT

Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker

Lt. Col. Edward W. Berry

Col. Chester A. Files

1st Lt. Frederick C. Burnaby

M/Sgt. Everett J. Bartlett

LISTED AS WOUNDED IN ACTION

(These men are entitled to the award of the *Purple Heart*, although no citation orders are on file. Some probably received this award after evacuation.)

1st Lt. Robert E. Jones

Corp. Clifton Vasso

T 4 Austin V. Chatterton

Pfc. Samuel Wolkin

LUZON CAMPAIGN

SILVER STAR

Tec 5. Vernon G. Davis

LEGION OF MERIT

Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker, Oak Leaf Cluster

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker

Col. Chester A. Files

Lt. Col. Edward W. Berry

Lt. Col. Waldo H. Fish, Jr., Oak Leaf Cluster

Major Franklin E. Carpenter

Major William N. Bailey

Capt. Frederick C. Burnaby

Capt. Paul B. Lyle

M/Sgt. Gustave Wahl

Tec 3. Millard H. Whitaker

AIR MEDAL

Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker

Capt. Robert D. Martz

1st Lt. Elmer F. Mindedahl

DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

LISTED AS WOUNDED IN ACTION

(These men are entitled to the award of the *Purple Heart*, although no citation orders are on file. Some probably received this award after evacuation.)

Capt. John J. Flynn	1st Lt. John H. Soellner
Capt. Robert D. Martz	Corp. Anthony A. Amato
1st Lt. Elmer F. Mindedahl	Corp. Paul C. Salisbury

KILLED IN ACTION

(A soldier killed in action is awarded a *Purple Heart* posthumously and the award is issued by The Adjutant General to the next in kin.)

The following soldiers of Division Artillery Hdqts. and Hdqts. Battery were killed in action.

Capt. Barrett L. Tyler	Tec 5. Emile N. Labrecque
S/Sgt. Walter P. Casey	Tec 5. Armand J. Macedo
Corp. Willard Crabtree	Tec 5. Henry S. Longo

192D FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

NEW GEORGIA OPERATION

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

Capt. William B. Craig

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Lt. Col. George M. Hill	Major John S. Blair, 3rd
Lt. Col. Stephen L. Nichols	S/Sgt. Walter J. C. Fesik

USAFISPA COMMENDATION

Capt. George T. Fielding, III	S/Sgt. Walter J. C. Fesik
-------------------------------	---------------------------

PURPLE HEART

Capt. William B. Craig	Pfc. Charles P. Roberts
Pfc. Edward W. Grabowski	Pfc. Charles W. Santarsiero

NOTE: The following is quoted from the Organizational History 1 July 1943 to 30 September 1943;

"Wounded. 1 Officer, Air Observer, shot down in flames while observing Artillery fire. Head wound. (Capt. Craig). 17 Enlisted Men; 5 from howitzer premature burst, the rest from daisy cutter bombs which landed in area."

Only names available are those listed above under Purple Heart.

LUZON CAMPAIGN

SILVER STAR

1st Lt. Billy R. Mahaffay
Sgt. Carman F. DeMattio
Corp. John J. Mown (Posthumous Award)
Corp. Leo Null (Posthumous Award)

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

BRONZE STAR MEDAL W/OAK LEAF CLUSTER

Lt. Col. Stephen L. Nichols

Major Nathan M. Southwick, Jr.

Lt. Col. John S. Blair, III

Capt. Earl G. Johnson

Capt. William G. McIntire

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Maj. Hugh E. Ryan

Maj. Delmar F. Parker

Capt. William B. Craig

1st Lt. Bernard J. Vinyard

1st Lt. John M. Feeney

1st Lt. Thomas K. Lewis

1st Lt. Seymour S. Rosen

1st Lt. Raymond W. Starostka

1st Lt. James E. Sweeney

1st Lt. William J. Walsh

W.O. Earl A. Taylor

1st Sgt. Flavio W. Foglio

T/Sgt. Joseph DePanfilis

T/Sgt. Salvator A. Mauro

T/Sgt. Clifton M. Baugham

Tec 3. Francis F. Kappelman

S/Sgt. Herbert M. Heebar

S/Sgt. Samuel J. LaLima

S/Sgt. Stuart I. Hodge

S/Sgt. Harold J. Cahill

S/Sgt. Alphonse F. Amsnay

S/Sgt. Frederick Skagen

S/Sgt. Clifford Dixon

S/Sgt. Frank K. Illk

Sgt. Fred M. Spinks

Pfc. Thomas K. Gardner

Sgt. John M. Higgins

Tec 4. Max D. Coffey

Tec 4. James L. Reese

Tec 4. Morris Goodman

Tec 4. George F. Slade

Tec 4. Armand F. Maida

Tec 4. Conrad Schwartz

Corp. Louis Firmani

Corp. Merl F. Gillett

Corp. Walter J. Bucko

Corp. Thomas W. Geddas

Corp. William F. Kennedy

Corp. Charles H. Storey

Corp. Joseph E. Andrzacik

Corp. John C. Basile

Corp. George J. Botchis

Tec 5. Kenneth C. Lancaster

Tec 5. Daniel Chester

Tec 5. William S. Barber

Tec 5. Harry R. Richwine

Tec 5. Drake L. Page

Tec 5. Pasquale W. Mappa

Tec 5. Menno L. Bargaen

Tec 5. Lawrence Checco

Tec 5. Ervin J. Sawvell

AIR MEDAL W/OAK LEAF CLUSTER

1st Lt. Julian H. Marshall, Jr.

AIR MEDAL

1st Lt. Thomas G. Hardie

PURPLE HEART

Lt. Col. Stephen L. Nichols

Major John S. Blair, 3rd

Major Hugh E. Ryan

Corp. Thomas P. Morton

Tec 5. Anthony A. Augustine

Pfc. Joseph M. Crawford

KILLED IN ACTION

A soldier killed in action is awarded a *Purple Heart* posthumously and the award is issued by the Adjutant General to the next of kin.

DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

The following soldiers of the 192d Field Artillery Battalion were killed in action.

Capt. George T. Fielding, II	Pfc. Angelo Copice
1st Lt. John L. Bivenour	Pfc. Stephen J. Tibai
Corp. John J. Mown	Pvt. Michael A. Colabella
Corp. Leo Null	Pvt. William T. Cravens
Pvt. Alfred W. Dickens	

103D FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

SINKING OF THE S. S. PRESIDENT COOLIDGE, 26 Oct. 1942

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

Capt. Elwood J. Euart (Posthumous award)

SOLDIERS MEDAL

Capt. Warren K. Covill	W.O. Robert H. Moshimer
1st Lt. Ward D. MacDonald	Tec. Sgt. J. S. Flanigan, Jr. (Citation)

LETTER OF COMMENDATION, From Commanding General, USAFISPA

Lt. Col. William B. McCormick

NEW GEORGIA OPERATION

SILVER STAR

1st Lt. Robert S. Pine

LEGION OF MERIT

1st Lt. Robert S. Pine

BRONZE STAR

Lt. Col. William B. McCormick	1st Lt. Johns H. Congdon, II
Sgt. Howard H. Calhoun, Jr.	

43RD DIVISION COMMENDATION

1st Lt. Robert W. Patenge

Listed as WOUNDED IN ACTION

(These men are entitled to the award of the *Purple Heart*, although no citation orders are on file. Some probably received this award after evacuation.)

S/Sgt. Robert J. Rodericks	Corp. Vincent J. Spallone
Tec 4. Dino J. DaDalt	Pvt. Richard H. Flood
Tec 5. Frank Dubish	Pvt. Stanley J. Ochol
Pvt. Paul C. Wight	

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

LUZON CAMPAIGN

SILVER STAR

Capt. Ralph D. Newby

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Lt. Col. William B. McCormick	(Oak Leaf Cluster)
Lt. Col. Robert W. Kenny	(Oak Leaf Cluster)
Capt. Robert W. Patenge	Sgt. Robert T. Johnson
Capt. Ward D. MacDonald	Tec 5. Edward E. Silva
Capt. Arthur W. Hoyt	Tec 5. Joseph Zapotosky
1st Lt. Charles H. Schubert	Corp. Emmett W. Ballree
S/Sgt. Ralph F. Whitehead	Corp. Lincoln B. Tillson
S/Sgt. Richard D. Anderson	Corp. Hugh B. Sims
S/Sgt. Clarence G. Proulx	Corp. Hyram H. Berry
Sgt. Dennis E. Hanley	Tec 4. Fred Atkinson
Sgt. Michael R. Peters	Tec 4. Charles A. Trice
Sgt. Arthur M. Cousineau	Pfc. Manning Simon
	Pfc. Jefferson D. Farris

AIR MEDAL

Capt. Ralph D. Newby	1st Lt. Duncan H. Doolittle
	1st Lt. Raymond C. Chapman

PURPLE HEART

Capt. Robert S. Pine (with Oak Leaf Cluster)	
Capt. Philip A. Hoghaug	Corp. Frank R. Mallette
1st Lt. Charles H. Schubert	Corp. Paul K. Schilling
1st Lt. Robert J. Vilyus	Tec 4. Samuel W. Kelly
2nd Lt. John H. Flanagan, Jr.	Pfc. Thomas R. Petrarca
2nd Lt. William S. Chaney	Pfc. Savino Basso
S/Sgt. Harry S. Miller	Pfc. James T. Jackson
Sgt. Albert J. Del Monte	Pfc. William E. Hillis
Sgt. Randolph Baggesen	Pfc. Andrew L. Mailhoit
Sgt. Arthur M. Cousineau	Pfc. Roy C. Seely
Sgt. Herve C. Pelland	Pvt. Roland J. Jarvis
Sgt. James J. Watson	Pvt. Robert G. LaValley
Tec 5. Victor G. Robbins	Pvt. Charles W. Guyette
Tec 5. Elroy H. Farley	Pvt. John G. McFarland
Tec 5. John H. Ivey	Pvt. Wesley W. Reinhart
Corp. Edgar F. Williams	Pvt. Dale R. Gerber
	Pvt. Clayton F. Orne

Listed as WOUNDED IN ACTION

(These men are entitled to the award of the *Purple Heart*, although no citation orders are on file. Some probably received this award after evacuation.)

1st Lt. Morris Krapes	Corp. John J. McAloon
Sgt. Joseph J. Hogan	Pvt. Anthony F. DeFrancisco
Corp. Wallace T. Bowden	Pvt. Joseph B. Lane

DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

KILLED IN ACTION

A soldier killed in action is awarded a *Purple Heart* posthumously and the award is issued by the Adjutant General to the next in kin.

The following soldiers of the 103d Field Artillery Battalion were killed in action.

Capt. Elwood J. Euart	Tec 4. Charles L. Urban
1st Lt. Dominic J. Braucci	Tec 5. Wilbert E. Goldsby
Corp. James J. Carlone	Pfc. Jerry Di Girolamo
Corp. Matthew A. Melone	Pfc. William A. Dulong
Corp. Daniel L. Roberts	Pfc. Walter Gula
Pvt. Albert Silva	

152D FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

NEW GEORGIA OPERATION

DISTINGUISHED CROSS ; LEGION OF MERIT ; PURPLE HEART

Capt. Harold A. Slager (Posthumous awards)

LEGION OF MERIT

Capt. Arthur H. Norwood

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Lt. Col. Norman E. Whitney (with bronze oak-leaf Cluster)	
Major Waldo H. Fish	1st Lt. Ernest M. Meier
Major Robert W. Kenny	S/Sgt. Bernard D. McLellan
Major Samuel F. Pearson	F/Sgt. Paul J. Cassidy
Capt. Thomas A. DeWolfe	T/Sgt. Newell F. Littlefield
Capt. Robert S. Hussey	Tec 4. Orin W. Farrington
1st Lt. Riner E. Deglow	Tec 4. Charles L. Boyle

PURPLE HEART

Corp. Alton F. Sabin

LUZON CAMPAIGN

SILVER STAR

Lt. Col. Wilber E. Bradt (with two oak leaf clusters)

Maj. Roger L. Averill	1st Lt. Jack G. Binks
Capt. Robert S. Hussey	S/Sgt. Roland E. Lancaster
1st Lt. John W. Wyne	Corp. Carroll J. Soucie
Pfc. Alfred M. Cookson	
Pvt. Nicholas C. Cordell (Posthumous award)	

LEGION OF MERIT

Lt. Col. Wilber E. Bradt

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

BRONZE STAR

Lt. Col. Wilber E. Bradt (bronze oak leaf cluster)	
Maj. Waldo H. Fish	
Maj. John R. Taylor, Jr.	
Capt. Robert L. Averill	
Capt. William G. McIntire	
Capt. Frank J. Burns (with bronze oak leaf cluster)	
Capt. Benjamin G. Green	
Capt. Riner E. Deglow (bronze oak leaf cluster)	
1st Lt. Charles W. Rice	
1st Lt. Alvin A. Brooks	Corp. Riley A. Duncan
W. O. (jg) Charles J. McClusky	Corp. Arthur Klish
S/Sgt. George Soliani	Corp. Joseph B. Farwig
S/Sgt. Dominic A. Setaro	Corp. Seldon Rogers
S/Sgt. James R. Wade	Corp. Phillip K. Ross
S/Sgt. Arthur Gendreau	Corp. William Wilson, Jr.
S/Sgt. Louis G. Hayduk, Jr.	Corp. Enrico P. Montenarino
S/Sgt. Lyle E. Schlag	Corp. Alexander Kagan
S/Sgt. Robert E. Kimbrough	Corp. Russell Storrs
M/Sgt. Arthur L. Hartman	Corp. Robert D. MacMurdy
M/Sgt. Wilbur O. Allen	Tec 5. Louis T. Cote
Sgt. Lewis Pentz	Tec 5. Richard C. Adams
Sgt. Warner M. Palmer, Jr.	Tec 5. Lawrence J. Sutton
Sgt. Henry W. Kuchinski	Tec 5. Oden C. Frye
Sgt. Charles A. Cefalo	Tec 5. Frank J. Traygis
Sgt. Milton Freeborn	Tec 5. Charles E. Peebles
Sgt. Delbert Boyles	Tec 5. Charles Tomsikin
Tec 3. John V. Merry	Pfc. Robert R. Stearns
Tec 4. George M. McNeil	Pfc. Roland F. Higgins
Tec 4. George M. Paine	Pfc. Walter V. Toffey
Tec 4. Charles E. Sinn	Pfc. Philip E. Buck
Tec 4. William R. McCurdy	Pfc. Joseph Sadowski
Tec 4. Kenneth Richards	Pfc. Eugene G. Santos
Tec 4. Edgar Rushton	Pfc. Edgar J. Dupuis
Corp. Robert A. Hughes	Pfc. James J. Fogarty
Corp. Laurence S. Segar	Pfc. Stanley Skawrenski
Corp. Joseph McLeod	Pfc. Alfred M. Cookson
Corp. Everett H. DeGrasse	Pfc. Everett C. Farren
Corp. Norman Brilliant	Pfc. Philip A. Shaw

AIR MEDAL

1st Lt. Bernard E. W. Meadows (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
1st Lt. John W. Wyne

DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

43D DIVISION COMMENDATION

S/Sgt. Ronald R. Robertson	Tec. 5. Eluterio Giacobelli
Sgt. Harold Titcomb	Pfc. Eugene C. Church
Tec 4. Lenard N. Uness	Pfc. Clarence E. Gaddis
Corp. Earl Baumann	Pfc. Mathew J. Genorese
Corp. Bennie Rakes	Pfc. Andrew Michra
Corp. Carl Steward	Pfc. Raymond Smith

PURPLE HEART

Capt. Frank W. Burns	Sgt. George W. Presbrey
1st Lt. John R. Pavka	Sgt. Harry Bruckner
2nd Lt. Stanley A. Stachelski	Tec 4. Alex V. Brodalen
2nd Lt. Charles W. Rice	Tec 4. Lionel O. Dupuis
2nd Lt. Sidney J. Leventhal	Corp. Norman L. Brilliant
S/Sgt. James M. Emerson	Corp. Carroll J. Soucie
S/Sgt. Odber N. Tibbetts	Corp. William C. Wilson
Sgt. Lewis A. Pentz	Corp. Duncan A. Chambers

Corp. Clarence A. McLeod (with Oak Leaf Cluster)

Corp. Riley A. Duncan	Pfc. Jack L. Corbet
Corp. Russell G. Storrs	Pfc. Homer R. Tibbetts
Tec 5. Louis T. Cote	Pfc. Steven B. Sojka
Tec 5. Walter J. Rulka	Pfc. Vincil D. Swank
Tec 5. Carl R. Wetzel	Pfc. Stanley J. Stanlewicz
Tec 5. Frank J. Traygis	Pfc. Robert R. Stearns
Pfc. Bertrain S. Bishop	Pvt. John C. Sheahan
Pfc. Edwin M. Barry	Pvt. Carlton M. Schofield

LISTED AS WOUNDED IN ACTION

(These men were entitled to the award of the *Purple Heart*, although no citation orders are on file. Some probably received this award after evacuation.)

Pfc. Herbert Espling
Pfc. William D. Sutton

KILLED IN ACTION

A soldier killed in action is awarded a *Purple Heart* posthumously and the award is issued by The Adjutant General to the next in kin.

The following soldiers of the 152nd Field Artillery Battalion were killed in action.

Capt. Harold A. Slager	Sgt. Marion C. Shaffer
1/Sgt. James D. Sturdivant	Corp. Isaac E. Clewley
Sgt. Frederick Blackburn	Pvt. Nicholas C. Cordell
Pvt. David Sweat, Jr.	

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

169TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION NEW GEORGIA OPERATION

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

Capt. Edward W. Wild
1st Lt. Donald L. Mushik

Pvt. Stanley L. Ginish
Pvt. Fred L. Junkin

SILVER STAR

2nd Lt. Arthur F. Malone (Posthumous Award)

Sgt. Joseph A. O'Connor
Sgt. Edmund P. Rodrigues
Sgt. Norman L. LaRose
Corp. Samuel B. Morgan
Corp. Delmont Caffey

Corp. Robert H. Sturges
T4. Donald W. Remington
T4. Edward J. Hawkins
Pfc. Joseph L. Bouchard
Pfc. Robert O. Wright

LEGION OF MERIT

Lt. Col. Wilber E. Bradt
Capt. Dixwell Goff
S/Sgt. Malcolm F. Manchester

Capt. James R. Ruhlin
S/Sgt. Eli L. Curtis

SOLDIERS MEDAL

Sgt. Halsey W. Buehler

BRONZE STAR

Major Rene L. DeBlois
Major William N. Bailey
Major Richard N. Rainey
Capt. Francis A. McAuliffe
Capt. Earl R. Davis
Capt. Edward J. Keegan
Capt. Michael J. Butler
Capt. Edgar S. Downing
Capt. Theodore J. Zabrowski

1st Lt. Ewart M. Blain
1st Lt. Joseph W. Mayne
1st Lt. Carl A. Newman
S/Sgt. Charles R. Brightman
S/Sgt. John K. Burrows
S/Sgt. Henry P. Maynard
Sgt. Norman J. LaRose
Corp. Stanley R. Nixon
Pfc. F. C. Burkett, Jr.

USAFISPA COMMENDATION

Sgt. Norman J. LaRose
Sgt. Henry P. Maynard

T5. Stanley R. Nixon
Pfc. F. G. Burkett

XIV CORPS COMMENDATION

Corp. Charles Peronni

43D DIVISION COMMENDATION

Major Rene L. DeBlois
Capt. Dixwell Goff
Capt. Edward J. Keegan
Capt. Michael J. Butler
Capt. Andrew F. Maffei
1st Lt. Joseph W. Mayne
1st Lt. Carl A. Newman
1st Lt. Robert W. Patenge
1st Lt. Theodore J. Zebrowski

1st Sgt. Louis F. Fountain
M/Sgt. Louis A. Calderone
T/Sgt. James T. Hussey
S/Sgt. John K. Burrows
S/Sgt. Sidney J. Theriot
S/Sgt. Colin C. Gill
S/Sgt. Sarando Sarganis
S/Sgt. Michael Taborrelli

DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Pvt. Holt R. Barker	T/5 Walter W. Jollie
S/Sgt. Joseph F. Weincak	T/5 Ernest G. Rousseau
S/Sgt. John T. Winkler	T/5 Leslie E. Shippe
Sgt. Antonio Capaldi	T/5 James H. Swan
Sgt. Victor Gauthier	Pfc. Grady S. Clarke
Sgt. George F. Howarth	Pfc. Onezime A. Istre
Sgt. Edward F. Perry	Pfc. Triffle Lisce
Corp. Harold A. Brown	Pfc. Joseph R. Zito
Pvt. Phillip J. Cayford	

LISTED AS WOUNDED IN ACTION

(These men are entitled to the award of the *Purple Heart*, although no citation orders are on file. Some probably received this award after evacuation.)

Major Wilber E. Bradt	Corp. Samuel B. Morgan
1st Lt. Donald Mushik	Corp. Richard Aldrich
1st Lt. Edward W. Wild	T/5 Frank J. Chevalier
2nd Lt. Ralph M. Pacella	Pfc. Thurman E. Miner
Sgt. Halsey W. Buchler	Pfc. John Zapetacky
Sgt. George W. Decoteaux	Pfc. Jack T. Dickerson
Corp. Clyde R. Mills	Pfc. Earl E. Bonawitz
Pvt. Anthony De Maio	

NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

PURPLE HEART

Lt. Col. Rene L. DeBlois

LUZON CAMPAIGN

SILVER STAR

Lt. Col. Wilber E. Bradt (Oak Leaf Cluster)
Capt. Wilton H. Bremer
Capt. William A. Farrell
1st Lt. Hugh B. Miller (Posthumous Award)
1st Lt. Dudley J. Goul
Sgt. John Cordiero (Posthumous Award)
Corp. Colin C. Gill
Pfc. Sylvester M. Beckman (Posthumous Award)

LEGION OF MERIT

Capt. William A. Farrell

PHILIPPINE MEDAL FOR MERIT W/CLUSTER

Capt. William A. Farrell

SOLDIERS MEDAL

Capt. Sidney P. Lanier

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

BRONZE STAR

Lt. Col. Rene L. DeBlois (Oak Leaf Cluster)

1st Lt. MacDonald Lowe	Tec 5. Anthony Otrando
M/Sgt. Louis A. Caldarone	Tec 5. Leonard H. DeBroack, Jr.
S/Sgt. John T. Winkler	Tec 4. Raymond V. Menzhuber
S/Sgt. Phillip W. Comella	Tec 4. Raymond J. Adams
S/Sgt. Michael B. Tadorelli	Corp. Frank Perry, Jr.
Sgt. Harry I. Collison	Pfc. Oscar L. Harpin
	Pfc. Maurice Nathan

AIR MEDAL

1st Lt. MacDonald Lowe
1st Lt. Raymond W. Leyden


PURPLE HEART

Capt. Francis A. McAuliffe	Capt. John R. Pavka
Capt. Wilton H. Bremer	1st Lt. Sidney P. Lanier
Capt. Andrew F. Maffei	1st Lt. Edward J. Brichta
Capt. Charles J. D'Avanzo	1st Lt. Joseph W. Mayne
Capt. Norman H. Bennett	1st Lt. Robert W. Gibbons
Capt. Edgar S. Downing	2nd Lt. Danforth J. Knafla
	2nd Lt. Arthur Seidman


2nd Lt. William F. Straight (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
2nd Lt. Ralph A. Call, Jr. 2nd Lt. Kenneth V. Swanson
S/Sgt. Felix S. Kryk

S/Sgt. Charles J. Monahan (with Oak Leaf Cluster)	
S/Sgt. Michael B. Tadorelli	Corp. Joseph L. Pariseau
S/Sgt. Harold J. Kee	Corp. Hallie M. Guy
S/Sgt. Raymond B. Peterson	Corp. Ulies F. Kinney
S/Sgt. Robert J. Dube	Corp. Joseph F. Di Tullio
M/Sgt. Louis A. Caldarone	Corp. Charlie B. Bostwick
T/Sgt. James T. Hussey	Corp. Donald B. Maurice
T/Sgt. Gerard F. Easton	Corp. Henry Prescott
Sgt. Harvey H. Banks	Corp. Frank Perry, Jr.
Sgt. Ernest C. Elliott	Corp. Melvin W. Pflum
Sgt. Duane C. Sjoblom	Corp. Edward P. Rablowsky

Corp. Carlo A. Gazerro (with Oak Leaf Cluster)	
Corp. Kenneth Maynard	Tec 5. Arthur E. Botello
Tec 5. Westley D. Lonergan	Tec 5. James D. Hoffman
Tec 5. Patrick J. Burke	Tec 5. William J. Skidd, Jr.
Tec 5. Warren E. Rideout	Tec 5. Otis P. Tucker
	Tec 5. Charles J. Giesler



Gen. Barker awarding the Legion of Merit to Colonel Chester A. Files.
15 January 1944



General H. R. Barker awards D.S.C. to Lt. Wm. B. Craig.
November 11, 1943



Captain James R. Ruhl awarded the Legion of Merit by Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker, 20 Jan. 1944.



1st Lt. Donald L. Almsnik, 169th P. A. Bn., awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker, 27 Dec. 1943.



Pvt. Stanley L. Ginish, Pawtucket, R. I., of the 169th Field Artillery, receives congratulations from Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker, Acting CG of the 43rd Division, upon receiving the DSC for heroism in action during the New Georgia Campaign, 14 July 1943. 20 January 1944



Private First Class, Fred L. Junkin of the 169th Field Artillery, receives congratulations from Brig. Gen. H. R. Barker, acting CG of the 43rd Division, upon receiving the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism at New Georgia, Solomon Islands, on 14 July 1943.



1st Lieut. Thomas S. Hardie receiving the Air Medal from Brigadier General Harold R. Barker, Division Artillery Commander of the 43rd Infantry "Winged Victory" Division at Camp LaCroix, Luzon, P. I. The award was given for heroic achievement against the enemy during the Luzon liberation campaign. 8/12/45

DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Tec 5. Rene D. Grenier (with Oak Leaf Cluster)	
Tec 5. Joseph P. Coleman	Pfc. Romeo G. Bessette
Tec 4. Louis J. Pannozzo	Pfc. Fred Polistena
Tec 4. William F. Taylor	Pfc. Marion W. Bargeron
Tec 3. Fred P. Najam	Pfc. Peter P. Serafin
Pfc. Eugene H. Bernatches	Pfc. John H. Woerner
Pfc. James H. Kirk	Pfc. Sidney H. Wood
Pfc. Lloyd M. Thacker	Pfc. Nicholas R. Bruscella
Pfc. Merle L. Burtchell	Pfc. Henry V. Binette
Pfc. Simon Singer	Pfc. Alve W. Cassity
Pfc. Austin N. Ray	Pfc. Robert I. Curler
Pvt. Joseph Albanese (with Oak Leaf Cluster)	
Pvt. Richard H. Peterson	Pvt. Tony Cariaga
Pvt. Clyde E. Guidry (with Oak Leaf Cluster)	
Pvt. Clarence R. Ryan	Pvt. John R. Cole
Pvt. James C. Fuquay	Pvt. Lorenzo DiBenedetto
Pvt. James J. McCarthy, Jr.	
Pvt. William A. Birmingham (with Oak Leaf Cluster)	
Pvt. David B. Morris	Pvt. William E. Wimmer
Pvt. Mike Swaiko	Pvt. James E. Worley
Pvt. Samuel J. Laregina	Pvt. Vincent J. Guider
Pvt. Phillip D. Jones	

KILLED IN ACTION

A soldier killed in action is awarded a *Purple Heart* posthumously and the award is issued by The Adjutant General to the next in kin.

The following soldiers of the 169th Field Artillery Battalion were killed in action.

1st Lt. N. J. Heidelberger	Sgt. John Cordeiro
1st Lt. Hugh B. Miller	Corp. Norbert F. McElroy
1st Lt. Earl M. Payne	Pfc. Sylvester M. Beckman
2d Lt. Arthur F. Malone	Pfc. Warren A. Harvey
2d Lt. Warren Mansfield	Pvt. La Verne M. Anderson
S/Sgt. Richard Gray	Pvt. Willard Chandler

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

APPENDIX D

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made to the State of Rhode Island, whose generous appropriation made possible the publishing of this history in order that the record of the 43rd Division Artillery be preserved.

To Honorable James H. Kiernan, majority leader in the House of Representatives, Rhode Island Legislature, for sponsoring in both the House and Senate the resolution to publish the 43rd Division Artillery History.

To Lt. Col. J. Gardner Conway, a member of the 43rd Division Artillery during World War II, who acted as liaison officer between Honorable James H. Kiernan and General Barker.

The author is deeply grateful for the valuable assistance given by the following members and friends of the 43rd Division Artillery: —

Robert W. Kenny, Brig. Gen. USAR. (Ret), for the editing of the entire manuscript and advice on format. Without his supervision the manuscript in many places would have lacked continuity.

Chester A. Files (Maj. Gen. RING. Ret.) for counsel and supervision of many details in the publishing of the history.

Col. Mario DeMaio, USA. and his Staff for the preparation of all the Maps and Overlays. This work was an outstanding contribution to the history.

Lt. Don C. Thorndike, former member of the 103d F. A., for advice and valuable assistance in the publishing of the history. His personal interest in the history was far beyond what normally could be expected from a publisher.

Col. Joseph E. Zimmer, for supplying most important Artillery records from the Division files in Hartford and other valuable assistance.

Col. Edward W. Berry for proof-reading and approving the manuscript, which includes many of his reports.

Capt. Frederick C. Burnaby, former Asst. S-3 Div. Art. for proof-reading the entire manuscript.

Col. Sidney P. Marland, Jr. former G-3, 43d Inf. Div. for supplying material covering operations of the 43d Inf. Div. during World War II.

Col. H. C. Marden former G-I of the 43d Div. for supplying material from Division files.

Col. Eugene S. Tarr, USA., C.O. U.S. Army Records Center, St. Louis, Mo. for supplying information and records that were available in no other office.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Kenneth H. Bitting, a former member of the 103d F. A., for contacting Col. Tarr and clerical assistance.

Col. Eugene A. Wright, Judge, Superior Court of the State of Washington, for furnishing information with reference to the language section, 43d Division.

General Walter Krueger USA. (Ret) for his permission to quote from his book "From Down Under to Nippon".

Maj. Gen. John M. Willems USA. for obtaining Maps of Luzon, Philippines.

Col. Henry L. Shafer USA. (Ret) for information concerning the 136th F. A. Bn. and 37th Division Artillery.

Brig. Gen. Waldo H. Fish, Jr. RING. for his review of material.

Col. William B. McCormick AUS (Ret) for information pertaining to the 103d F. A. Bn.

Col. Norman E. Whitney AUS (Ret) for information pertaining to the 152d F. A. Bn.

Col. George M. Hill AUS (Ret) for information pertaining to the 192d F. A. Bn. and the supplying of Records.

Col. S. L. Nichols USA. (Ret) for information pertaining to the 192d F. A. Bn.

To the following who made available all pictures used in the History.

Special Credit should be given to the Signal Corps U.S.A. for its permission to use their pictures which are used extensively throughout the history.

Mrs. Donna Traxler, Army Photographic Agency, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Major Loren P. Fitzgerald, Signal Corps USA. Commanding Army Photographic Agency, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Major Gerald Fink U. S. Marine Corps. Head, Historical Branch, G3 Division.

I am particularly grateful to Mrs. Gertrude Frances Kenny for successful and efficient typing of this manuscript.

My deepest gratitude is due to my wife, Beatrice Winter Barker, for her encouragement, assistance and patience during the period of preparation of the History;

To my son, Thomas Richards Barker, a Lieutenant and Artillery Forward Observer in the European Theater during World War II, who was awarded the Silver Star and Bronze Star Medals for gallantry in action, and his wife Sally West Barker, a Wave in the U. S. Navy during World War II, for their stimulating interest;

To my daughter, Ann-Francis Barker Ford, wife of Commander William R. Ford, U. S. Navy, for her assistance in contacting personnel at the Pentagon, Washington, D. C., in regard to records and photographs for the history.

HISTORY OF THE 43D DIVISION ARTILLERY

APPENDIX E

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The author's thanks are due to the Publishers and the Army, Navy and Marine Departments who have allowed him to take quotations from the following Documents and Books.

DOCUMENTS

Biennial Report of The Chief of Staff of The United States Army to The Secretary of War.

1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945.

Marland, Sidney P. Jr., Colonel, G.S.C., A.C. of S., G-3. *Historical Report, Luzon Campaign 43d Infantry Division.*

BOOKS

Feldt, Eric A., O.B.E., Royal Australian Navy. *The Coastwatchers.* Oxford University Press, New York, N. Y.

Field, James A. Jr., *The Japanese at Leyte Gulf.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J.

Freidin, Seymour and William Richardson. *The Fatal Decisions.* William Sloane Associates, New York, N. Y.

Hayashi, Saburo, *Kogun, The Japanese Army In The Pacific War.* Marine Corps Association, Quantico, Va.

Isley, Jeter and Philip A. Crowl. *The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J.

Krueger, Walter, General, U.S.A. *From Down Undre To Nippon.* Association of the U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

Miller, John Jr. *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive and Cartwheel: Reduction of Rabaul.* U. S. Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific. Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, Washington 25, D. C.

Morison, Samuel E., *Breaking The Bismarcks Barrier and New Guinea and The Marianas.* Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass.

Rentz, John N., Major, USMCR., *Marines in the Central Solomons.* Hdqts., U. S. Marine Corps., Washington 25, D. C.

Smith, Robert Ross, *The Approach to the Philippines.* U. S. Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific. Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, Washington 25, D. C.

Zimmer, Joseph E., Colonel Infantry (Ret) *History of the 43d Infantry Division.* State Armory, Hartford, Conn.

NOTES

APPENDIX F

NOTES

CHAPTER I ORGANIZATION

1. From *The Fatal Decisions*, Wm. Sloane Associates, New York
2. From *Report of the Chief of Staff U.S.A. 7/1/41 to 6/30/43*

CHAPTER V GUADALCANAL — RUSSELL ISLANDS

1. From U. S. Army in W. W. II,
Guadalcanal, The First Offensive

CHAPTER VI THE NEW GEORGIA OFFENSIVE

1. From *Breaking The Bismarcks Barrier*, by S. E. Morison
2. From *Marines in the Central Solomons*.
3. From *The Coastwatchers*, by Eric A. Feldt
4. From U.S. Army in W.W. II, *Cartwheel: Reduction of Rabaul*
5. From *Marines in the Central Solomons*

CHAPTER VIII THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

1. From U. S. Army in W. W. II,
The Approach to the Philippines
2. From the *History of the 43d Infantry Division* by J. Zimmer
3. From *Down Under To Nippon* by Gen. Krueger
4. From the *History of the 43d Infantry Division* by J. Zimmer.
5. From U. S. Army in W. W. II,
The Approach to the Philippines

CHAPTER IX LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN

1. From *Report of the Chief of Staff U.S.A. 7/1/41 to 6/30/45*.
2. From *The Japanese at Leyte Gulf* by James A. Field, Jr.
3. From *Report of the Chief of Staff U.S.A. 7/1/41 to 6/30/45*
4. From *Down Under To Nippon* by Gen. Krueger
5. From *Report of the Chief of Staff U.S.A. 7/1/41 to 6/30/45*.
6. From *Kogun (The Japanese Army in the Pacific War)*
7. From *Historical Report, Luzon Campaign, 43d Infantry Division* compiled by Sidney P. Marland, Jr., Colonel,
G.S.C., A. C. of S., G-3
8. Same as note 7
9. Same as note 7
10. Same as note 7
11. Same as note 7
12. Same as note 7

